Skip to main content

Architectural Ethics: A Phenomenological Perspective

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
  • 1244 Accesses

Part of the book series: Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey ((COPH,volume 11))

Abstract

Many voices indicate that the moral mission of architecture has been in decline for the last few decades. Numerous theorists have been promoting a vision of architecture as an intellectualized, abstract exploration of form. Others suggest that architecture should investigate intelligence, projection, and innovation, following the market dynamics and seemingly staying away from a fruitless social critique. In both the aesthetic and the pragmatist approach, architects tend to see architecture as an autonomous discipline, reducing its dependency on external conditions – such as social, cultural, and political factors. Accordingly, the gap between architecture and the world of its users expands. Is there a way out of these difficulties? Ethics indubitably needs a more prominent place within architectural discourse.

This chapter addresses architectural ethics from a phenomenological perspective, referring primarily to the works of Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer. It argues that phenomenology – allowing for and demanding a non-reductionist account of the human environment – provides viable foundations for ethical discourse in architecture.

The article begins with a brief introduction to phenomenology, and then concentrates on two themes. Firstly, it discusses architecture as a part of the lifeworld and argues for the importance of context in architectural design. Secondly, it theorizes architectural ethics within the phenomenological concept of practice. The way of defining practice and specifying its priorities very much determines the way of approaching ethical issues within any given conceptual framework. The chapter concludes with an example of architectural practice (the Rural Studio) that reflects phenomenological ideas.

The essence of architecture lies not in its usefulness – the purely practical solutions it offers to the human need of shelter – but in the way it meets the much profounder spiritual need to shape our habitat. Mario Botta

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    It may be argued that even though Martin Heidegger did not develop an explicit ethics, he clearly indicates a way of grounding ethical reflection in ontology. In “Letter on Humanism” (1947), referring to the Greek concept of ethos, he sees the ethical way of being as cultivating “what belongs to man in his essence” (Heidegger 1977a: 233). In this perspective ethical reflection is inseparable from the reflection on the conditions of human life (on the “essence” of our being-in-the-world). Heidegger states: “If the name ‘ethics,’ in keeping with the basic meaning of the word ethos […] then that thinking which thinks the truth of Being as the primordial element of man […] is in itself the original ethics.” (Heidegger 1977a: 235) Accordingly, ethical discourse in architecture should be based on a wider project of understanding of human existence, supplemented with a thorough reflection on architecture’s role in the human world.

  2. 2.

    There can be distinguished two major phenomenological traditions: descriptive and interpretive (hermeneutic). Descriptive phenomenology refers primarily to the early works of Husserl. Interpretive tradition emerged from the works of Heidegger – in his view, phenomenology went beyond the description of lived experience and aimed at its ontological interpretation.

  3. 3.

    Although Heidegger does not use the term “lifeworld,” this concept may be identified, for instance, when one looks closer at Heidegger’s description of the fourfold (Geviert). The elements of the fourfold (the divinities, the sky, the mortals, the earth) may be linked to the spiritual, cultural, social, and environmental aspects of the human world. The fourfold is defined in opposition to the idea of Gestell (an imposition of techno-scientific, instrumental rationality upon the world as a whole).

  4. 4.

    For instance, in Book i, Chapter ii, Vitruvius discusses the fundamental principles of architecture: Order, Arrangement, Eurythmy, Symmetry, Propriety, and Economy. While the former four principles refer to the formal properties of an architectural object, the latter two deal foremost with the ways of using architectural artifacts and the given cultural/economic/physical context of architecture.Vitruvius defines “propriety” as “this perfection of style which comes when a work is authoritatively constructed on approved principles. It arises from prescription, from usage, or from nature. From prescription, in the case of hypaethral edifices, open to the sky, in honour of Jupiter Lightning, the Heaven, the Sun, or the Moon. […] Propriety arises from usage when buildings having magnificent interiors are provided with elegant entrance-courts to correspond; for there will be no propriety in the spectacle of an elegant interior approached by a low, mean entrance. […] Finally, propriety will be due to natural causes […] in using an eastern light for bedrooms and libraries, a western light in winter for baths and winter apartments, and a northern light for picture galleries and other places in which a steady light is needed. Economy in Vitruvius’ view “denotes the proper management of materials and of site, as well as a thrifty balancing of cost and common sense in the construction of works.” (Vitruvius, De Architectura: Book i, Chapter ii.)

  5. 5.

    The famous Vitruvian triad (firmitas, utilitas, venustas, i.e. firmness, commodity, and delight; or: durability, convenience, and beauty – depending on the translation) may be related to Aristotle’s subcategorization of “science” (dianoia) as theoretical, practical, and poetical. De Architectura, understood through this perspective, points at three interrelated, irreducible dimensions of architecture: theoretical, ethical, and creative aspects.

  6. 6.

    This use of the term “science” carries a different meaning than that covered today by the term “scientific method.” Generally speaking, Aristotle makes science coextensive with reasoning. In the early Greek understanding, science (dianoia) referred to the capacity for, process of, or result of discursive thinking, in contrast with the immediate apprehension that is characteristic of noesis (understanding as the ability to sense, or know something immediately; intuitive thinking).

  7. 7.

    The term poiesis is here central – in the Greek understanding it referred generally to the activity of making; not only the act of creating a work of art, but any everyday object such as a chair or a building. Since poiesis is defined by its external product, the human capability for “making” is perfected not in the activity of making itself, but in the quality, pathos, or usefulness of its product.

  8. 8.

    Mockbee recollects, “I’d like to explain a little about my background – about being blessed and cursed as a Southerner […] As Southerners our heritage is part of our character. My great grandfather rode with the Mississippi Partisan Rangers under Colonel W. C. Falkner and later General Forrest. These were my heroes growing up in the segregated South of the 1950s and the early 1960s. […] Later I came to realize the contradictions that existed in my world. That I came from an isolated area where lies were being confronted with the truth. That I came from the American South which was attached to fiction and false values and a willingness to justify cruelty and injustice in the name of those values” (Mockbee 1998).

Bibliography

  • Allsopp, B. (1974). Towards a humane architecture. London: Frederick Muller.

    Google Scholar 

  • Aristotle, S. (1998 [350 BC]). Nicomachean ethics. Mineola: Dover Thrift Editions.

    Google Scholar 

  • Blake, P. (1977). Form follows Fiasco: Why modern architecture hasn’t worked. Boston: Little, Brown & Company.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dean, A (2001). The hero of Hale county: Sam Mockbee: An interview [On-line]. Available at: http://archrecord.construction.com/people/interviews/archives/0102mockbee-1.asp . Retrieved December 12, 2009.

  • Dean, A., & Hursley, T. (2002). Samuel Mockbee and an architecture of decency. The rural studio. New York: Princeton Architectural Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dean, A (2004). Samuel Mockbee: A life’s work. aia gold medal winner [On-line]. Available at: http://archrecord.construction.com/features/aiaAwards/04mockbee-1.asp. Retrieved September 11, 2009.

  • Dripps, R. D. (1999). The first house: Myth, paradigm and the task of architecture. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eisenman, P. (1984). The end of the classical: The end of the beginning, the end of the end. Perspecta 21: The Yale Architectural Journal, 21, 154–173.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gadamer, H. G. (1981). Reason in the age of science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gadamer, H.-G. (1993). The enigma of health: The art of healing in a scientific age. Oxford: Polity Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gadamer, H. G. (2004 [1960]). Truth and method. London/New York: Continuum.

    Google Scholar 

  • Giedion, S. ((2002)[1962]). Space, time and architecture. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Guba, E., & Lincoln, Y. (1994). Competing paradigms in qualitative research. In N. Denzin & Y. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research (pp. 105–117). Thousand Oaks: Sage.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harries, K. (1983). Thoughts on a non-arbitrary architecture. In D. Seamon (Ed.) (1993), Dwelling, seeing and designing. Toward a phenomenological ecology (pp. 41–59). New York: State University of New York Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harries, K. (1997). The ethical function of architecture. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heathcott, J. (2007, May 18). The value of architecture. Metropolis Magazine. Available at: http://www.metropolismag.com/story/20070518/the-value-of-architecture. Retrieved November 16, 2008.

  • Heidegger, M. (1962 [1927]). Being and time. New York: Harper & Row.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heidegger, M. (1977a [1947]). Letter on humanism. In M. Heidegger (Ed.), Basic writings (pp. 189–242). London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heidegger, M. (1977b [1951]). Building, dwelling, thinking. In M. Heidegger (Ed.), Basic writings (pp. 319–340). London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hudson, J. (2001). Samuel Mockbee. http://bombsite.com/issues/75BOMB75/Spring2001. [On-line]. Available http://bombsite.com/issues/75/articles/2380. Retrieved September 19, 2009.

  • Husserl, E. ((1970) [1936]). The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology. Evaston: North Western University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ihde, D. (1993). Philosophy of technology: An introduction. St. Paul: Paragon House Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ivy, R. (2002) Sambo. Night in Gotham.Architectural Record. 12. Available at: http://archrecord.construction.com/news/fromTheField/archives/021217.asp. Retrieved February 11, 2009.

  • Jacobs, J. (1961). The death and life of great American cities. New York: Random House.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kearney, R. (Ed.). (2001). Continental philosophy in the 20th century. New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Koolhas, R., & Mau, B. (1995). S, M, L, XL. New York: Monacelli Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lyotard, J. -F. (1988). Domus and megalopolis. In N. Leach (1997) (Ed.), Rethinking architecture: A reader in cultural theory. London/New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Madison, G. B. (2001). The politics of postmodernity: Essays in applied hermeneutics. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Merleau-Ponty, M. (2002 [1945]). Phenomenology of perception. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mockbee, S. (1998) The rural studio. Architectural design, everyday and architecture. Available at: http://speakingoffaith.publicradio.org/programs/ruralstudio/mockbee_ruralstudio.shtml. Retrieved January 22, 2010.

  • Pérez-Gómez, A. (1983). Architecture and the crisis of modern science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ray, N. (Ed.). (2005). Architecture and its ethical dilemmas. New York: Taylor & Francis.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ryker, L. (1995). Mockbee Coker: Thought and process. New York: Princeton Architectural Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schön, D. (1983). The reflective practitioner. New York: Basic Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sirowy, B. (2010). Phenomenological concepts in architecture. Towards a user-oriented practice. A Ph.D. dissertation. Oslo: Oslo School of Architecture and Design.

    Google Scholar 

  • Somol, R., & Whiting, S. (2002). Notes around the Doppler effect and other moods of modernism. Perspecta 33: The Yale Architectural Journal.

    Google Scholar 

  • Spector, T. (2001). The ethical architect: The dilemma of contemporary practice. New York: Princeton Architectural Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Till, J. (2009). Architecture depends. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tippett, K. (2007) “Architecture of decency” Radio programme, 15.11. Available: http://speakingoffaith.publicradio.org/programs/ruralstudio/index.shtml. Retrieved December 15, 2009.

  • Tschumi, B. (1994). Architecture and disjunction. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Venturi, R. (1966). Complexity and contradiction in architecture. New York: The Museum of Modern Art Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vesely, D. (2004). Architecture in the age of divided representation. The question of creativity in the shadow of production. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vitruvius (15 bc) De architectura (English trans: Ten Books on Architecture).

    Google Scholar 

  • Wasserman, B., Sullivan, P., & Palermo, G. (2000). Ethics and the practice of architecture. New York: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Willis, J., Jost, M., & Nilakanta, R. (2007). Foundations of qualitative research: Interpretive and critical approaches. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Beata Sirowy .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2014 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Sirowy, B. (2014). Architectural Ethics: A Phenomenological Perspective. In: Fløistad, G. (eds) Ethics or Moral Philosophy. Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey, vol 11. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6895-6_13

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics