Abstract
From the different classes of hard cases as mentioned in the previous chapters, it does not follow that the aim of the law to govern the process of technological innovation, necessarily falls short in coping with its own purpose. Yet, such hard cases on the legal personhood of robots, clauses of immunity, artificial agency in contracts, and new types of responsibility for the behaviour of others, raise the further issue on whether and how the existence and content of the law can always be determined on the basis of its own sources. Before the hard cases of today’s laws of robots, the aim of this chapter is to determine which cases of robotics should be given priority and, moreover, whether one right answer is legally at hand, whether legal systems are open to alternative solutions, or political decisions need to be taken via international agreements. In light of the current debate on whether a certain type of drone design should be considered legal in the field of military robotics technology, for example, a reasonable compromise on the basis of legal expertise is at stake.Whereas both the UN General Assembly and its Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon have been quiescent up to the date of publication of this book, it is noteworthy that the condition of immunity for the use of robot soldiers today goes hand in hand with no-fault responsibility for the employment of both industrial and service robots in the civil sector.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
See above in the introduction to Chap. 2.
- 3.
See above in Sect. 2.3.
- 4.
See above in Sect. 2.3.2.
- 5.
- 6.
See above in Sect. 2.3.2.
- 7.
Jonathan Hutson, Sudan Armed Forces Implicated in Video Captured by their Own Drone, retrieved at http://satsentinel.org/blog/sudan-armed-forces-implicated-video-captured-their-own-drone on 25 April 2012.
- 8.
See above in Sect. 4.5.1.
- 9.
See above in Sect. 5.3.1.
- 10.
See above in Sect. 6.1.
- 11.
See above in Sects. 4.3.2 and 5.4.2.
- 12.
See above in Sect. 2.3.1.
- 13.
In Bingham (2011: 48–49), italics added.
- 14.
See above Sect. 5.4.1.
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Pagallo, U. (2013). Law as Meta-technology. In: The Laws of Robots. Law, Governance and Technology Series, vol 10. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6564-1_6
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