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Scientific Explanation pp 39–69Cite as

A Toolbox for Describing and Evaluating Explanatory Practices

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Abstract

In this chapter we develop a toolbox for analysing explanatory practices. An analysis of an explanatory practice can be either a description or a description plus an evaluation (one cannot evaluate without knowing what is going on, so evaluation without description is impossible). Because explanations consist of an explanans and an explanandum, we need tools for analysing both parts. In Sect. 3.2 we introduce a set of important types of why-questions, ordered in four main categories. This section offers tools for describing the explananda that scientists are dealing with. In Sects. 3.3 till 3.6 we present possible formats for answers to explanation-seeking questions (each section is about one of the main categories distinguished in Sect. 3.2). That completes the toolbox we need for describing explanatory practices. Section 3.7 adds a normative component: tools for the evaluation of explanatory practices. These tools take the form of clusters of evaluative questions (we will present five such clusters).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Elster clarifies the Kitty Genovese case as follows: “For more than half an hour on March 27, 1964, thirty-eight respectable, law-abiding citizens in Queens, New York, watched a killer stalk and stab a woman in three separate attacks in Kew Gardens. Twice their chatter and the sudden glow of their bedroom lights interrupted him and frightened him off. Each time he returned, sought her out, and stabbed her again. Not one person telephoned the police during the assault; one witness called after the woman was dead”. (2007, p. 12, footnote 6)

  2. 2.

    “Smoking causes lung cancer” is meaningless, while “Smoking causes lung cancer in humans” is a meaningful claim.

  3. 3.

    The questions of 4.2 and 4.3 have “rather than” as connective, the questions in 4.4 have “while”. So it is easy to keep them apart.

  4. 4.

    These ideas were first presented in Weber et al. 2012.

  5. 5.

    Halonen and Hintikka (1999) claim that unification is a criterion for theory choice but that it has nothing to do with explanation. They arrive at this wrong conclusion because they neglect unification acts. See Weber and Van Dyck (2002) for an argument against the position of Halonen and Hintikka.

  6. 6.

    We cannot argue for this position here extensively. We refer the reader to Weber and Van Bouwel (2009) in which it is argued that it is very difficult to find intuitively acceptable non-causal explanations.

  7. 7.

    A necessary cause is a positive causal factor as defined in Sect. 3.3.2 which satisfies an extra condition: P K(E) = 0.

  8. 8.

    Such an exhaustive account, if possible at all, would require a full length monograph in itself. However, in Weber, Gervais & Van Bouwel (ms.) the issue of interesting versus non-interesting explanation-seeking questions is discussed in more detail. Among other things, this paper contains more examples of guidelines.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Ghent University (UGent), Blandijnberg 2, Ghent, B-9000, Belgium

    Erik Weber, Jeroen Van Bouwel & Leen De Vreese

Authors
  1. Erik Weber
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  2. Jeroen Van Bouwel
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  3. Leen De Vreese
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Correspondence to Erik Weber .

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Weber, E., Van Bouwel, J., De Vreese, L. (2013). A Toolbox for Describing and Evaluating Explanatory Practices. In: Scientific Explanation. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6446-0_3

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