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Theories of Scientific Explanation

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Book cover Scientific Explanation

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Abstract

In this chapter we first summarize the ideas of Carl Hempel, the godfather of this subdomain of the philosophy of science (Sect. 1.2). Then we present the problems that other philosophers have raised in connection with Hempel’s theory of explanation (Sect. 1.3). Subsequently, we clarify how the major research traditions in the field that have emerged after Hempel, can be seen as different reactions to these problems (Sect. 1.4). Finally, we discuss two of these reactions in more detail: Philip Kitcher’s unification account in Sect. 1.5 and Wesley Salmon’s causal-mechanical account in Sect. 1.6.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    An explanans may be true even if we don’t have any evidence in favour of it. And a well-confirmed explanans may be false (which means that our evidence is incomplete and therefore misleading). For these reasons, Hempel introduces two concepts based on the concept of potential explanans.

  2. 2.

    Note that Feynman assumes that the mirrors are flat.

  3. 3.

    Based on research done by Ghent University in the Spring of 2012.

  4. 4.

    We have adapted the notation in the quotation to ours—we also slightly altered Hempel’s original condition, in which he allows for premises not contained in the knowledge system at the time of the explanation, since this doesn’t make a difference to our discussion.

  5. 5.

    Some nice footage illustrating these problems has been produced by the Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science of Ghent University and is available at http://www.caeits2011.ugent.be/.

  6. 6.

    This is the the probability of the explanandum given the causes mentioned in the explanans.

  7. 7.

    As a historical note, we should add that Kitcher’s account builds on, amends and extends Michael Friedman’s (1974) unificationist account.

References

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Correspondence to Erik Weber .

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Weber, E., Van Bouwel, J., De Vreese, L. (2013). Theories of Scientific Explanation. In: Scientific Explanation. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6446-0_1

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