Abstract
In this chapter I deal with the participation of ordinary Rwandans in the genocide. The contributions of several authors (Lemarchand, Uvin and Strauss) are examined and criticized. Using recent contributions from economics and the social sciences (Akerlof, Axelrod and Kuran) I regard participation as norm abiding behavior under elite and peer-pressure in a rational choice framework.
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Notes
- 1.
Uvin P., Aiding Violence, p. 67.
- 2.
Brush S.G., Dynamics of Theory Change in the Social Sciences, Relative Deprivation and Collective Violence, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 40, No. 4, December 1996.
- 3.
The well-known 1984 National Agricultural Survey is a good example of this school.
- 4.
Skocpol T. States and Social Revolutions: a Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China, Cambridge University Press, 1979.
- 5.
Gupta 1990, p. 114.
- 6.
De Lame D. (1996), Une Colline entre mille ou me calme avant la tempete, Transformations et Blocages du Rwanda Rural, Musée Royale de l’ Afrique Centrale, Tervuren, postface p. 295.
- 7.
Lemarchand, R., Reconsidering Rwanda and the Holocaust, Journal of Genocide Research, September 2002.
- 8.
Lemarchand R., Reconsidering Rwanda and the Holocaust, Journal of Genocide Research, September 2002.
- 9.
Reyntjens F., l’Afrique des Grands Lacs en crise, 1994, p. 301–302.
- 10.
We remark that the November 1993 coup d’état in Burundi was followed by large scale killing of Hutu and Tutsi, occuring without interference of the international community. Several scholars deduce from this that the Habyarimana regime learned from this that ‘Tutsi’ (remark the generalisation) could not be trusted. Other scholars remark that they may have learned something else: that the killing of large numbers of people could take place without firm international response. We remind that by the time of the coup d’état the Habyarimana regime had already organised the killing of 2,000 Tutsi in several Rwandan communes.
- 11.
Janky B. and Takacs K., Social Control, Participation in Collective Action and Network Stability.
- 12.
For simplicity we assume the intrinsic utility function has a single peak.
- 13.
Kuran mentions the Asch and Milgram experiments to support his view that people fear isolation in groups.
- 14.
But see below for the influence well-placed people can have on group-decisions.
- 15.
In this threefold conception, Kuran recognises the economic, social and psychological sources of utility.
- 16.
Kuran (1995, 64) models reputational utility as a function of mean all public preferences or mean public opinion.
- 17.
Guichaoua (2010, 124–125) for example describes how the extremist radio RTLM reported vividly on the death of the Burundese president and interpreted the meaning of his assassination for Rwanda.
- 18.
This does not mean that 90% of the population become active killers, it suffices that they accept the new norm.
- 19.
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Verwimp, P. (2013). Collective Action, Norms and Peasant Participation in Genocide. In: Peasants in Power. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6434-7_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6434-7_8
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