Abstract
In this paper, I argue that some of the disagreements about the continuity or discontinuity of human moral life with that of animals can be assuaged by drawing a distinction between two senses in which someone can be a ‘moral being’: being a moral agent (i.e. being morally responsible for one’s action) and being a moral judge (i.e. being able to form moral judgments). More precisely, I argue that it is not necessary to be a moral judge to be a moral agent, because moral actions (actions we are morally responsible for) don’t need to stem from moral judgments. Consequently, I argue that, even if moral judgment is highly likely to be a human specificity, moral agency is something that we might share with other animals, given that the only requisite to be a moral agent is to be able to be motivated by the fact that other entities do have interests.
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- 1.
Famous psychological studies led by Turiel suggest that, by the age of 4, children are able to understand moral concepts and use them to form moral judgments. For example, they are able to distinguish moral rules (that are universally valid and independent from authority) from conventional rules (that are only locally valid and dependent on authority) or prudential rules (see Turiel 2002 for a review).
- 2.
For example, patients with lesions in the prefrontal cortex are still able to make moral judgments, but are much less prone to act according to these judgments, due to emotional and motivational deficits (Damasio 1995). Patients suffering from aboulia, who have lost all motivation, are also plausible cases of people able to form moral judgments but lacking moral motivations (Marit and Wilkosz 2005).
- 3.
I define ‘moral agency’ as the ability to be morally responsible for (some of) one’s action and ‘moral ignorance’ as the inability to judge something as morally right or wrong.
- 4.
- 5.
This case is inspired by Singer (1972).
- 6.
One might say that these appreciations are not really moral and that the praise we attribute agents for caring about their relative has nothing to do with moral praise. This is indeed a possibility; nevertheless it seems me very unlikely: a mother who doesn’t care about her children elicits from us blame that is very likely moral blame.
- 7.
The results obtained by Pizarro et al. show that many participants considered Jack responsible and blameworthy for having smashed the window. That Jack had not taken the time to realize that what he was doing was wrong was no excuse.
- 8.
One could consider that these example are not sufficient because it is one thing to evaluate persons (as nice or vicious) and another to attribute them responsibility for their action. This is true. Nevertheless, I think we also have the intuition in those cases that these persons are responsible for their actions. Let’s take the reverse psychopath and imagine that he helps you (by saving your life). It seems quite natural to feel grateful and consider that you owe him something. But this feeling cannot be accounted by a mere judgment of ‘niceness’ (you are not indebted to all people you find nice): rather, you would feel indebted in such a case because the reverse psychopath deserves credit for what he did – that is to say: because he was responsible for what he did.
- 9.
For a development of the psychological theory underlying this account of moral responsibility, see Cova et al. (submitted).
- 10.
Some (e.g. Knobe 2006) have argued that our theory-of-mind is already suffused with moral considerations and evaluations, which goes directly against our argument that presupposes that theory of mind is independent from the faculty of moral judgment. However, there are reasons to doubt this claim. See Cova et al. (2010) for a rebuttal.
- 11.
Does it mean that empathy is necessary to be a moral agent? No, empathy is what makes us care about others’ interests and be good moral agents. But, a bad moral agent, one who doesn’t care about others, is still a moral agent, so empathy is not necessary to be a moral agent. Note also that empathy might not even be necessary to be a good moral agent: there might be other emotional or cognitive ways to care about others’ interests.
- 12.
This claim immediately raises several questions. (i) First, if Jakie is really a moral agent, does that immediately make him a moral patient (i.e. someone it is wrong to harm). I was tempted to say ‘yes’ until an anonymous reviewer gave me the following argument I found quite convincing: ‘Are all moral agents moral patients? Probably, but: one could imagine someone who has racist beliefs and thinks, for example, that black people are inferior to white people, and thus think that they do not bear rights in the same way and to the same extent as white people, yet think that they are equally morally responsible for their actions, and are bound by the same norms. In this case, being a moral agent would not be sufficient for being a moral patient. This option does not seem conceptually incoherent.’ (ii) Second, if Jakie can be responsible for his action, does it necessarily entail that he can be punished? I am not sure either, for punishment seems to require something more than moral responsibility. For example, it seems to me that we want the people we punish to understand why they are punished and that it is essential for punishment that the punished one understands it as such. This intuition is supported by experimental studies showing that people consider revenge satisfactory only if the offender understands (and acknowledges) that revenge was taken against him because and in virtue of a prior unfair behaviour (Gollwitzer and Denzler 2009). If it is the case, then one has to be both a moral agent and a moral judge to be an appropriate target of punishment. (Even if you take a consequentialist stance on punishment, then you must admit that an agent that cannot understand why he has been punished and on whom deterrence won’t work is not a suitable target of punishment.)
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Acknowledgments
This research was supported in part by a Grant from the French Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR) (ANR Blanche: SoCoDev). I thank François Jacquet and an anonymous reviewer for useful comments on previous versions of this paper.
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Cova, F. (2013). Two Kinds of Moral Competence: Moral Agent, Moral Judge. In: Musschenga, B., van Harskamp, A. (eds) What Makes Us Moral? On the capacities and conditions for being moral. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, vol 31. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6343-2_7
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