Abstract
Hilary Kornblith’s naturalised epistemology centrally involves the thesis that knowledge is a natural kind like water or aluminium. In his most recent work, Kornblith seeks to defend this thesis by attacking what he perceives to be the central alternative: Edward Craig’s “genealogy of knowledge”. As Kornblith sees it, Craig is committed to the view that knowledge is an artificial or social kind. I argue, against Kornblith, (1) that Kornblith’s favoured account of natural kinds —the account developed by Richard Boyd—does not allow for a distinction between natural and social kinds: monarchy, liberalism, and even Napoleon are all natural kinds for Boyd; (2) that Kornblith misunderstands Craig’s genealogy: Craig is not committed to the view that knowledge is not a natural kind; Craig’s account of how the concept of knowledge has developed is compatible with the idea that we often use “knowledge” as a natural kind term; and (3) that Craig’s genealogy is in fact congenial to the general programme of naturalised epistemology.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Barnes, B. 2000. Understanding agency: Social theory and responsible action. London: Sage.
Beebe, J.R. 2012. Social functions of knowledge attributions. In Knowledge ascriptions, ed.M. Gerken and J. Brown, 220–242. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bloor, D. 1991. Knowledge and social imagery, 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Boyd, R. 1980. Scientific realism and naturalistic epistemology. In PSA: Proceedings of the biennial meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 2: Symposia and invited papers, 613–662.
Boyd, R. 1983. On the current status of the issue of scientific realism. Erkenntnis 19: 45–90.
Boyd, R. 1988. How to be a moral realist. In Essays on moral realism, ed. G. Sayre-McCord, 181–228. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press.
Boyd, R. 1991. Anti-foundationalism and the enthusiasm for natural kinds. Philosophical Studies 61: 127–148.
Boyd, R. 1999. Homeostasis, species, and higher taxa. In Species: New interdisciplinary essays, ed. R.A. Wilson, 141–185. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Craig, E. 1990. Knowledge and the state of nature: An essay in conceptual synthesis. Oxford: Clarendon.
Craig, E. 1993. Was wir wissen können. Frankfurt a. M: Suhrkamp.
Craig, E. 2007. Genealogies and the state of nature. In Bernard Williams, ed. A. Thomas, 181–200. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dupré, J. 1993. The disorder of things: Metaphysical foundations of the disunity of science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fricker, M. 2007. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fricker, M. 2010. Scepticism and the genealogy of knowledge: Situating epistemology in time. In Social epistemology, ed. A. Haddock, A. Millar, and D. Pritchard, 51–68. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gelfert, A. 2011. Steps to an ecology of knowledge: Continuity and change in the genealogy of knowledge. Episteme 8: 67–82.
Hacking, I. 2007. Natural kinds, rosy dawn, scholastic twilight. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82(61): 203–239.
Kappel, K. 2010. On saying that someone knows: Themes from Craig. In Social epistemology, ed. A. Haddock, A. Millar, and D. Pritchard, 69–88. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kelp, C. 2011. What’s the point of ‘Knowledge’ anyway? Episteme 8: 53–66.
Kornblith, H. 1993. Inductive inference and its natural ground: An essay in naturalistic epistemology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kornblith, H. 2002. Knowledge and its place in nature. Oxford: Clarendon.
Kornblith, H. 2006. Appeals to intuition and the ambitions of epistemology. In Epistemology futures, ed. S. Hetherington, 10–25. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kornblith, H. 2007a. Naturalism and intuitions. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74: 27–49.
Kornblith, H. 2007b. The metaphysical status of knowledge. Philosophical Issues 17: 145–164.
Kornblith, H. 2011. What should we care about the concept of knowledge? Episteme 8: 38–52.
Kusch, M. 2009. Testimony and the value of knowledge. In Epistemic value, ed. A. Haddock, A. Millar, and D. Pritchard, 60–94. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kusch, M. 2011. Knowledge and certainties in the epistemic state of nature. Episteme 8: 6–23.
Neta, R. 2006. Epistemology factualized: New contractarian foundations for epistemology. Synthese 150: 247–280.
Pritchard, D. 2009. Knowledge. Houndmills: Palgrave MacMillan.
Williams, B. 2002. Truth and truthfulness: An essay in genealogy. Princeton/Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Acknowledgements
For discussions relating to the topic of this paper I am grateful to Miranda Fricker, Hilary Kornblith, Martin Lenz, Veli Mitova, Adela Roszkowski, the students of my class on Craig in the Winter term 2009–2010, and audiences in Amsterdam and Berlin.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordecht.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Kusch, M. (2013). Naturalized Epistemology and the Genealogy of Knowledge. In: Lenz, M., Waldow, A. (eds) Contemporary Perspectives on Early Modern Philosophy. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 29. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6241-1_6
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6241-1_6
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-007-6240-4
Online ISBN: 978-94-007-6241-1
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)