Skip to main content

Self-Organization: What Is It, What Isn’t It, and What’s It Got to Do with Morphogenesis?

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Social Morphogenesis

Abstract

This chapter provides basic definitions of self-organization and the terms most frequently associated with it within the theory from which it originated: Complexity theory. Using these definitions, I draw out the consistent meta-theoretical assumptions on which the assertions and practice of complexity theory in the natural sciences have been based. One in particular is highlighted: the causal relation between elements and relations between relations. This, I argue, is a crucial ontological premise of self-organization. In relating self-organization and morphogenesis, I concentrate on this broadly shared meta-theoretical assumption, showing that the causal social relation has also been consistently important as an ontological premise in morphogenesis. The chapter concludes that only through philosophical analysis of the possibility of a meta-theory underpinning the concepts of both naturalistic complexity and social science can self-organization be successfully integrated into social science.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 109.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 139.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 139.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    For a critical realist, much of the work on complexity speaks only to the empirical domain. There also exist the domains of the actual and real. Observations and remarks limited to the empirical domain fail to examine questions about mechanisms—or ‘laws’—which would question the intransitive ‘reality’ of what is experienced, or to give the transitive experience an intransitive referent. The failure to examine this essential area of the production of knowledge is highlighted briefly in a later section, but to discuss it in-depth would constitute a separate paper.

  2. 2.

    Traffic studies in complexity are enduring examples, from mentions in Sterman’s paper Learning about Complex Systems (1994, p. 299) to Chowdhury et al. (2000), Statistical physics of vehicular traffic and some related systems to numerous mention in Boccara (2003) Modeling Complex Systems. This object of study precedes any mention of it in the social science literature, where it is frequently used as a link to justify application to social phenomena, a justification that is erroneous based upon these studies that are purely mathematical.

  3. 3.

    Note also the lack of claim about large, overarching ‘systems’.

  4. 4.

    Mainzer (2007) points out that there are two kinds of self-organization: Dissipative and conservative. It is dissipative with which this chapter is concerned and which are more often referenced in the complexity literature.

  5. 5.

    Bak’s self-organizing critical systems are essentially systems in the process of self-organizing, no finer understanding is necessary here.

  6. 6.

    Note physics and not complexity, an illustration that the propositions of self-organization were becoming more accepted.

  7. 7.

    The property of self-similarity underlies power-law relationships.

  8. 8.

    I make no refutation of the necessary condition.

  9. 9.

    Here Galam refers to Sokal’s ‘hoax’ paper ‘Transgressing the boundaries: toward a transformative hermeneutics of quantum gravity’, and the subsequent books by Sokal and Bricmont (1998, 1999) in which they detail the misunderstandings of physics that have been used in postmodern social science in this manner.

  10. 10.

    Do not denote any importance to the use of the word complexity in this quote, I make no insinuation that Archer is talking of the same thing that I am.

  11. 11.

    Although, as should by now be apparent, its claims to be a theory are somewhat tenuous.

  12. 12.

    See Miller and Page (2007), in particular Sect. 9.6 in which we are not only invited to see parallels between general assertions and detailed mathematical models, but also to reverse the philosophical rationale for applying models at all.

  13. 13.

    Though in saying this I make no claim that the nature of the relation between these different objects will be the same.

References

  • Adriani P, McKelvey B (2006) From Gaussian to Paretian thinking: causes and implications of power-laws in organizations. Organ Sci 20(6):1053–1071

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Anderson PW (1972) More is different. Science 177:393–396

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Archer, M.S. (1984). The social origins of educational systems. Sage Publications, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Archer MS (1988) Culture and agency. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Archer MS (1995) Realist social theory: the morphogenetic approach. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Archer MS (2000) Being human: the problem of agency. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Archer MS (2003) Structure, agency and the internal conversation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Bak P (1996) How nature works. Springer-Verlag, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Bak P, Tang C, Wiesenfeld K (1987a) Self-organized criticality. Phys Rev A 38(1):364–374

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bak P, Tang C, Wiesenfeld K (1987b) Self-organized criticality: an explanation of 1/f noise. Phys Rev Lett 59(4):381–384

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barabási L (2009) Scale-free networks: a decade and beyond. Science 325:325–326

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barabási L (2011) Bursts. Dutton, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Bhaskar R (1979) The possibility of naturalism. Routledge, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Boccara N (2003) Modeling complex systems. Springer, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Cilliers P (1998) Complexity and postmodernism. Routledge, Abingdon

    Google Scholar 

  • Chowdhury D, Santern L, Schdschnieder A (2000) Statistical physics of vehicular traffic and some related systems. Phys Rep 329:199–329

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Donati P (2011) Relational sociology. Routledge, Abingdon

    Google Scholar 

  • Dreyfus HL (1999) What computers still can’t do: a critique of artificial reason. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Dyson F (1978) Characterizing irregularities. Science 200:677–678

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Galam S (2004) Sociophysics: a personal testimony. Phys A 336:49–55

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Galam S (2006) Pourquoi des électons se seres? Le monde, 20

    Google Scholar 

  • Gell-Man M (1988) The concept of the institute. In: Pines D (ed) Emerging synthesis in science. Addison Wesley, Boston

    Google Scholar 

  • Gell-Man M (2002) What is complexity? In: Curzio AQ, Fortis M (eds) Complexity and industrial clusters. Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg

    Google Scholar 

  • Lazer D et al (2009) Computational social science. Science 323:721–723

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mainzer K (2007) Thinking in complexity. Springer, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Mandelbrot BB (1977) The Fractal geometry of nature. Freeman, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Miller JH, Page SE (2007) Complex adaptive systems: an introduction to the computational models of social life. Princeton University Press, New Jersey

    Google Scholar 

  • Newman MEJ (2005) Power-laws, Pareto distributions and Zipfs law. Contem Phys 46:323–351

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nicolis G, Prigogine I (1989) Exploring complexity. Freeman, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Prigogine I, Stengers I (1984) Order out of chaos. Bantam, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Sokal A, Bricmont J (1998) Fashionable nonsense: postmodern intellectuals’ abuse of science. Picador, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Sokal A, Bricmont J (1999) Fashionable nonsense: postmodern intellectuals’ abuse of science. Picador, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Sornette D (2003) Critical phenomena in natural sciences: chaos, fractals, self organization, and disorder: concepts and tools. Springer, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Sterman JD (1994) Learning in and about complex systems. Syst Dyn Rev 10(2–3):291–330

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • van Fraassen BC (1980) The Scientific Image. Clarendon, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Wagner HR (1964) Displacement of scope: a problem of the relationship between small-scale and large-scale social theories. Am J Sociol 36(6):571–584

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Kate Forbes-Pitt .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Forbes-Pitt, K. (2013). Self-Organization: What Is It, What Isn’t It, and What’s It Got to Do with Morphogenesis?. In: Archer, M. (eds) Social Morphogenesis. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6128-5_6

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics