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Limits of Constraint Satisfaction Theory of Coherence as a Theory of (Legal) Reasoning

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Coherence: Insights from Philosophy, Jurisprudence and Artificial Intelligence

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 107))

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to explore the limits of the constraint satisfaction theory of coherence (CsCS) as a basis for a model of legal argumentation concerning questions about norms. The main thesis defended here is that CaCS is a promising basis for such model, but it has to overcome certain important objections. This paper focuses on objections of a technical nature, related to the problems of representation of arguments and relations between arguments in the framework of CaCS. The paper outlines possible ways of dealing with these difficulties and indicates a perspective of further research on the subject.

Michał Araszkiewicz thanks the participants of the “Artificial Intelligence, Coherence and Judicial Reasoning” workshop (ICAIL 2011, Pittsburgh, USA, June 10) for their comments concerning argument of this paper. Special thanks are due to Jaap Hage for numerous discussions related to coherence (also as constraint satisfaction) in general and to this paper in particular. I am also grateful to Stefano Bertea for his comments on this paper.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Amaya (2007, 2011), Araszkiewicz (2010), see also Amaya and Šavelka in this volume.

  2. 2.

    Cf. Hage (2005) and Hage in this volume.

  3. 3.

    Such theories may have different methodological characteristics, namely they can aim at description or justification as regards human cognition (I am grateful to Hage for this remark). However, this very general level can be seen as encompassing all these different types of theories.

  4. 4.

    Hage (2005), Amaya (2007), Araszkiewicz (2010); also Amaya, Hage and Šavelka in this volume.

  5. 5.

    The presentation here is based mainly on the authoritative exposition in Thagard (2000).

  6. 6.

    Thagard’s analysis of Paul Bernardo’s case in the domain of ethics is a good example, cf. Thagard (2000, 143).

  7. 7.

    Our example is based on continental legal procedures and not on common law legal procedures, which include trial before the jury.

  8. 8.

    But, presumably, not earlier. Let us not that CaCS, as defined above is not constructive; it does not specify a procedure of adding new elements to the initial set E.

  9. 9.

    The link between coherent legal theories and persuasive legal arguments was emphasized by L. Thorne McCarty (1997, 221), who also acknowledged difficulties in accounting for the concept of coherence in the field of legal reasoning.

  10. 10.

    Cf. for instance Pollock (1995, Chap. 3), Prakken (1997), Hage (2003), Sartor (2005, Chap. 2).

  11. 11.

    This reference will be discussed more broadly below.

  12. 12.

    The definition of undercutting will be given below with an example.

  13. 13.

    Note that the order of elements is not important because the (in)coherence relations are symmetric in CaCS.

  14. 14.

    The issue of bipolarity of CaCS (that is, the problem of whether positive constraints and negative constraints are reducible to each other, are they mutually definable and so on) is largely unexplored. For a general account of bipolarity cf. Dubois and Prade (2006) and for an extensive discussion of bipolarity in the context of abstract argumentation frameworks—Amgoud et al. (2008).

  15. 15.

    AAF; most famously, Dung (1995).

  16. 16.

    Cf. many examples in Thagard (2000).

  17. 17.

    By ‘introducing structure’ I mean here imposition of rigours of certain logical language on elements and constraints in CaCS framework.

  18. 18.

    Cf. insightful comments on this subject by Hage in this volume.

  19. 19.

    I do not introduce formalism to make the argument more readable.

  20. 20.

    And let us emphasize that the propositions e1 and e3 (that is (1) and (5)) should be symmetrically deductively constrained.

  21. 21.

    It is worth noting that generative power of coherence was emphasized by Hage, cf. Hage (2005, 54), and the example discussed on preceding pages when Hage shows how filling in the ‘missing links’ makes a theory of a case more and more coherent.

  22. 22.

    And to an adopted algorithm for the computation of coherence. Cf. Thagard (2000, 25 ff.).

  23. 23.

    For instance, recently, Bex and Verheij (2011).

  24. 24.

    More about the necessity of accounting for these two layers of legal reasoning may be found in Amaya in this volume.

  25. 25.

    At this point we can mean either the criteria accepted by the court but violated by it or some higher criteria than actually applied ones.

  26. 26.

    The possible structure of these constraints will be dealt with in the next subsection.

  27. 27.

    Cf. Araszkiewicz (2010, 14–15), for introduction of another element type related to factor-based reasoning.

  28. 28.

    Introducing syntactical rigor could be helpful as regards the verification of whether there is a relation of (in)coherence between two elements or not.

  29. 29.

    For instance due to political processes like European integration, cf. Hesselink (2001).

  30. 30.

    On the different types of priority between the rules cf. Sartor (2005, Chap. 7).

  31. 31.

    Similar extensions have been recently formulated in the context of Abstract Argumentation Frameworks. Cf. Nielsen and Parsons (2007).

  32. 32.

    A similar representation of undercutting argumentation, albeit in different formal setting, is discussed by Thomas Gordon and Douglas Walton is their seminal paper on Carneades argumentation system, cf. Gordon and Walton (2006, 202).

  33. 33.

    Advanced in the field of AI and Law by Bex and Verheij (2011).

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  1. Department of Legal Theory, Faculty of Law and Administration, Jagiellonian University, Bracka 12, Kraków, 31-005, Poland

    Michał Araszkiewicz

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Correspondence to Michał Araszkiewicz .

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  1. , Department of Legal Theory, Jagiellonian University, Bracka 12, Kraków, 31-005, Poland

    Michał Araszkiewicz

  2. Institute of Law and Technology, Masaryk University, Faculty of Law, Veveří 70, Brno, 611-80, Czech Republic

    Jaromír Šavelka

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Araszkiewicz, M. (2013). Limits of Constraint Satisfaction Theory of Coherence as a Theory of (Legal) Reasoning. In: Araszkiewicz, M., Šavelka, J. (eds) Coherence: Insights from Philosophy, Jurisprudence and Artificial Intelligence. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 107. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6110-0_12

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