Abstract
A discussion note on Samuli Hurri’s paper ‘Justice kata nomos and Justice as epieikes (Legality and Equity)’, this chapter focuses on the Aristotelian grounds rather than the consequences of Hurri’s argument. Section 10.1 deals with the interpretation of Rhet. 1.1, 1354a 26–30. Section 10.2 discusses the functioning of equity as described in Rhet. 1.13, 1374a 18–b 23. By way of conclusion, Sect. 10.3 argues that a less strict opposition of facts and qualities, and a more limited understanding of arguments from equity, which both seem to be more faithful to Aristotle, actually provide more firm grounds for a practical notion of justice.
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Notes
- 1.
I have modified the translation of Kennedy (2007) on the following points: ‘show the facts: whether etc.’ instead of ‘show that’, and ‘judge’ instead of ‘juror’.
- 2.
I have slightly modified the translation of Kennedy (2007), rendering kyrion as ‘have authority to decide’ rather than ‘have authority to determine’.
- 3.
On the meaning of deixai, see Grimaldi (1980, 12).
- 4.
A parallel passage can be found in Plato’s Laws, where the Athenian explains the duties of the judges at artistic competitions. The judges, he says, need more than just taste: they have to be able to decide against the opinion of the audience. The judge should not listen to the audience (para theatrou… manthanonta), nor should his decision (gignôskonta) be influenced by fear and unmanliness (Lg. 2.659a 2–7). The passage is also mentioned by Schütrumpf (1994, 106–107 note 47) as a possible sign of Plato’s influence on the terminology of Rhet. 1.1.1354a 30. Contrary to his argument, however, it seems that Plato’s view of the desirable assessment of artistic competitions does not say anything about either the participants’ or the audience’s licence to give their opinion. Rather, it is the task of the judge to disregard these opinions and decide according to the actual merits of the presentations.
- 5.
Here I have modified the translation of Kennedy (2007) to keep Aristotle’s ‘iron’ (sidērōi), which illustrates the point much better than Kennedy’s ‘weapon’.
- 6.
I have modified the translation of Kennedy (2007) on several points. He renders 1375a 27–31 as ‘for is evident that if the written law is contrary to the facts, one must use common law and arguments based on fairness as being more just. [One can say] that to use [the jurors’] “best understanding” is not to follow the written laws exclusively; and that fairness always remains’.
Bibliography
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Acknowledgement
I am indebted to Péter Cserne, Edward M. Harris, and the editors of this volume for their comments and advice. My participation at the workshop was supported by an Ustinov Travel Award I received from Ustinov College, Durham University.
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Könczöl, M. (2013). Legality and Equity in the Rhetoric: The Smooth Transition. In: Huppes-Cluysenaer, L., Coelho, N. (eds) Aristotle and The Philosophy of Law: Theory, Practice and Justice. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 23. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6031-8_10
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