Just City and Just Soul in Plato’s Republic

Abstract

The analogy between just city and just soul is a basic building block of Plato’s theory of justice. I adopt David Keyt’s recent illuminating reading of the analogy, and I show how it can be used with a faculty interpretation of the second building block of the theory, Plato’s analysis of the human soul. I also argue that there is a third building block, Plato’s functional theory of good and virtue. I bring together these three building blocks of his theory to try to resolve two important interpretive controversies. First, are the parts of the soul faculties or agents? The agent interpretation has been recently well developed, though paradoxical. I try to show that there is strong evidence for the faculty interpretation and Plato’s theory of justice is better with it. Second, in Plato’s ideal city, is it true that only the philosophers can be just? A positive answer has had strong supporters in recent literature. I argue that this is an unnecessarily extreme interpretation of Plato’s theory of justice, and that it wrecks Plato’s main argument that we are better off being just rather than unjust.

An earlier draft of this chapter was read at a conference in honor of David Keyt in 2006. I wish to thank the audience particularly Marc Cohen and Charles Young for the helpful comments. I am especially grateful to David Keyt from whose work—marked by an admirably close reading of texts, great clarity of reasoning and statement, and superior craftsmanship—I have been learning for a long time. I am honored to contribute this essay to the volume.