I Cannot Tell You (Everything) About My Dreams: Reply to Ivanowich and Weisberg

  • Miguel Ángel SebastiánEmail author
Part of the Studies in Brain and Mind book series (SIBM, volume 6)


One of the main problems for the scientific study of consciousness is methodological. At least prima facie, the kind of knowledge we have of our own experiences is direct and not mediated by an inference process. This kind of knowledge contrasts with the kind of knowledge we have of others’ experiences, which relies on the observation of their behavior and their reports.


Conscious Experience Performance Capacity Sensory Cortex Phenomenal Consciousness Alphanumeric Character 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


  1. Block, N. 2007. Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30: 481548.Google Scholar
  2. Block, N. 2011. Perceptual consciousness overflows cognitive access. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12: 567575.Google Scholar
  3. Brown, R. 2012. The myth of phenomenological overflow. Consciousness and Cognition 21: 599–604.Google Scholar
  4. Carruthers, P. 2000. Phenomenal consciousness: A naturalistic theory. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Damasio, A. 2000. The feeling of what happens: Body and emotion in the making of consciousness. Harvest Books.Google Scholar
  6. Dement, W., and W. Kleitman. 1957. The relation of eye movements during sleep to dream activity: An objective method for the study of dreaming. Journal of Experimental Psychology 53: 339–346.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Heekeren, H.R., S. Marrett, P.A. Bandettini, and L.G. Ungerleider. 2004. General mechanism for perceptual decision-making in the human brain. Nature 431: 859–862.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Ivanowich, M. 2014. Commentary on “Not a HOT Dream”. In Consciousness inside and out: Phenomenology, neuroscience, and the nature of experience, ed. Brown Richard, 1–10. Dordrecht: Springer.Google Scholar
  9. Landman, R., Spekreijse, H., and Lamme, V. 2003. Large capacity storage of integrated objects before change blindness. Vision Research 43(2): 149–164.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Lau, H., and R. Brown. Forthcoming. The emperor’s new phenomenology? The empirical case for conscious experience without first-order representations. In Festschrift for ned block, ed. Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  11. Leclair-Visonneau, L., D. Oudiette, B. Gaymard, S. Leu-Semenescu, and I. Arnulf. 2010. Do the eyes scan dream images during rapid eye movement sleep? Evidence from the rapid eye movement sleep behavior disorder model. Brain: A Journal of Neurology 133: 1737–1746.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Roffwarg, H.P., W.C. Dement, J.N. Muzio, and C. Fisher. 1962. Dream imagery: Relationship to rapid eye movements of sleep. Archives of General Psychiatry 7: 235–258.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Rosenthal, D.M. 2007. Phenomenological overflow and cognitive access. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30: 521–522.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Sebastián, M.A. 2014. Not a HOT dream. In Consciousness inside and out: Phenomenology, neuroscience, and the nature of experience, 415–432. Dordrecht: Springer.Google Scholar
  15. Sebastian, M.A. Manuscript. Experiential awareness: Do you prefer It to Me?Google Scholar
  16. Sligte, I.G., H.S. Scholte, and V.A.F. Lamme. 2008. Are there multiple visual short-term memory stores? PLoS One 3: 1–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Sperling, G. 1960. The information available in brief visual presentation. Psychological Monographs General and Applied 74(11): 1–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Weisberg, J. 2014. Sweet dreams are made of this? A HOT response to Sebastián. In Consciousness inside and out: Phenomenology, neuroscience, and the nature of experience, 433–443. Dordrecht: Springer.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Programa de Maestría y Doctorado en Filosofía, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM, Circuito Mtro Mario de la CuevaCiudad UniversitariaMéxicoMéxico

Personalised recommendations