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The dlPFC is not a NCHOT: A Reply to Sebastián

  • Matthew IvanowichEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Studies in Brain and Mind book series (SIBM, volume 6)

Abstract

In his article, Sebastián argues that experiments by Lau and Passingham (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 103:18763–18768, 2006) demonstrate that proponents of higher-order thought (“HOT”) theory should be committed to the claim that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (“dlPFC”) is the neural correlate of HOT (“NCHOT”). In this commentary I briefly describe what I take to be a promising response on behalf of the HOT theorist: namely, that an alternative interpretation of the function of the dlPFC allows the defender of HOT theory to hold that the dlPFC isn’t a NCHOT of the sort that is required to make an experience phenomenally conscious.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyThe University of Western OntarioLondonCanada

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