The dlPFC is not a NCHOT: A Reply to Sebastián
In his article, Sebastián argues that experiments by Lau and Passingham (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 103:18763–18768, 2006) demonstrate that proponents of higher-order thought (“HOT”) theory should be committed to the claim that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (“dlPFC”) is the neural correlate of HOT (“NCHOT”). In this commentary I briefly describe what I take to be a promising response on behalf of the HOT theorist: namely, that an alternative interpretation of the function of the dlPFC allows the defender of HOT theory to hold that the dlPFC isn’t a NCHOT of the sort that is required to make an experience phenomenally conscious.
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