Sweet Dreams Are Made of This? A HOT Response to Sebastián

  • Josh WeisbergEmail author
Part of the Studies in Brain and Mind book series (SIBM, volume 6)


Sebastián (this issue) argues that data from dream research undermines a prominent version of the higher-order representation theory of consciousness. In this commentary, I argue that Sebastián’s attack falls short, for three main reasons. First, the data from dream studies is notoriously hard to interpret, leaving ample space for the higher-order theorist to contest Sebastián’s claims. Second, even accepting the dream data as given, there is still enough brain activity present in the dreaming brain to vindicate higher-order claims. And third, it is not clear that the higher-order theory must be committed to the anatomical claims exposing it to Sebastián’s critique.


Anterior Cingulate Cortex NREM Sleep Confidence Judgment Phenomenal Consciousness Cognitive Access 
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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of HoustonHoustonUSA

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