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Varieties of Synesthetic Experience

  • Berit BrogaardEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Studies in Brain and Mind book series (SIBM, volume 6)

Abstract

In her response to my “Seeing as a Non-Experiental Mental State: The Case from Synesthesia and Visual Imagery” Ophelia Deroy presents an argument for an interesting new account of synesthesia. On this account, synesthesia can be thought of as “a perceptual state (e.g. of a letter)” that is “changed or enriched by the incorporation of a conscious mental image (e.g. a color).” Deroy argues convincingly that Perky cases, in which the content of visual imagery is partially constituted by the content of perceptual experience, possibly are best understood as incorporated, or mixed, mental states (Deroy,  Chap. 27, this volume; Perky 1910). But even if Perky cases are not truly mixed conscious states, Deroy argues, it is quite plausible that some of our mental states have perceptual as well as imagistic elements. Cases of synesthesia are good candidates to be exactly these kinds of mixed states.

Keywords

Perceptual Experience Visual Imagery Perceptual State Colored Shape Visual Word Form Area 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Departments of Philosophy, Center for Neurodynamics & Brogaard Lab for Multisensory ResearchUniversity of MissouriSt. LouisUSA

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