Synesthesia: An Experience of the Third Kind?
What is it like to have a synesthetic experience? Most synesthetes have stressed “having trouble putting into words some of the things (they) experience” as if they had to explain “red to a blind person or middle-C to a deaf person”. The current definition of synesthesia as a condition in which “stimulation in one sensory or cognitive stream leads to associated experiences in a second, unstimulated stream” leaves the question open: What do these ‘associated experiences’ consist in?
KeywordsPerceptual Experience Visual Experience Mental Imagery Visual Imagery Conscious State
This research has been conducted thanks to the European Commission FP7 programme (IEF, 4CB). Thanks to Richard Brown and Fiona Macpherson for comments and suggestions on this material.
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