Ignoring the Real Problems for Phenomenal Externalism: A Reply to Hilbert and Klein

  • Adam PautzEmail author
Part of the Studies in Brain and Mind book series (SIBM, volume 6)


I disagree with those who think phenomenal externalism can be refuted very easily on the basis of controversial intuitions about brains in vats (Horgan, Tienson and Graham), inverted spectrum (Shoemaker), actual cases of perceptual variation (Block), and so on. Both sides of the debate have missed the best argument against phenomenal externalism. The real trouble with phenomenal externalism is that it goes against decades of research in psychophysics and neuroscience. This research supports a brain-based theory of phenomenal consciousness.


Firing Rate Content Claim Structure Argument External Property Sensory Intensity 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Texas at AustinAustinUSA

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