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An Epistemology for Phenomenology?

  • Ruth Garrett MillikanEmail author
Part of the Studies in Brain and Mind book series (SIBM, volume 6)

Abstract

There is a tendency to assimilate so called “consciousness studies” to studies of the phenomenology of experience, and it seems to me that this is a shame. It is a shame, I think, because there is no such thing as a legitimate phenomenology of experience whereas there certainly is such a thing as consciousness. So long as people assimilate studies of consciousness to studies of phenomenal experience, they are side stepping the real issues – the ones for another lifetime.

Keywords

Phenomenological Description Color Constancy Phenomenal Property Phenomenal Experience Distal Property 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of ConnecticutMansfieldUSA

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