It’s Still There!

  • Benj HellieEmail author
Part of the Studies in Brain and Mind book series (SIBM, volume 6)


The view concerning perception developed in ‘There it is’ (Hellie 2011) involves, most centrally, the following theses:


Perceptual Condition Rational Psychology Direct Realism Basic Justification Epistemological Literature 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


  1. Carnap, Rudolf. 1932. Psychology in physical language. Erkenntnis 3: 107–142. Reprinted in ?CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Chalmers, David J. 2003. The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief. In Consciousness: New philosophical essays, ed. Quentin Smith and Alexander Jokic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  3. Chalmers, David J. 2004. The representational character of experience. In The future for philosophy, ed. Brian Leiter. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  4. Crane, Tim. 2007. Intentionalism. In Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, ed. Ansgar Beckermann and Brian McLaughlin. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  5. Goldman, Alvin. 1976. Discrimination and perceptual knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 73: 771–791.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Harman, Gilbert. 1990. The intrinsic quality of experience. In Action theory and the philosophy of mind, vol. 4 of philosophical perspectives, ed. James Tomberlin, 31–52. Atascadero: Ridgeview.Google Scholar
  7. Heal, Jane. 2003. Mind, reason, and imagination. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Hellie, Benj. 2006. Beyond phenomenal naivete. The Philosophers Imprint 6(2): 1–24.Google Scholar
  9. Hellie, Benj. 2007. Factive phenomenal characters. Philosophical Perspectives 21: 259–306.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Hellie, Benj. 2010. An externalist’s guide to inner experience. In Perceiving the world, ed. Bence Nanay. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  11. Hellie, Benj. 2011. There it is. Philosophical Issues 21: 110–164.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Lewis, David. 1973. Why conditionalize? In?Google Scholar
  13. Lewis, David. 1982. Logic for equivocators. Noûs 16: 431–441.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Lewis, David. 1986. On the plurality of worlds. London: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  15. Martin, Michael G.F. 2000. Beyond dispute: Sense-data, intentionality, and the mind-body problem. In History of the mind-body problem, ed. Tim Crane and Sarah Patterson. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
  16. Martin, Michael G.F. 2002. The transparency of experience. Mind and Language 17: 376–425.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Martin, Michael G.F. 2004. The limits of self-awareness: Disjunctivism and indiscriminability. Philosophical Studies 120: 37–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. McDowell, John. 1994. Mind and world. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  19. Pollock, John. 1974. Knowledge and justification. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  20. Pryor, James. 2000. The skeptic and the dogmatist. Nous 34: 517–549.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Robinson, Howard. 1994. Perception. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
  22. Soteriou, Matthew. 2005. The subjective view of experience and its objective commitments. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105: 193–206.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Stalnaker, Robert C. 2008. Our knowledge of the internal world. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Williamson, Timothy. 2000. Knowledge and its limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of TorontoTorontoCanada

Personalised recommendations