Abstract
This article investigates under which conditions collective rights for specific (cultural) groups are legitimate. To this aim, Hegel’s conception of collective rights is critically analyzed in order to develop criteria for collective rights in a multicultural society (in contrast to Hegel’s mono-cultural society).
In the conclusion of the investigation, three levels of collective rights are distinguished. First, the collective rights which can be attributed to persons, who share some ‘objective’ (natural or cultural) qualities, which hinder them to function as free and equal persons. Secondly, the collective rights for groups of persons, who made the free choice to participate in a social dialogue as a member of a specific social group, with its own values and norms. Thirdly, the collective rights formulated in the framework of the national state under the conditions of the globalized market.
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Notes
- 1.
The problem concerns the unity of the distinct groups. Does this unity, for example, presuppose a political culture that has emancipated itself from a majority culture or must this unity be focused on the relation between the majority and the minority? See J. Habermas (1996: 174–175) and W. Kymlicka (1995: 52).
- 2.
G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts [Grl.], §75: “Ebensowenig liegt die Natur des Staats im Vertragsverhältnisse …” [“It is equally far from the truth to ground the nature of the state on the contractual relation …” (Hegel 1952: 58f.)].
- 3.
In Grl, §197, Hegel connects the mechanism of the market with the theoretical and practical ‘Bildung’.
- 4.
In Grl. §182, Hegel introduces the civil society as the domain which is characterized by the dialectics between the ‘particular goal’ (besondere Zweck) and the ‘form of generality’ (die Form der Allgemeinheit). “Meinen Zweck befördend, befördere ich das Allgemeine, und dieses befördert wiederum meinen Zweck.” (§184, Zusatz).
- 5.
Ethical Life (Sittlichkeit), the institutional unity of family, civil society and state, is understood by Hegel as ‘das lebendige Gute’, i.e., as the ‘good life’ realizing itself. (Grl.§142).
- 6.
Grl.§206.
- 7.
This determination of subjective identity ‘form above’ comes up, for example, if Rawls’ moral individual has a ‘plan of life’, or in Pogge’s ‘central idea of moral cosmopolitism’: “every human being has a global stature as an ultimate unit of moral concern” (Pogge 2004: 169).
- 8.
For an analysis of Hegel’s concept of conscience, see Paul Cobben, Das endliche Selbst (Würzburg 1999), 148–158.
- 9.
However, it is important to understand that Hegel discusses ‘conscience’ in the Philosophy of Right from the perspective of ‘objective spirit’, not from the perspective of ‘absolute spirit’: Grl.§137 Anm.: “Das religiöse Gewissen gehört aber überhaupt nicht in diesen Kreis.”
- 10.
In his critique of Young, Brian Barry rightly concludes that ‘culture’ cannot be identified as such an objective criterion (Barry 2001: 306–307).
- 11.
Will Kymlicka not only thinks that this kind of compensatory rights are only guaranteed if the groups which need compensation are represented in the parliament, but also that these rights are temporary (Kymlicka 1995: 141–142).
- 12.
J. Habermas also stresses that the membership of a group must be mediated by subjective choice (Habermas 1996: 259).
- 13.
“Human rights deliberately leave significant leeway open in the choice of a constitution or of economic or social rules” (Gosepath 2004: 162).
- 14.
Kymlicka formulates two criteria for the distinction of groups: “… there are two ways of drawing principled distinctions between various groups. Groups have a claim to representation if they meet one of the two criteria: (1) are the members of the group subject to systemic disadvantage in the political process? Or (2) do the members of the group have a claim to self-government?” (Kymlicka 1995: 144–145).
- 15.
Because the membership of a nation state is a collective, not a universal right, Phillip Cole thinks it is incompatible with liberal theory (Cole 2000: 202).
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Cobben, P. (2013). Which Identities Are Entitled to Collective Rights?. In: Merle, JC. (eds) Spheres of Global Justice. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5998-5_41
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