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Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa pp 179–191Cite as

Reflective Knowledge and the Pyrrhonian Problematic

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Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies Series ((PSSP,volume 119))

Abstract

Section 1 of this chapter reviews the Pyrrhonian problematic, characterized as a multistage dialectic that begins with Agrippa’s Trilemma concerning a regress of reasons and ends with a version of the problem of the criterion. Section 2 reviews Sosa’s two-tier epistemology, giving special attention to (a) Sosa’s characteristic distinction between animal and reflective knowledge, (b) the value of reflective knowledge over mere animal knowledge, and (c) relations among human knowledge, animal knowledge, and reflective knowledge. Section 3 considers Sosa’s treatment of the Pyrrhonian problematic and the role of reflective knowledge in his solution to it. Section 4 offers an evaluation.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Sosa confronts Agrippa’s regress argument in numerous places. See, for example, “The Foundations of Foundationalism” and “The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge,” both in Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology (Sosa 1991). References to page numbers for those papers below are for Knowledge in Perspective. See also Sosa 1997a and “The Problem of the Criterion,” Lecture 6 of A Virtue Epistemology (Sosa 2007).

  2. 2.

    See, for example, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” in (Sellars 1963), and (BonJour 1978). Sosa considers this objection to foundationalism in various places, but see especially The Raft and Pyramid” (Sosa 1991: 181–182).

  3. 3.

    Sextus, Against the Mathematicians, VII, 259 (quoted by Sosa in 1997a: 231 and 2007: 129).

  4. 4.

    This kind of question is raised to Sosa by Barry Stroud (1994). Sosa replies in Sosa 1994. See also their exchange on the same topic in Greco 2004a, b: 164–173, 315–317.

  5. 5.

    Coherentism has been defended, among others, by Laurence BonJour (1985) and Keith Lehrer (1997). Infinitism is defended by Peter Klein (2005).

  6. 6.

    See, for example, the collection of papers in (Kornblith 2001).

  7. 7.

    The contemporary literature in epistemology has seen a dramatic rise in interest regarding the value of knowledge. See, for example, Zagzebski (1996), Kvanvig (2003), and the papers collected in Pritchard et al. (2008).

  8. 8.

    Sosa has developed and defended this view over many years, including in 1991, 2007, 2009, and 2011. See also Sosa 2004.

  9. 9.

    More recently, Sosa presents his account of knowledge in terms of an “AAA structure” that he argues is common to all performances, or at least all performances with an aim. Thus, one’s belief may be assessed as accurate (true), as adroit (manifesting intellectual competence or ability), and as apt (true in virtue of manifesting intellectual competence). It is this latter status, Sosa argues, that is necessary and sufficient for knowledge or, more exactly, animal knowledge (Sosa 2007: 24). Reflective knowledge is again more demanding, requiring defensibly apt belief or belief that the knower aptly believes to be apt. Accordingly, reflective knowledge is “apt belief aptly noted” (2007: 32). More recently still, Sosa requires for reflective knowledge that one’s animal belief be guided by one’s perspective on it (Sosa 2011, esp. Chap. 1). Also, see John Turri’s Chap. 8.

  10. 10.

    Sosa defends this position in 2007, especially in Lecture 4, “Epistemic Normativity,” and 2011, especially Chap. 3, “Value Matters in Epistemology.”

  11. 11.

    This comes out clearly in Sosa 2004: 291. See also Sosa 1997a and 2007: 113–133.

  12. 12.

    See especially Sosa 1997a and 2007: 113–133.

  13. 13.

    This version of the problem of the criterion is closely related to another that Sosa considers: In order to have knowledge about particular things, one must first know a general criterion by which such knowledge can be judged. But in order to know such a general criterion, one must first have knowledge of particular things, for how else could one arrive at the criterion in the first place? We are therefore faced with a dilemma: either we must first know particular things without knowing a general criterion or we must first know a general criterion without knowing particular things. Both options, the Pyrrhonian argues, are unsatisfactory. Sosa takes the first horn of the dilemma: One comes to know particular truths in virtue of one’s beliefs satisfying some general criterion.

  14. 14.

    I reconstruct Sosa’s response here from Sosa 1997a, 2004: 290–304, 309–315; 2007: 113–133; and 2009: 135–243.

  15. 15.

    Here I have substituted “noncircular” for “legitimating.” Earlier in Sosa’s essay, we are told that a legitimating account, in the relevant sense of “legitimating,” must be “without circularity or endless regress” (Sosa 2009: 159).

  16. 16.

    Cf. my “How to Preserve Your Virtue While Losing Your Perspective,” in Greco 2004b.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Saint Louis University, 3800 Lindell Boulevard, St. Louis, MO, 63108, USA

    John Greco

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Correspondence to John Greco .

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Waterloo, University Avenue West 200, London, N6G 1H3, Ontario, Canada

    John Turri

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Greco, J. (2013). Reflective Knowledge and the Pyrrhonian Problematic. In: Turri, J. (eds) Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 119. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5934-3_10

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