Abstract
This paper raises issues about how philosophy ought to proceed. In the background are two competing approaches to the evidential grounding of philosophical insight. According to a widespread view, philosophical knowledge rests on a set of intuitions. According to another, philosophy has no special evidential grounding. This paper will resist the attractions of the first picture, and argue against the separateness of philosophy that it lends support. I shall try to make plausible that such a picture can be harmful both for philosophy and for empirical science. We should replace it with a mild form of unity of science.
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Alvin Goldman, “Philosophical Intuitions: Their Target, their Source and their Epistemic Status”, in: Grazer Philosophische Studien 4, 2007, pp. 1-26, p. 1.
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George Ainslie, Picoeconomics. Cambridge: CUP 1992, and many later writings.
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The work Holton and Berridge are doing together is not published yet.
- 9.
I am very grateful to Nick Allott for comments.
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Gjelsvik, O. (2013). Philosophy as Interdisciplinary Research. In: Andersen, H., Dieks, D., Gonzalez, W., Uebel, T., Wheeler, G. (eds) New Challenges to Philosophy of Science. The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5845-2_36
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5845-2_36
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