Abstract
The paper’s focus is on the inner strain in Aquinas’ Natural Law, first pointed out by Suarez, as a conflict between the competing visions of rational nature: natural power of reason versus natural inclination. The paper‘s aim is to vindicate Suarez’ critique of Aquinas’ concept of Natural Law as natural inclination.
The paper argues that Aquinas’ Aristotelian concept of purposeness of nature, unable to account for genuine Free Will or contingency, resulted in his notion of Natural Law as natural inclination. This notion went against the early Christian vision of Natural Law as a law given to men exclusively, being endowed with reason and, thus, capable of understanding God’s command. This vision was reasserted by Suarez, who perceived its incompatibility with Aquinas’ notion of Natural Law as natural inclination.
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- 1.
[Massuet collation]: «homo vero rationabilis, et secundum hoc similis Deo, liber in arbitrio factus et suae potestatis, ipse sibi cause est ut aliquando quidem frumentum aliquando autem palea fiat» (Lib. 4, Cap VII, in Sancti Irenaei (1857), Adversus Haereses, vol 2, 154).
- 2.
«Bonum est autem obedire Deo, et credere ei, et custodire ejus praeceptum» (Lib.IV Cap LXIV, ibid, 298).
- 3.
«Quemadmodum enim ligua per gustum accipit experimentum dulcis at amari…sic et mens per utrorumque experimentum … inobedientiam … amarum et malum est» (ibid).
- 4.
God gave mankind natural [Law] precepts [naturalia praecepta] which were initially infixed [ab initio inflixa] (4.13.3). Man was able to perceive God’s Commandments (4.39.1–2). But men “turned themselves to make a calf”, hence, they were placed in a state of servitude, which did notcut them from God, but subjected them to the ‘yoke of bondage’ [of the ritual Law] (4.39.1–2). God thus gave to Moses the [written] Law, which testified of the sin…: it … made the sin to stand out in relief, but did not destroy it (3.18.7). Natural [Law] precepts, being common to the Jews as well as to the Gentiles, had a beginning in the Old Testament but received their …completion in the New Testament (4.13.4).
- 5.
Latin text: http://individual.utoronto.ca/pking/resources/augustine/De_libero_arbitrio.txt; English translation: Saint Augustine (1968).
- 6.
“…poena iniusta esset et praemium, si homo uoluntatem liberam non haberet….Debuit igitur deus dare homini liberam uoluntatem”.
- 7.
“Sicut autem natura rationis praeceptum capit, sic praecepti obseruatio sapientiam. Quod est autem natura ad capiendum praeceptum, hoc est uoluntas ad obseruandum”.
- 8.
“Peccatum autem malum est in neglegentia uel ad accipiendum praeceptum uel ad obseruandum uel ad custodiendam contemplationem sapientiae”.
- 9.
Latin text: http://www.augustinus.it/latino/grazia_libero_arbitrio/grazia_libero_arbitrio.htm. English translation: The Fathers of the Church, vol 59, 243–308.
- 10.
“Qui ergo noverunt divina mandata, aufertur eis excusatio, quam solent homines habere de ignorantia”(The translation here is slightly different from Russell).
- 11.
“…debetis quidem per liberum arbitrium non facere mala, et facere bona: hoc enim nobis lex Dei praecipit in Libris sanctis, sive Veteribus, sive Novisi”.
- 12.
“…voluntas humana non tollitur [gratia], sed ex mala mutatur in bonam, et cum bona fuerit adiuvatur”.
- 13.
“Gratia nos facit legis dilectores, lex vero ipsa sine gratia nonnisi praevaricatores facit”.
- 14.
- 15.
“… in quo per peccatum sit imminutum vel corruptum liberum arbitrium …” http://www.franciscan-archive.org/lombardus/opera/ls2-25.html
- 16.
Anselm’s voluntarism was one such noted manifestation of Augustinian influence.
- 17.
Latin text & English translation: St Thomas Aquinas, (1964–1975); Latin text: http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/iopera.html#OM, English Translation: http://www.newadvent.org/summa/ The references in the text are to Summa Teheologica, unless otherwise indicated.
- 18.
«regula est et mensura actuum» .
- 19.
“rationis enim est ordinare ad finem”.
- 20.
Finnis (2011), 36.
- 21.
“…practical principles… state what ought to be…rather than what is…” (Finnis 1998, 87)
- 22.
“…hujusmodi propositiones universals rationis practicae ordinatae ad actiones habent rationem legis”.
- 23.
“… scripta in ratione naturali quasi per se nota…”.
- 24.
“…praecepta ad decalogum …sunt illa quae statim ex principiis communibus primis cognosci possunt modica consideratione”.
- 25.
Aquinas’ comparison is with a transparent body which has the capacity to receive light due to its diaphanous nature; the capacity or aptitude is lessened by overshadowing clouds, yet remains in the nature of the body (1.2.85.2).
- 26.
“…per peccatum et ratio hebetatur praecipue in agendis, et voluntas induratur ad bonum…”.
- 27.
Armstrong argued that natural necessity, implied by Aquinas’s concept of naturalis inclinatio, should be understood ‘analogically’ (Armstrong 1966, 44). Hence, natural inclination was indispensable for the knowledge of “the term, not known to everyone, but known in itself” (ibid, 48). For O’Connor, since the natural inclinations were apprehended by reason as being good, there was no inconsistency in Aquinas’ defining Natural Law as a law of reason, as well as a law corresponding to the natural inclinations (O’Connor 1968, 72).
Finnis has retracted his early statement that “Aquinas considers that practical reasoning begins… by experiencing one’s nature, so to speak, from inside, in the form of one’s inclinations. But, again, there is no process of inference” (Finnis 2011, 34), now contending that it is “far from clear that the data on the basis of which the originating practical insights occur must include pre-rational inclinations” (ibid, 440). This observation was elaborated in Finnis’ Aquinas (I am indebted to John Finnis for pointing out this connection [in private correspondence]). According to Finnis, Aquinas’ first principles are “‘induction’ of principles [Ethics iv.3. n.7 [1148], by which he means insight into data of experience” (Finnis 1998, 87). Finnis’ insight (ibid, 91), that Aquinas’ notion of Natural Law as self-evident principles was not to be inferred from human nature is, in a sense, in accord with the presented here vision of Natural Law as evident knowledge, which could be traced back to the early Patristics. But for Finnis, as for Aquinas, in no way man could grasp these self-evident principles and, nevertheless, disobey Natural Law; Augustinian Free Will is, essentially, a superfluous concept within this paradigm.
- 28.
“…secundum igitur ordinem inclinationum naturalium est ordo praeceptorum legis naturae…”.
- 29.
“…in qua communicat cum omnibus substanitiis…”.
- 30.
“… quaelibet substantia appetite conservationem sui esse secundum suam naturam…”
- 31.
«…pertinent ad legem naturalem ea per qua vita hominis conservatur…» .
- 32.
«… quae natura omnia animalia docuit, ut est commixtio maris et feminae, et education liberorum…»
- 33.
«… ius quod dicitur naturale, secundum primum modum, commune est nobis et aliis animalibus…»
- 34.
Aquinas usage of ius in Q. 57 corresponded with the Roman Law ius naturale.
- 35.
“… homo habet naturalem inclinationem ad hoc quod veritatem cognoscat de Deo, et ad hoc quod in societate vivat…”
- 36.
«…considerare autem aliquid, comparando ad id quod ex ipso sequitur, est proprium rationis…»
- 37.
«…not est simul affirmare et negare… fundatur supra rationem entis et non entis… super hoc principio omnia alia fundantur…»
- 38.
«… sicut autem ens est primum quod cadit in apprehension simpliciter…»
- 39.
«…omne enim agens agit propter finem, qui habet rationem boni…»
- 40.
“…cum rationis ordo a fine incipiat…”
- 41.
«… maxime est contra rationem ut homo inordinate se habeat circa finem…»
- 42.
«Unde cum omnia quae divinae providentae subduntur a lege aeterna regulentur et mensurentur,… manefestum est quod omnia participant aliqualiter legem aeternam, inquantum scilet ex empressione ejus habent inclinations in proper actus et fines».
- 43.
«…omnes hujusmodi inclinationes quarumcumque partium naturae humanae reducuntur ad unum primum praeceptum …»
- 44.
Maritain (1952), 62–63.
- 45.
Veatch (1981), 310.
- 46.
Finnis (2011), 33.
- 47.
- 48.
Finnis (2012), 18.
- 49.
“…intellectus comparatur ad voluntatem ut movens…”.
- 50.
“Cum enim propter finem agat et intellectus et natura… necesse est ut agenti per naturam praedeterminetur finis, et media necessaria ad finem, ab aliquo superiori intellectu; sicut sagittae praedeterminatur finis et certus modus a sagittante”.
- 51.
“…Deus ex necessitate suam bonitatem velit, alia vero non ex necessitate…respectu illorum quae non ex necessitate vult, liberum arbitrium habet”.
- 52.
“causae proximae sunt contingents… quia Deus voluit eos contingenter evenire”.
- 53.
«… cum malum culpae dicatur per aversionem a bonitate divina … manifestum est quod impossibile est eum malum culpae velle. Et tamen ad opposita se habet, inquantum velle potest hoc esse vel non esse. Sicut et nos, non peccando, possumus velle sedere, et non velle sedere» .
- 54.
«Particularia autem operabilia sunt quaedam contingentia: et ideo circa ea iudicium rationis ad diversa se habet… Et pro tanto necesse est quod homo sit liberi arbitrii, ex hoc ipso quod rationalis est» .
- 55.
«Si autem illa definitur esse necessitas, secundum quam dicimus necesse esse ut ita sit aliquid uel ita fiat, nescio cur eam timeamus, ne nobis libertatem auferat uoluntatis …
cum uolumus, libero uelimus arbitrio … et non ideo ipsum liberum arbitrium necessitati subicimus, quae adimit libertatem» http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/augustine/civ5.shtml (English Translation: http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/120105.htm) .
- 56.
«verbum Augustini est intelligendum de necessario necessitate coactionis. Necessitas autem naturalis non aufert libertatem voluntatis, ut ipsemet in eodem libro dicit» .
- 57.
Though, Suárez did not use the terms ‘voluntarists’ and ’intellectualists’.
- 58.
Suárez (1944). The following references are to Tractatus, unless otherwise indicated.
- 59.
“… quae accusat, vel approbat facta…”.
- 60.
“…in ratione est lex naturalis constituenda tanquam in proxima regula intrinsica humanarum actionum…”.
- 61.
«… disconueniens naturae rationali…»
- 62.
«…ipsa natura est mensura talis actus, & consequeter est lex naturalis…»
- 63.
“…nec praecipit, nec ostendit honestatem, aut malitiam, nec dirigit, aut illuminat nec alium proprium effectum legis habet”
- 64.
“…illam rationem mensurae vel fundamemtati honestatis non satis esse ad rationem legis…”
- 65.
“…non pended a Deo in ratione, licet pendeat in existential…”
- 66.
«…distinguit varias inclinationes naturales humanae nature, secundum quas ratio dictat de his, quae sunt bona, vel mala tali naturae ut inde colligat praecepta legis naturalis…»
- 67.
“… iudiciu ostendens veritate rei…”
- 68.
Suárez also noted that a judgement showing the nature of given action [iudiciu indicas natura actionis]….points out that obligation should be assumed to exist [ostendi illam (obligationem), quae supponi debet]. Therefore if this judgement is to have the nature of law, it must indicate some sort of authority as the source of such obligation [ergo iudicium illud, ut habeat rationem legis, debet in decare aliquod imperium, a quo talis obligation manet] (2.6.6)
- 69.
Cruz (2008), 55.
- 70.
…ut a legislatore precipiente, & obligante…
- 71.
… id est iudicium rectu de agendis, & voluntate efficace movedi ad illis…
- 72.
Law, in general, was, for Suárez, ‘a certain measure of moral acts, in the sense that such acts are characterised by moral rectitude through their conformity to the law, and by perversity, if they are out of harmony with the law’ (1.1.5). It was a common, just and stable precept, which had been sufficiently promulgated (1.12.5).
- 73.
Finnis (2011), 45–6.
- 74.
Finnis (2011), 342.
- 75.
Finnis (2011), 342.
- 76.
Finnis suggests that the idea of Creation out of ‘liberality’ (and, thus, the concept of Free Will of God) could also be found in Aquinas (Finnis 1998, 310). But the central issue in the voluntarists-intellectualist debates was whether God’s will was under a dictate of His intellect (Taitslin 2011, 126–139, 170–179). On this point Aquinas was unambiguous (ST 1. 83.4 ad 3). Only because of the voluntarist contrary premise that God’s will was not moved by His intellect, the voluntarists, such as Scotus and Ockham, had to face a question of ‘justification’ of Creation and Natural Law. This was not an issue for Aquinas.
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Taitslin, A. (2013). The Competing Sources of Aquinas’ Natural Law: Aristotle, Roman Law and the Early Christian Fathers. In: Contreras, F. (eds) The Threads of Natural Law. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 22. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5656-4_4
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