Abstract
Aristotle’s practical philosophy has often been considered as the paradigm of a non-deontological conception—that is, one in which there is not a concept of rule as a criterion universally determining what individuals shall do. Yet this image needs to be severely rectified when we turn our attention to the Aristotelian theory of law, which is to be found—even if merely sketched—in his Ethics and his Politics. For in the legal sphere, the “technical” necessity for positive rules as stable and institutionalised devices guiding the practice seems more evident. Aristotle’s theory of law includes a fundamental thesis about the “rule of laws, not of men” which is indeed based upon the postulate of a system of general, positive rules conceived of as the essential instruments for the public organization of the polis. Aristotle thinks of these rules—actually, the rules of “legal justice” (nomikon dikaion)—as strictly universal (katholou), not merely empirical rules (or “rules of thumb”), their peculiar particularity and variability notwithstanding. It would be erroneous then, if only for this reason, to think (as it is, however, frequently done) that the Aristotelian system is completely unaware of the idea of a “natural law”. For instance, Aquinas’s definition of lex as regula et mensura is directly taken from the Nicomachean Ethics. Nevertheless, this Aristotelian “natural law” is about values and principles and no longer only about rules, and of course it is not “natural” at all in the sense of the natural law theories either. Rather these are principles of a moral-political kind, thus immanent to prāxis and hence to law as an “architectonic” institution
Decision rests with perception (Eth.Nic.II.9.1109b23)
Although you perceive particulars, perception is of universals (A.Po.II.19.100a16-b1)
This paper has been developed within the framework of the research project Constitucionalismo y argumentación (DER2010-20132), held by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation. I would like to thank Jenny Porter and Victoria Roca for their linguistic revision.
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Notes
- 1.
See Jaeger (1968: 426ff).
- 2.
Eth.Nic.VI.2.1139a20ff.
- 3.
Metaph.I.1.980a22.
- 4.
Eth.Nic.X.7–8.
- 5.
DeAn.II.3414b18-19; Metaph.I.1.980b 27–8; Eth.Nic.X.7.1177b2-34. See Burnyeat (2008). (Unless otherwise indicated, all the translations are taken from the revised Oxford edition of Aristotle’s works.)
- 6.
This is the reason that completely prevents us from interpreting the Aristotelian natural teleology as a purposive teleology (i.e., an anthropomorphic or a theological one). See Irwin (1988: 300, 525).
- 7.
As a result, nature and form identify. Phys.II.1.193b14ff.
- 8.
An.Post.II.19.100b. Met.I.1.980b29. See Barnes (1993: 259ff). Logic itself is but an instrument (organon) to investigate and formulate such universalities in nature.
- 9.
See Met.I.1.981a5-7, where Aristotle attributes to technē the production of the common logos that results from the multiple perceptions of particulars after their common content being retained in memory. Another relevant sign is the consideration of science as a virtue in the Ethics, which is a consideration from the point of view of the practical rules involving the construction of knowledge and the excellence of action they tend to achieve.
- 10.
Met.I.2.982b24-28. That end is truth itself: see II.1.993b20-21.
- 11.
- 12.
Nomoi are said to be expressions of intellect or nous (Eth.Nic.X.9.1180a18). In the Politics, legislators are compared to dēmiourgoi or craftsmen (such as weavers or shipbuilders) that impose a form (the constitution) upon materials (a given population and territory). See Pol.III.3.1276b1-11; IV.1.1288b19-21; VII.4.1326a35-38.
- 13.
Eth.Nic.V.7.1134b20, Ross’s and Broadie-Rowe’s translations.
- 14.
- 15.
Eth.Nic.III.3.1112a21ff.; VI.5.1140a32. Deliberation is a kind of inquiry, but not all inquiry is deliberative, for instance mathematics (1112b20ff.).
- 16.
- 17.
On the relationship between rules and identity judgments, see Wittgenstein (1999: §§142–3).
- 18.
- 19.
Compare to Hart’s definition of a “social rule” in terms of a constellation of justificatory practices involving the “acceptance” of a certain standard. This is the “internal aspect” of the rule to which an observer has to refer from the “internal point of view” of the agents (Hart 1994: 55ff.).
- 20.
- 21.
Pol.I.2.1253a37-39, my translation.
- 22.
Eth.Nic.II.1.1103b3-4; X.9.1180a32ff; Bodéüs (1993: 60–1).
- 23.
See Eth.Nic.VI.8.1141b25; X.9.1181b1.
- 24.
Eth.Nic.V.7.1134b20-22, Broadie & Rowe’s translation and emphasis.
- 25.
- 26.
- 27.
“For practically the majority of the acts commanded by the law are those which are prescribed from the point of view of virtue taken as a whole [hōlen aretē]; for the law bids us practice every virtue and forbids us to practice any vice. And the things that tend to produce virtue taken as a whole are those of the acts prescribed by the law which have been prescribed with a view to education for the common good” (V.2.1130b18ff.).
- 28.
As Miller (1995: 59) puts it: “[L]egal judgement is indispensable for the habituation and moral development of the citizens. Hence, human beings require a legal and political system in order to acquire ethical virtue”.
- 29.
Nussbaum (1985: 212).
- 30.
Eth.Nic.V.1.1129a34. Gauthier-Jolif’s translation.
- 31.
“The goodness or badness, justice or injustice, of laws varies of necessity with the constitutions of states” (Pol.III.11.1282b8-10).
- 32.
Eth.Nic.V.7.1135a5-6, my translation.
- 33.
Pol.III.9.1280a9, IV.4.1292a32, my translation.
- 34.
Firstly, Aristotle clearly differentiates the constitutional level from that of ordinary legality. The constitution establishes the different political organs and the ways for the citizen to participate in the deliberative, executive and judicial functions (for citizen is “whoever capable of participating in the deliberative or judicial function”, Pol.III.1275b18-19. Miller (1995: 87ff.) has interpreted this in terms of “political rights”). According to Aristotle, “the laws are, and ought to be, framed with a view to the constitution, and not the constitution to the laws” (IV.1289a13-15). Legislative activity is of an interpretative nature and it is developed within the constitutional framework (II.9.1269a32; see Bodéüs 1993: 74; Miller 1995: 157ff.). Secondly, the level of legality is neatly differentiated from that of particular rules. These are not nomoi but “decrees” (psephismata) that regulate particular situations (see MacDowell 1993: 43ff.) and must fit to legality since no decree should be universal (katholou): “The law ought to be supreme over all, and the magistracies should judge of particulars, and only this should be considered a constitution” (II.4.1292a33ff.; see III.11.1282b2ff; 15.1286a10). Finally, judicial decisions are particular determinations of nomoi to singular situations.
- 35.
See Eth.Nic.V.3.1131a27-29, Pol.III.8.1280a7-22, Pol.III.12.1282b18-23.
- 36.
As long as they are general, the laws reflect the “wisdom of the many” resulting from deliberative democracy: although each of the particular individual may not be a good man (spoudaios), when all of them meet together in the polis can be better than the few good, for each individual among the many has a part of virtue and wisdom (Pol.III.11.1281a42-1281b6; see Waldron 1999: 105ff., 119ff.).
- 37.
See Pol.IV.4.1292a2-38.
- 38.
Eth.Nic.II.4.1105b5-10, my emphasis.
- 39.
Eth.Nic.II.1.1103a17; see Gadamer (1999: 54).
- 40.
“The account of akrasia suggests a similar point about moral rules: for Aristotle here seems to believe that if a syllogism of the good, with its universal first principle, is fully active, the agent will not err from passion. Rules in the private sphere, law in the public, are necessities, not desiderata: necessary because we are not always competent agents, not always fully virtuous. We lack information, we reason slowly; the judgments even of good men can be distorted by desire. If we were really practically wise all the time, we would seldom require rules” (Nussbaum 1985: 211–2).
- 41.
Eth.Nic.X.9.1180b24-5, my translation.
- 42.
See Pol.III.15.1286a15-16; Rhet.I.1.1354a22.
- 43.
Eth.Nic.I.1.1094a14; 2.1094b5.
- 44.
Eth.Nic.VI.8.1141b28-29, Bodéüs’ translation.
- 45.
Eth.Nic.II.6.1107a29-32 (my translation; see 2.1104a5ff.); VI.7.1141b15-17.
- 46.
Rhet.I.1.1354b7-8, my translation.
- 47.
See Rhet.I.1.1354a29-32, 1354b11-16.
- 48.
Eth.Nic.I.2.1094b5-7, my translation.
- 49.
“And while people hate men who oppose their impulses, even if they oppose them rightly, the law in its ordaining of what is good is not burdensome” (Eth.Nic.X.9.1180a23-24).
- 50.
See Schauer (1991).
- 51.
See Eth.Nic.III.3.1112a34-b2; Eth.Eud.II.10.1226a33-b2.
- 52.
Eth.Nic.V.10.1137b12-16; see 1137b28-9; Const.Ath.9.
- 53.
Rhet.I.13.1374a25, my emphasis.
- 54.
On rules’ over- and under-inclusiveness, see Schauer (1991).
- 55.
See the example Aristotle gives in Rhet.I.13.1374a32ff.
- 56.
Rhet.I.13.1374b10-13, my translation.
- 57.
Eth.Nic.V.10.1137b29-32, my translation. See III.3.1112b8-9.
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Vega, J. (2013). Aristotle on Practical Rules, Universality, and the Law. In: Contreras, F. (eds) The Threads of Natural Law. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 22. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5656-4_1
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