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Building Relationships with Trust

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Agreement Technologies

Part of the book series: Law, Governance and Technology Series ((LGTS,volume 8))

Abstract

In this chapter we put together two major threads of work: trust in the enactment of contracts and the modelling of relationships between agents. We depart from previous work where trust is defined as the relationship between commitment of action and instant observation of the actual actions being performed. Here we generalise the approach by assuming a time delay between the observation of the actions and their valuation. The fundamental new idea being that commitment for action has a social dimension as the commitment of an agent should mean ‘attempting to act’ in the interest of the contractual partner, and that attempt has a time dimension that cannot be ignored.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For convenience it is assumed that both agents are presumed to have completed their enactments by the same time, t′.

  2. 2.

    The ontology is not made explicit to avoid overburdening the notation.

  3. 3.

    It is arguably more correct to consider: \(\mathrm{Value}((a,b)) =\mathrm{ Value}(b) -\mathrm{ Value}(a)\), as β’s actions may be influenced by his expectations of α’s enactment of a—this additional complication is ignored.

  4. 4.

    Computable in the sense that it is finitely computable, and hopefully not computationally complex.

  5. 5.

    The maximum entropy prior expresses total uncertainty about what the prior distribution is.

  6. 6.

    Optimistic in the sense that the estimation can be performed on the basis of the agent’s interaction history.

  7. 7.

    All actions are assumed to be dialogical.

  8. 8.

    Usually omitted to simplify notation.

  9. 9.

    Usually, a set of axioms defined over the concepts and relations is also required. We will omit this here.

  10. 10.

    The reliability estimate should perhaps also be a function of the commitment, R α t, b), but that complication is ignored.

  11. 11.

    In its purest form, individuals in these societies collect food and consume it when and where it is found. This is a pure equity sharing of the resources, the gain is proportional to the effort.

  12. 12.

    In these societies there are family units, around a shelter, that represent the basic food sharing structure. Usually, food is accumulated at the shelter for future use. Then the food intake depends more on the need of the members.

  13. 13.

    This is for efficiency. Updating the model following each utterance could expend resources to little effect.

  14. 14.

    If α assumes the each dimension of the contract space may be ordered to reflect β’s preferences and interprets β’s illocutionary actions of offer as willingness to accept whilst rejecting α’s previous offers then a probabilistic model of β’s limit contracts is derived using maximum entropy inference.

  15. 15.

    When questioning suspects the police may have two officers present each with a deliberately different stance.

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Correspondence to Carles Sierra .

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Sierra, C., Debenham, J. (2013). Building Relationships with Trust. In: Ossowski, S. (eds) Agreement Technologies. Law, Governance and Technology Series, vol 8. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5583-3_29

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5583-3_29

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  • Online ISBN: 978-94-007-5583-3

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