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(Social) Norms and Agent-Based Simulation

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Abstract

This chapter aims to identify the main relevant steps in the evolution of (social) norms as well as some of the factors or determinants of such a process and to discuss the most urgent scientific tasks to be fulfilled within a community of scientists committed to the study of norms. It is clearly the case that the scientific study of norms needs innovation and opening up to new instruments, new tools, new competencies, and especially new perspectives and approaches. As argued in this chapter, the merging of Agent-Based Modelling and Multi-Agent Systems appears as a promising direction to give a strong, innovative boost to the study of norms.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This section is inspired by and elaborates on some of the views expressed at that workshop, but is not intended to be a collectively agreed report of the discussion, which had a wider focus than simulation-based studies alone.

  2. 2.

    http://secondlife.com/

  3. 3.

    http://www.battle.net/wow/

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Correspondence to Giulia Andrighetto .

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Andrighetto, G. et al. (2013). (Social) Norms and Agent-Based Simulation. In: Ossowski, S. (eds) Agreement Technologies. Law, Governance and Technology Series, vol 8. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5583-3_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5583-3_11

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