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Sen’s Capability Approach: The Role of Practical Reason in Social Science

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Theoretical and Practical Reason in Economics

Part of the book series: SpringerBriefs in Philosophy ((BRIEFSPHILOSOPH))

Abstract

This chapter will present Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach (CA) highlighting how it creates a role for practical reason in social sciences, and specifically in economics. Section 3.2 will deal with two problems in Sen’s CA: first, the definition of specific capabilities given their plurality, and second, how to choose among capabilities given their incommensurability, and thus the issue of whether there is a hierarchy of capabilities. These two problems are at the root of the claim that the CA is inoperative. The first problem was the topic of a discussion between Sen and Nussbaum about establishing a possible list of capabilities. This will lead to introduce and discuss Nussbaum’s positions.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For a good survey of Sen’s position, see e.g., Sen (1993), Robeyns (2005), Walsh (2000, 2003).

  2. 2.

    “It is sometimes desirable”, asserts Severine Deneulin, “that functionings and not capabilities constitute the goal of public policy. In some areas, it is sometimes more important to have people function in a certain way than it is to give them the opportunity to function in a certain way. It is sometimes more important to focus on the human good (functionings), rather than on the freedom and opportunities to realize that human good (capabilities)” (Deneulin 2002, p. 506).

  3. 3.

    There is also the problem of informational requirements. I will not consider it because it is a technical problem that can be overcome technically.

  4. 4.

    Nussbaum (1990, pp. 205, 217—an outline sketch—234 and 237).

  5. 5.

    Nussbaum (1990, pp. 219–225), (1992, pp. 216–220), (1993, pp. 263–265), (1995b, pp. 76–79), (2000, pp. 78–80), (2003, pp. 41–42), (Nussbaum 2006, pp. 392–401).

  6. 6.

    See, e.g., Sen (1997, pp. 746 and 763, 2000, pp. 483, 486–487, 2002, 158ff., 2004c, p. 49).

  7. 7.

    About the information and interpretation problems, see Sen (1999a, pp. 26–32).

  8. 8.

    Sen develops the issue of how to do with partial orderings in many writings. A complete order, he maintains, is not necessary. It is a special case within the general case of partial orderings. See, e.g., 1985, pp. 198–199; 1997: Annex; 1999a, pp. 22–32 and passim.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, IAE, Universidad Austral, Mariano Acosta s/n y Ruta Nacional 8, 1629, Buenos Aires, Pilar, Argentina

    Ricardo F. Crespo

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Crespo, R.F. (2013). Sen’s Capability Approach: The Role of Practical Reason in Social Science. In: Theoretical and Practical Reason in Economics. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5564-2_3

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