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Introduction

  • Ricardo F. CrespoEmail author
Chapter
Part of the SpringerBriefs in Philosophy book series (BRIEFSPHILOSOPH)

Abstract

In this first chapter the main hypothesis of the book are presented. It argues that economics today requires the theoretical and practical uses of reason. These uses are first defined and characterized. Then, the concepts of “capacity” of Nancy Cartwright and of “capability” of Amartya Sen are introduced as examples of theses uses respectively. The book will argue that Sen’s capabilities—opportunities which are the goals of human development—are like Cartwright’s capacities—stable real causes—of the process of human development.

Keywords

Theoretical reason Practical reason Instrumental reason Ends in economics Nancy Cartwright Capacity Amartya Sen Capability 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsIAE, Universidad AustralPilarArgentina

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