The Berlin Group and the USA: A Narrative of Personal Interactions

  • Nicholas RescherEmail author
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science book series (BSPS, volume 273)


The article describes the contacts and collaborations between the author, Paul Oppenheim, C. G. Hempel, and Olaf Helmer in the 1940s and 1950s, particularly in the context of interactions at the RAND Corporation.


Canyon Road Rand Corporation Logical Empiricism Mandatory Retirement Philosophical Pragmatism 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of PittsburghPittsburghUSA

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