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Carl Hempel: Whose Philosopher?

  • Nikolay MilkovEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science book series (BSPS, volume 273)

Abstract

This chapter outlines Carl Hempel’s philosophical development in broad perspective. One little-appreciated fact that becomes clear in our discussion is that the Vienna Circle had less influence on Hempel than did the Berlin Group. Tracing this influence involves presenting seminal doctrines of Hempel’s masters and of his academic associates. The ultimate aim here is to locate Hempel’s place in the history of twentieth-century philosophy of science.

Keywords

Vienna Circle Philosophical Development Scientific Philosophy Berlin Group Exact Philosophy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of PaderbornPaderbornGermany

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