Abstract
Climate change is now widely recognized as a political priority, yet different views exist on how to shape an international response. Following serious setbacks in the climate negotiations, this question has also grown to encompass the adequacy of different venues and institutions to address the challenge of climate change mitigation. Applying a diverse set of metrics, this chapter assesses the structure and achievements of a number of existing and proposed fora for international climate cooperation. It starts with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, and proceeds to survey other venues focused on climate change. Rather than identifying one single panacea for climate change mitigation, the analysis shows that different approaches to climate cooperation evidence distinct strengths and shortcomings, typically accompanied by correlating trade-offs; and that a balanced combination of approaches may be needed to address the climate mitigation challenge. Unsurprisingly, the analysis also affirms that the global objective of effective climate change mitigation cannot be reached in any of the venues unless participants raise their political ambition.
Camilla Bausch works in the Senior Management and as a Senior Fellow at the Ecologic Institute, Berlin; Michael Mehling is President of the Ecologic Institute, Washington DC, and an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University.
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Notes
- 1.
See, most recently, Decision 2/CP.17, Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, 15 March 2012, recital 3 of Sec. II.A.
- 2.
Katherine Michonski and Michael A. Levi, Harnessing International Institutions to Address Climate Change (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2010) discuss a number of bodies not dealt with here, such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
- 3.
For discussion of the principles and objective of the UN climate regime, see in this volume Rowena Maguire, Foundations of International Climate Law: Objectives, Principles and Methods.
- 4.
See e.g. UN Security Council, Presidential Statement on Possible Security Implications of Climate Change, UN Doc. S/PRST/2011/15, 20 July 2011, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10332.doc.htm (last accessed on 24 June 2012); General Assembly, Resolution, “Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Humankind”, A/RES/65/159 December 2010, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/un/eng/ares65159.pdf (last accessed 24 June 2012); for more details on UNGA and UN Security Council see: Camilla Bausch, “The Power of Plurality – On the Different Fora Contributing to the Post-2012 Negotiations”, in Michael Rodi and Michael Mehling (eds), Bridging the Divide in Global Climate Policy: Strategies for Enhanced Participation and Integration (Berlin: Lexxion, 2009), 53; For the climate-related work of UNEP, refer to the UNEP website: http://unep.org/climatechange (last accessed on 15 June 2012). On the role of UNEP in global environmental governance, as well as on the UNEP reform debate, see: Marianne Beisheim and Nils Simon, “Neuer Schwung für die Reform der internationalen Umweltgovernance”, 37 SWP-Aktuell (2010).
- 5.
This was acknowledged even at the UN climate summit in Durban, South-Africa, in 2011. Decision 1/CP.17 on the Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, 15 March 2012, spells this out in its preambular language: “Noting with grave concern the significant gap between … Parties’ mitigation pledges … and … pathways consistent with having a likely chance of holding the increase of … temperature below 2 degrees C or 1.5 degrees C above pre-industrial levels.” Many scientific analyses support this finding, including the UNEP “Emission Gap Report”, UNEP, The Emissions Gap Report – Are the Copenhagen Accord Pledges Sufficient to Limit Global Warming to 2°Celsius or 1.5°Celsius? A Preliminary Assessment (November 2010).
- 6.
David G. Victor, The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the Struggle to Slow Global Warming (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Ruth Greenspan Bell, “The Kyoto Placebo”, 24 Issues in Science and Technology (2006), 28; Christoph Böhringer and Carsten Vogt, “Dismantling of a Breakthrough: The Kyoto Protocol as Symbolic Policy”, 20 European Journal of Political Economy (2004), 597.
- 7.
“Flexibility mechanisms” is a collective term applied to three instruments aiming at efficient GHG emission reduction: international Emissions Trading (ET), the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and Joint Implementation (JI), see Kyoto Protocol, articles 6, 12 and 17, respectively. For an introduction into the mechanisms see Camilla Bausch et al., “Efficient Climate Policy through Flexible Mechanisms”, in Michael Rodi (ed), Between Theory and Practice: Putting Climate Policy to Work, Vol. 1 (Berlin: Lexxion, 2008), 9.
- 8.
According to the UNFCCC Secretariat, its staff of “around 500 international civil servants works towards the UNFCCC’s goals, guided by the Convention’s 194 and the Protocol’s 190 Parties.” See UNFCCC, “Fact sheet: UNFCCC Secretariat”, available at http://unfccc.int/files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/unfccc_secretariat.pdf (last accessed on 12 June 2012).
- 9.
Nevertheless, the Cancún summit saw parties exploring new ways of dealing with the consensus requirement. Despite Bolivia explicitly opposing to the decision taken, the Presidency declared consensus. This approach shows the shaping power of political will, albeit potentially at the risk of undermining the perceived legitimacy of the outcomes, see Antto Vihma, A Climate of Consensus: The UNFCCC Faces Challenges of Legitimacy And Effectiveness (Helsinki: FIIA, March 11, 2011), at 2 seqq.
- 10.
Decision 1/CP.17 on the Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, 15 March 2012.
- 11.
According to UNEP calculations, the Montreal Protocol is projected to have reduced GHG emissions by 11 billion tonnes of CO2-equivalent emissions by 2010; it remains unclear to the authors whether the negative interplay has been taken into account in these calculations.
- 12.
For a comprehensive overview, see Sebastian Oberthür and Kelly Yasuko Matsumoto, “Managing Policy Contradictions between the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols: The Case of Fluorinated Greenhouse Gases”, in: Sebastion Oberthür and Olav Schram Stokke (eds), Institutional Interplay and Global Environmental Change: Interplay Management and Institutional Complexes: State of the Art and Perspectives (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009).
- 13.
Philip Drost, Multilateral Environmental Agreements 2008: State of Affairs and Developments, ed. (Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing, 2008), at 211.
- 14.
See, for example, Jessica Leber, “Emissions: Decades-old Global Pact Morphs into Potent Climate Treaty”, ClimateWire, 26 November 2008; see also Guus J.M. Velders et al., “The Importance of the Montreal Protocol in Protecting Climate”, 104 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (2007), 4814.; John M. Broder, “Experts Point to a More Proven Tool to Fight Warming”, International Herald Tribune, 9 November 2010, at 2.
- 15.
More details on the MEM and the MEF can be found in Bausch, “The Power of Plurality”, supra, note 4, at 47 et sqq.
- 16.
See also Andrew Light and Nina Hachigian, “Rise of the Green Dragon?”, available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/04/rise_green_dragon.html (last accessed on 12 June 2012).
- 17.
Available at http://www.greenpeace.org/international/press/reports/bush-mem (last accessed on 12 June 2012).
- 18.
In 2008, MEM participants produced a “Declaration of Leaders Meeting of Major Economies on Energy Security and Climate Change”, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2008/doc/doc080709_10_en.html (last accessed on 12 June 2012). Chinese news criticized the MEM as “fruitless”: Zhang Jin, “No Progress on Carbon Emission Cuts at MEF Meeting”, 27 May 2009, China Radio International, available at http://english.cri.cn/6966/2009/05/27/1461s488215.htm (last accessed on 10 June 2012).
- 19.
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks at the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate”, 27 April 2009, available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/04/122240.htm (last accessed on 10 June 2012).
- 20.
State Department, “Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate”, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/04/122097.htm (last accessed on 10 June 2012).
- 21.
These are: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
- 22.
For a list of events, see http://www.majoreconomiesforum.org/meetings (last accessed on 10 June 2012).
- 23.
For a summary of past meetings, see http://www.majoreconomiesforum.org/past-meetings (last accessed on 10 June 2012).
- 24.
Chair’s Summary, L’Aquila, July 10, 2009, available at http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/Chair_Summary,1.pdf (last accessed on 10 June 2012).
- 25.
See http://www.majoreconomiesforum.org/the-global-partnership (last accessed on 10 June 2012).
- 26.
Participants at the launch were Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, the European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Norway, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
- 27.
Brazil and India, for instance, explicitly opposed the outcome of the Leaders Meeting being framed as a negotiated communiqué, arguing that negotiation of the elements of a climate deal should be left to the UNFCCC, see Teriete, “Major Economies Meet in Mexico – Many Good Ideas in their Text, But All in Square Brackets”, 24 June 2009, available et http://blogs.panda.org/climate/2009/06/24/major-economies-meet-in-mexico-%E2%80%93-many-good-ideas-in-their-text-but-all-in-square-brackets (last accessed on 10 June 2012).
- 28.
It should be noted, however, that no such attempts are currently apparent to extend the mandate and role of the MEF.
- 29.
Its members are currently Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.
- 30.
Chair’s Summary, 8 June 2007, available at http://www.g-8.de/Content/EN/Artikel/__g8-summit/anlagen/chais-summary,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/chairs-summary.pdf (last accessed on 10 June 2012).
- 31.
G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit Leaders Declaration, Hokkaido Toyako, 8 July 2008, Points 22 to 35, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2008/doc/doc080714__en.html (last accessed on 10 June 2012).
- 32.
Chair’s Summary, L’Aquila, Italy, 10 July 2009, at 5, available at http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/Chair_Summary,1.pdf (last accessed on 10 June 2012).
- 33.
Chair’s Summary, L’Aquila, Italy, 10 July 2009, available at http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/Chair_Summary,1.pdf (last accessed on 10 June 2012).
- 34.
For details see Chair’s Summary, Muskoka, Canada, 25–26 June 2010, available at http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/g8/summit-sommet/2010/muskoka-declaration-muskoka.aspx?lang=eng (last accessed on 10 June 2012).
- 35.
The declaration can be accessed here: http://www.g20-g8.com/g8-g20/g8/english/the-2011-summit/declarations-and-reports/declarations/renewed-commitment-for-freedom-and-democracy.1314.html (last accessed on 10 June 2012).
- 36.
Camp David Declaration, Camp David, Maryland, United States, 18–19 May 2012, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/19/camp-david-declaration (last accessed on 10 June 2012).
- 37.
A compilation of the submissions, dated 28 March 2012, can be accessed here: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/adp1/eng/misc01.pdf (last visited on 24 June 2012).
- 38.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 May 2011, “Magerer Ertrag in Deauville”, available at http://www.faz.net/f30/common/Suchergebnis.aspx?term=eingespielten+Rhythmus+und+der+Illusion&x=0&y=0&allchk=1 (translation by authors; last accessed on 10 June 2012).
- 39.
This is why some see the G8 as an inadequate forum. See, for example, Sascha Müller-Kraenner, “Weichenstellung statt Katerstimmung – Nach dem Kopenhagen Debakel braucht Europa eine effektive Klimastrategie”, 66 Internationale Politik (2010), 2–7.
- 40.
As underlined in paragraph 2 of the concluding document of the HDP, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/53/43288908.pdf (last accessed on 10 June 2012).
- 41.
As underlined in paragraph 2 of the concluding document of the HDP, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/53/43288908.pdf (last accessed on 10 June 2012).
- 42.
Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/59/43299158.pdf (last accessed on 10 June 2012).
- 43.
Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/53/43288908.pdf (last accessed on 10 June 2012).
- 44.
The HAP agenda is available at http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/summit/20090709.O2E.html (last accessed on 10 June 2012).
- 45.
See http://www.oecd.org/site/0,3407,en_21571361_40549151_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last accessed on 10 June 2012); see also, for example, Ulrich Benterbusch, OECD Director of the HDP, outlining the way forward: http://wn.com/the_heiligendamm_process_extending_the_g8-g5_dialogue (last accessed on 10 June 2012).
- 46.
As a side observation, it bears noting that, in Deauville, the G8 also issued a joint declaration with Africa on shared values and responsibilities, which did not however mention climate at all and barely touched on the issue of renewable energy, while underlining the importance of access to energy, see http://www.g20-g8.com/g8-g20/g8/english/the-2011-summit/declarations-and-reports/declarations/shared-values-shared-responsibilities-g8-africa.1320.html (last accessed on 10 June 2012).
- 47.
The G20 comprises: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Republic of Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America and the European Union, which is represented by the rotating Council presidency and the European Central Bank. Initially, the G20 convened the finance ministers and Central Bank governors of these states, but more recently, G20 summits have also attracted heads of state and government.
- 48.
Available at http://www.g20.org/about_what_is_g20.aspx (last accessed on 10 June 2012).
- 49.
Official website of the French 2011 G20 presidency, FAQs: http://www.g20.org/about_faq.aspx (last accessed on 10 June 2012).
- 50.
See also Joy A. Kim, who points out that this perspective on climate governance “is neither desirable nor useful”, “Polycentric Governance of Climate Change in the Post-Copenhagen Era: The Role of the G20”, Conference Paper submitted to the 2nd Global Conference on Environmental Governance and Democracy – Strengthening Institutions to Address Climate Change and Advance a Green Economy, Yale, 2010, at 1, 10.
- 51.
This impression is supported, for example, by Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “Magerer Ertrag in Deauville”, 27 May 2011, available at http://www.faz.net/f30/common/Suchergebnis.aspx?term=eingespielten+Rhythmus+und+der+Illusion&x=0&y=0&allchk=1 (last accessed on 10 June 2012); Political indications for this trend are manyfold, for example: Deutsch-Chinesisches Gemeinsames Kommuniqué zur umfassenden Förderung der Strategischen Partnerschaft, July 2010, Recital 9, available at http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/334836/publicationFile/50199/100718-DeutschChinesisches_Kommunique.pdf (last accessed on 10 June 2012).
- 52.
G20, Leaders’ Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, 24–25 September 2009, available at http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/mediacenter/129639.htm (last accessed on 20 June 2012).
- 53.
For details, see David Runnalls, “Fossil Fuel Subsidies and the G20”, in John Kirton and Madeline Koch (eds), G8 & G20: The 2010 Canadian Summits (London: Newsdesk Media, 2010), 164, at 164.
- 54.
IGO-4, Analysis of the Scope of Energy Subsidies and Suggestions for the G-20 Initiative (Paris et al.: IEA/OPEC/OECD/World Bank Joint Report, 2010), at 5.
- 55.
G20 Seoul Summit, Leaders’ Declaration, 11–12 November 2010, available at http://www.g20.org/Documents2010/11/seoulsummit_declaration.pdf (last accessed on 20 June 2012).
- 56.
See G20 Los Cabos Summit, Leaders’ Declaration, 18–19 June 2012, available at http://g20mexico.org/images/stories/docs/g20/conclu/G20_Leaders_Declaration_2012.pdf (last accessed on 20 June 2012), paras. 70–72.
- 57.
Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Fact-Sheet-Creating-a-21st-Century-International-Economic-Architecture (last accessed on 20 June 2012). It should be mentioned, however, that some researchers see a risk that the G20 will exhaust themselves; the trend then would rather be to integrate new countries in the G8 format.
- 58.
Kim, “Polycentric Governance”, supra, note 50, with further references to arguments of some that the “expansion of its agenda beyond global economic governance … is a means for the group to further develop and solidify its status in the future” – which could be an additional incentive for heads to put climate change prominent on the G20 agenda.
- 59.
Kim, “Polycentric Governance”, supra, note 50.
- 60.
Trevor Houser, A Role for the G-20 in Addressing Climate Change? (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2010).
- 61.
Kim, “Polycentric Governance”, supra, note 50.
- 62.
See OECD, “Members and Partners”, available at www.oecd.org/document/25/0,3746,en_36734052_36761800_36999961_1_1_1_1,00.html (last accessed on 20 June 2012).
- 63.
See OECD, “Our Mission”, available at www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last accessed on 20 June 2012).
- 64.
See OECD, “Environment Directorate”, available at www.oecd.org/department/0,3355,en_2649_33713_1_1_1_1_1,00.htm (last accessed on 20 June 2012).
- 65.
See Article 4 of the Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, 14 December 1960, available at www.oecd.org/document/7/0,3746,en_2649_201185_1915847_1_1_1_1,00.html (last accessed on 20 June 2012): “Article 5: In order to achieve its aims, the Organisation may: (a) take decisions which, except as otherwise provided, shall be binding on all the Members; (b) make recommendations to Members; and (c) enter into agreements with Members, non-member States and international organisations.”
- 66.
UNFCCC, “Investment and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change”, 2007, available at http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/application/pdf/background_paper.pdf (last accessed on 20 June 2012); and the respective update: “Investment and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change: An Update”, UN Doc. FCCC/TP/2008/7, 2008.
- 67.
BASIC = Brazil, South Africa, India and China.
- 68.
See also Daniel Bodansky, A Tale of Two Architectures: The Once and Future U.N. Climate Change Regime (Phoenix, Az.: Arizona State University, 2011), at 18; Michonski and Levi, Harnessing International Institutions, supra, note 2, at 1–3.
- 69.
See supra, Section 2.2.
- 70.
Other, more theoretical criteria for the assessment and classification of international climate policy frameworks have been proposed by Robert N. Stavins, Joseph E. Aldy, Scott Barrett, “Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global Climate Policy Architectures”, 3 Climate Policy (2003), 373; Valentina Bosetti et al., Modeling Economic Impacts of Alternative International Climate Policy Architectures: A Quantitative and Comparative Assessment of Architectures for Agreement, Discussion Paper 08–20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, 2008); Daniel Bodansky, International Climate Efforts Beyond 2012: A Survey of Approaches (Arlington, VA: Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 2004).
- 71.
See Vihma, A Climate of Consensus, supra, note 8.
- 72.
See, for instance, the discussion by Robert N. Stavins, Options for the Institutional Venue for International Climate Negotiations, Issue Brief 2010–3 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, 2010).
- 73.
Michonski and Levi, Harnessing International Institutions, supra, note 2, at 3.
- 74.
See Houser, A Role for the G-20 in Addressing Climate, supra, note 68.
- 75.
Daniel Bodansky, A Tale of Two Architectures: The Once and Future U.N. Climate Change Regime (Phoenix, Az.: Arizona State University, 2011), at 18; Daniel Bodansky and Elliot Diringer, The Evolution of Multilateral Regimes: Implications for Climate Change (Arlington, VA: Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 2010); Michonski and Levi, Harnessing International Institutions, supra, note 2; Robert O. Keohane and David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate Change, Discussion Paper 2010–33 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, 2010), at 3–4.
- 76.
Houser, A Role for the G-20 in Addressing Climate, supra, note 68.
- 77.
Aware of this very real possibility, the UN climate regime has already decided to launch a comprehensive review, starting in 2013 and set to conclude by 2015, the year when global emissions should peak.
- 78.
Leading by example will also be an issue relevant to the political discussion within the EU, which is currently reflected in the debate on the – 30 % emission reduction target for 2020.
- 79.
With this implication Robert N. Stavins, Options for the Institutional Venue for International Climate Negotiations, Issue Brief 2010–3 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, 2010).
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Bausch, C., Mehling, M. (2013). Alternative Venues of Climate Cooperation: An Institutional Perspective. In: Hollo, E., Kulovesi, K., Mehling, M. (eds) Climate Change and the Law. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 21. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5440-9_6
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