Rationality and Experimental Economics

  • Mario GrazianoEmail author
Part of the SpringerBriefs in Philosophy book series (BRIEFSPHILOSOPH)


The theory of rational choice (TRC) is a model of explanation used by social science theorists to interpret behavior. Initially, the theory was the dominant paradigm of economics. A fundamental postulate of neoclassical economics was that economic phenomena primarily resulted from the action of agents who were fully rational, equal and therefore indistinguishable from each other and all agents pursuing their own personal and individual gain.


Utility Function Nash Equilibrium Game Theory Rational Agent Rational Choice 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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© The Author(s) 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Cognitive SciencesUniversity of MessinaMessinaItaly

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