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Spain: The Constitutional Court’s Move from Categorical Exclusion to Limited Balancing

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Exclusionary Rules in Comparative Law

Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 20))

Abstract

Spain inherited the French tradition of “nullities” but, since the end of the Franco dictatorship and the passage of a new constitution in 1978, a doctrine of evidentiary exclusion has developed which is perhaps the most rigorous in Europe. The move from dominance of the “search for truth” to emphasis on the protection of constitutional rights began with a decision of the new Constitutional Court of Spain in 1984, in which it held that violations of fundamental constitutional rights should lead to exclusion of evidence gathered as a result thereof. This decision led to the enactment of a law in the Judicial Code, which required exclusion of any direct and derivative evidence gained from violation of fundamental rights, that is, a clear adoption of the doctrine of the “fruits of the poisonous tree”. This Chapter documents this development and the application of the doctrine to violations of the right to privacy and to illegal confessions, but also lays out some subtle changes in the approach of the Constitutional Court which were triggered in a decision of 1998, where the court required trial courts to engage in a kind of balancing before it found whether evidence gathered following a fundamental violation was linked to the violation by a “nexus of illegality”. This has opened the door to exceptions to the earlier regime of nearly absolute exclusion in cases of constitutional violations.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For a general legal comparative view see Armenta Deu (2007, 544–575; 2009)

  2. 2.

    Guasp Delgado, (1947, 583–584), Muñoz Sabaté (1993,74), and Fernández Entralgo (1996, 121); quoting the same authors, see also Miranda Estrampes (2004, 54).

  3. 3.

    Explanatory Memorandum, VI. Also in XIX: “Sacred is the interest of society (to punish the infringement of the criminal law); but no less sacred are individual rights”.

  4. 4.

    Gómez Colomer (2008, 108 ff.).

  5. 5.

    Ibid, 109–110.

  6. 6.

    Fernández Entralgo (1996, 219).

  7. 7.

    Vives Antón, (1987, 125–126).

  8. 8.

    See Moreno Catena (1987, 134).

  9. 9.

    STC 114/1984, of 29 November.

  10. 10.

    STC 114/1984, FJ 2.

  11. 11.

    Aguilera Morales (2009, 83), who considers that the STC 114/1984, of 29 November, has granted the exclusionary rule the status of a constitutional right. Of a different opinion Del Moral García (2001, 138).

  12. 12.

    STC 114/1984, FJ 4. On this decision of the Constitutional Court see also, Gómez Colomer (2008, 114).

  13. 13.

    STC 114/1984, FJ 5. After this judgment, the close relation between the exclusionary rule and the right to a fair trial has been recognized in numerous Constitutional Court decisions.

  14. 14.

    For a detailed study of this rule see Asencio Mellado (1989, 80–91), Díaz Cabiale (1991, 120 ff.), Urbano del Castillo (1996, 228–237).

  15. 15.

    STS 64/1986 of 21 May.

  16. 16.

    For example, Díaz Cabiale (1991, 121). For the different opinions in the literature see, Miranda Estrampes (2004, 69).

  17. 17.

    On the evolution of the jurisprudence see Sect. 9.1.2.

  18. 18.

    The Spanish text uses the word “violentar” which literally means to force, but, more broadly, it is equivalent to breach or violation, in this case, of a fundamental right.

  19. 19.

    See for example, González García (2007, 31–54).

  20. 20.

    For example, STC 85/1994.

  21. 21.

    On the tortuous regulation of procedural nullities, see, among others, Vergé Grau (1982), Martín de la Leona (1996), Garcimartín Montero (2002), Lourido Rico (2004), Serra Domínguez (1981, 43 et seq.), Borrajo Iniesta (1993, 265 ff.), Bachmaier Winter (1994, 243 ff.), and Bachmaier Winter (1996, 1676 ff.).

  22. 22.

    See STS 4 April 1994 (RJ 2867); STS 2096/1996 of 9 April; 4859/1997, of 8 July; STS of 11 February 2000 (RJ 743), among many others.

  23. 23.

    Art. 10.2 Const.: “The principles relating to the fundamental rights and liberties recognized by the Constitution shall be interpreted in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the international treaties and agreements thereon ratified by Spain”.

  24. 24.

    See Sect. 9.1.3.1 and subsections, above.

  25. 25.

    This can be deduced from FJ 4º, where the Court indicates it is not establishing a general doctrine on exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, but is just deciding the issue as it applies to the case before it.

  26. 26.

    However, this question is still a subject of controversy in the legal literature. See among others, Fernández Entralgo (1996, 157) or Díaz Cabiale and Martín Morales (2001, 197).

  27. 27.

    STC 84/1994 of 14 March.

  28. 28.

    Ibid, FJ 4.

  29. 29.

    SSTC 6/1995 of 6 June; 54/1996 of 26 March.

  30. 30.

    STC 81/1998 of 2 April; STS 4 July 1997. On this decision see the study of Martínez García (2003, 191).

  31. 31.

    STC 81/1998 of 2 April. This doctrine has been followed in numerous cases. See, Sect. 9.2.3.4, below, for examples relating to illegal wiretaps. On the relation between the concept of “illegality connection” within the evidentiary exclusionary rules and the dogmatic German theory of the “objective accountability” (teoría de la imputación objetiva), see González Cusac (2008, 279).

  32. 32.

    STS 127/2004 of 19 January.

  33. 33.

    For criticism of the limitations, see, Gómez Colomer (2008, 145), and Aguilera Morales (2009, 105–106).

  34. 34.

    See STS 1203/2002, of 18 July.

  35. 35.

    See Armenta Deu (2009, 47–48).

  36. 36.

    STS 7310/1993, of 2 November.

  37. 37.

    STS 2943/1990, of 29 March.

  38. 38.

    STC 231/1988, of 1 December.

  39. 39.

    See Serrano Alberca (1980, 233).

  40. 40.

    STC 37/1989, of 15 February.

  41. 41.

    STS 2623/2000, of 31 March.

  42. 42.

    See Moreno Catena (2005, 230), Gil Hernández (1995, 60).

  43. 43.

    SSTS 4064/2003, of 12 June and 1470/2003, of 4 March.

  44. 44.

    In Niemietz v. Germany (1993), 16 E.H.R.R. 97, 111, § 29, the ECtHR said it would be too restrictive “to limit the notion of private life to an ‘inner circle.’” See also Veeber v. Estonia (2004), 39 E.H.R.R. 6, 125.

  45. 45.

    STC 10/2002, of 17 January.

  46. 46.

    See SSTS 13585/1994, of 19 September; 503/2001, of 29 January; 705/2003, of 5 February. In general see, Hinojosa Segovia (1996), and Cabezudo Bajo (2004).

  47. 47.

    See STC 171/1999, of 27 September.

  48. 48.

    ATC 290/2004, of 19 July.

  49. 49.

    See STC 22/1984, of 17 February; 137/198, of 17 October; 95/1999, of 31 May or 161/1999, of 19 July.

  50. 50.

    ATC 171/1989, of 3 April.

  51. 51.

    STC 22/2003, of 10 February.

  52. 52.

    SSTC 290/1994, of 27 October; 50/1995, of 23 February, 136/2000, of 29 May; 56/2003, of 24 March. The Spanish case law has definitely been influenced by the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in this area, especially in relation to the requirement of proportionality.

  53. 53.

    See STC 41/1998, of 24 February.

  54. 54.

    STC 94/1999.

  55. 55.

    For a discussion of this issue, see Vegas Torres (1996, 367–370).

  56. 56.

    STC 139/1999 of July 22. This doctrine has been reiterated in subsequent decisions: SSTC 161/1999, of 27 September, 136/2000, of 29 May, or 149/2001, of 27 June.

  57. 57.

    STC 161/1999 of September 27.

  58. 58.

    In the same sense STC 8/2000, of 17 January; STS 422/2002, of 28 January; 7995/2002, of 29 November.

  59. 59.

    STS 1055/2004, of 18 February.

  60. 60.

    ATC 123/2002, of 15 July. In an isolated decision, however, the Supreme Court ruled that a subsequent court confession should be suppressed if the court erroneously admitted the illegally seized physical evidence which preceded it, STS 13 March 1999 (RJ 2105).

  61. 61.

    § 579(4) CCP also provides, that in urgent cases involving offenses committed by armed bands or terrorist groups, the interception of telephone calls may be authorized by the Ministry of Home Affairs or the Director for the State Security, but the order must be ratified, or revoked, by a judge within 72 h in a reasoned decision.

  62. 62.

    See the guidelines set by the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court on April 4, 1995 in favor of this broad interpretation. Since then, see SSTS 308/1999, of 25 January; 6051/1994, of 26 September; 5195/2000, of 26 June.

  63. 63.

    See Moreno Catena (2005, 248).

  64. 64.

    In general, on the telephone tapping in Spain see, López Barja de Quiroga (1989), López-Fragoso Álvarez (1991), Martín Morales (1995), Montero Aroca (1999), and Gómez Colomer (1998, 145–167).

  65. 65.

    See Montón Redondo (1995, 1043–1052), Gimeno Sendra (1996, 1617–1624).

  66. 66.

    STC 49/1999, of 5 April.

  67. 67.

    For subsequent decisions of the Constitutional Court applying the requirements: STC 239/1999, of 20 December; STC 47/2000, of 17 February; STC 126/2000, of 16 May; STC 299/2000, of 11 December; STC 202/2001, of 15 October; STC 87/2002, of 22 April; STC 167/2002, of 18 September; STC 184/2003, of 23 October; STC 165/2005, of 20 June; STC 205/2005, of 18 July; and STC 26/2006, of 30 January. For subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court: STS 310/2000, of 24 January; STS 1683/2000, 3 March; STS 879/2001, 10 February; STS 5207/2001, of 18 June; STS 5466/2001, of 25 June; STS 2417/2002, of 4 April; STS 2912/2002, of 24 April; STS 4707/2003, of 4 July.

  68. 68.

    STC 86/1995 of 6 June. The Supreme Court reached a similar result after an illegal interception of a cell phone conversation, STS 734/1999, 8 February.

  69. 69.

    STS 4 October 1996 (RJ 7564).

  70. 70.

    See Sect. 9.1.4.3 above, with discussion of STC 81/1998, of 2 April.

  71. 71.

    STC 238/1999 of 20 December. See STC 26/2006 of 30 January and STC 70/2007 of 16 April, for similar decisions.

  72. 72.

    STC 136/2006, of 8 May. The Supreme Court reached a similar decision in the so-called Al Qaeda Case of May 31, 2006 (STS 7464/2006).

  73. 73.

    Valenzuela-Contreras v. Spain (1999), 28 E.H.R.R. 483, 506–107, §§ 58–61.

  74. 74.

    Prado Bugallo v. Spain, no. 58796/00, ECHR, 18 Feb. 2003.

  75. 75.

    Abdulkadir Coban v. Spain, ECHR, Decison of inadmissibility, 25 Sept. 2006.

  76. 76.

    SSTS 1011/2001, of 14 February; 3687/2001, of 7 May; 1303/2003, of 26 February or 6395/2003, of 17 October.

  77. 77.

    Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006, on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks. As stated in its Art. 1, this Directive aims to harmonize Member States’ provisions concerning the obligations of the providers of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks with respect to the retention of certain data which are generated or processed by them, in order to ensure that the data are available for the purpose of the investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime, as defined by each Member State in its national law.

  78. 78.

    Spanish Law 25/2007 of 18 October.

  79. 79.

    STC 18/2005, of 1 February.

  80. 80.

    See STC 161/1997, of 2 October; 61/2005, of 14 March; 127/1992, of 28 September; 197/1995, of 21 December.

  81. 81.

    In this sense, SSTC 37/1989 of 15 February and 161/1997, of 2 October.

  82. 82.

    On the interrogation of the defendant and the consequences of its unlawfulness, see Asencio Mellado (1989, 127).

  83. 83.

    STS 6635/1991, of 26 November.

  84. 84.

    See, for example, Silva Melero, La prueba procesal (1963, 193–195).

  85. 85.

    On the discussion of the use of narco-analysis to obtain confessions, from a psychological point of view, see Romero Coloma (1989, 45–56).

  86. 86.

    ATC 970/1987.

  87. 87.

    Gäfgen v. Germany (G.C.) (2011) 52 E.H.R.R. 1, 42, §§ 166–167.

  88. 88.

    In this sense STC 37/1989, of 15 February, quoted by Vegas Torres (1993, 83).

  89. 89.

    See SSTS 3155/1995, of 2 June and 6296/1996, of 12 November. Of another opinion, however, is, Vegas Torres (1993, 82), who considers that the right to remain silent and the privilege against self-incrimination are compatible with the admonition of the accused to declare according to the truth.

  90. 90.

    STS 3843/1990, of May 19.

  91. 91.

    STS of April 11, 1991 (RJ 2606).

  92. 92.

    STS 621/1992, of January 30.

  93. 93.

    See SSTC 128 y 129/1993 both of 19 April. For a similar decision, see STS 8120/ 1991, of October 25.

  94. 94.

    SSTS 1430/1995, of 10 March; 4739/1995, of 28 September; or 1199/1996, of 26 February.

  95. 95.

    STS 879/1998, of February 11; STS 740/1996, of February 7.

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  1. Facultad de Derecho, Universidad Complutense, E-28040, Madrid, Spain

    Lorena Bachmaier Winter

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    Stephen C. Thaman

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Winter, L.B. (2013). Spain: The Constitutional Court’s Move from Categorical Exclusion to Limited Balancing. In: Thaman, S. (eds) Exclusionary Rules in Comparative Law. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 20. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5348-8_9

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