Abstract
This Chapter describes, from an International point of view, the situation in different countries around the world, with particular attention to the regulation of the network on the territory, the techniques used by dissidents in loco to circumvent filters and several actions brought at state level to repress protest activities on the network. The first part of the Chapter analyzes Internet legal (and censorship) issues in the main regions of the world; the second part, with a greater level of detail, analyzes some critical situations, such as those in Cuba, Burma, Saudi Arabia, India, Syria, Iran, China, Australia, in several countries of the former Soviet Union, in the Koreas and in Vietnam, or some examples of a “freedom of information” approach, like the one that happened in Iceland.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
See the official web site at http://opennet.net/. Accessed 19 November 2011.
- 2.
See the full text of the Report at http://opennet.net/research/regions. Accessed 15 November 2011. The authors of the Report write, on the ONI web site: “The eight regional overviews provide broad summaries that exhibit the ways in which the countries within each region are grappling with the implications of Internet freedom and the challenges of regulating online content. These overviews include background research and, when applicable, synthesize the findings of technical tests carried out in these regions” (emphasis mine).
- 3.
See Asiatic Internet usage and population statistics (updated for June 30, 2011), at http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats3.htm. Accessed 26 November 2011. According to these statistics, Asia (with a population, in 2011, of 3,879,740,877) has an Internet penetration rate of 24% (932,393,209 Internet users, and 152,957,480 Facebook subscribers) and has the 56% of the population of the world. For a complete overview of Internet governance, intended as (emphasis mine), “ […] the development and application by Governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet” (Butt 2005: 2), in Asia and in 27 countries of the region, see the study by Butt regarding information and communications technology strategies and the public policy issues in these regions (Butt 2005). See, also, the Deibert, Palfrey, Rohozinski and Zittrain study regarding security, identity, and resistance in Asian Cyberspace (Deibert et al. 2012).
- 4.
See the ONI Country Profile regarding China at http://opennet.net/research/profiles/china-including-hong-kong. Accessed 21 November 2011. See, also, Sect. 6.2.7.
- 5.
See the ONI Country Profile regarding Burma at http://opennet.net/research/profiles/myanmar-burma. Accessed 21 November 2011. See, also, Sect. 6.2.1.
- 6.
See the ONI Country Profile regarding Vietnam at http://opennet.net/research/profiles/vietnam. Accessed 21 November 2011. See, also, Sect. 6.2.10.
- 7.
See the ONI Country Profile regarding Singapore at http://opennet.net/research/profiles/singapore. Accessed 24 November 2011.
- 8.
See the ONI Country Profile concerning South Korea at http://opennet.net/research/profiles/south-korea. See, also, Sect. 6.2.3.
- 9.
See, also, Sect. 6.2.15.
- 10.
See the ONI Country Profile regarding Pakistan at http://opennet.net/research/profiles/pakistan. Accessed 21 November 2011.
- 11.
See the ONI Country Profile regarding Nepal at http://opennet.net/research/profiles/nepal. Accessed 21 November 2011.
- 12.
See the ONI Country Profile concerning Malaysia at http://opennet.net/research/profiles/malaysia. Accessed 21 November 2011. For an interesting technological and political overview see, also, Gong’s study regarding Internet politics, state controls and the effect of blogs on the 2008 general election in Malaysia (Gong 2011). The author described how opposition candidates benefited significantly more from having a blog than did non-opposition candidates, as blogging provided opportunities denied to them by Malaysia’s state-controlled media (Gong 2011: 307). According to Gong, two points are, in similar situations, fundamental: (i) the Internet allows previously marginalized, or even new parties, to emerge and compete with established players especially in Malaysia, where the opposition is denied easy access to mainstream media and where the Internet becomes a powerful means they can use to gain publicity; (ii) there is a potential redistribution of power, and egalitarian use of the Internet may result in decentralized networks that redistribute power from party leaderships to grassroots activists (Gong 2011: 311–312).
- 13.
See Sect. 1.4.
- 14.
See the official web site of the project at http://www.nepalwireless.net/. Accessed 21 November 2011. As is remarked on the web site of the project, this action is inspired by the social cause for the socio economic transformation of rural villages in Nepal by optimum use of Information and Communication technologies, and is promoting wireless technologies connecting rural side to urban areas so that the transfer of technologies from urban to rural area would be possible through Internet and Intranet. Nepal Wireless have received license from Nepal Telecommunication Authority for wireless frequency of 5.8 GHz and 2.4 GHz through ISM band, and is planning to bring Internet to several sectors, like (i) e.commerce, (ii) tele-medicine, and (iii) distance learning.
- 15.
See Sect. 6.2.1.
- 16.
See the ONI Country Profile regarding Thailand at http://opennet.net/research/profiles/thailand. Accessed 14 November 2011.
- 17.
See an English translation of the Computer Crimes Act at http://www.prachatai.com/english/node/117. Accessed 19 November 2011. See, especially, Section 16 of the Act, which states (emphasis mine): “Any person, who imports to a computer system that is publicly accessible, computer data where a third party’s picture appears either created, edited, added or adapted by electronic means or otherwise in a manner that is likely to impair that third party’s reputation or cause that third party to be isolated, disgusted or embarrassed, shall be subject to imprisonment for not longer than 3 years or a fine of not more than 60,000 baht, or both. If the commission under paragraph one is a trustworthy action the perpetrator is not guilty. An offence under paragraph one shall be a compoundable offence. If a party injured by an offence under paragraph one has died before filing a complaint, then their parents, spouse or children may file a complaint and shall be deemed to be the injured party”.
- 18.
See the ONI Regional Overview concerning Australia and New Zealand at http://opennet.net/research/regions/australia-and-new-zealand. Accessed 24 November 2011.
- 19.
See, also, Sect. 6.2.11.
- 20.
See the ONI Regional Overview regarding Commonwealth of Independent States at http://opennet.net/research/regions/commonwealth-independent-states. Accessed 24 November 2011.
- 21.
See the ONI Country Profile concerning Ukraine at http://opennet.net/research/profiles/ukraine. Accessed 24 November 2011.
- 22.
See the ONI Country Profile concerning Georgia at http://opennet.net/research/profiles/georgia. Accessed 24 November 2011.
- 23.
See the ONI Country Profile concerning Kyrgyzstan at http://opennet.net/research/profiles/kyrgyzstan. Accessed 24 November 2011.
- 24.
See the ONI Regional Overview regarding Europe at http://opennet.net/research/regions/europe. Accessed 24 November 2011.
- 25.
See the ONI Regional Overview concerning Latin America at http://opennet.net/research/regions/la. Accessed 24 November 2011.
- 26.
See the ONI Country Profile regarding Cuba at http://opennet.net/research/profiles/cuba. Accessed 23 November 2011. See, also, Sect. 6.2.2.
- 27.
See an interesting news (AFP 2012) concerning the web presence of cartels and the possibility to use it against them with hacktivism actions. “ Mexico drug cartels […] have increasingly turned to the Internet to improve their communications, avoid detection, and recruit members, but officials say that reliance could be used in the fight against. […] Groups like the Zetas - a brutal gang of former hitmen - have also been using the web not just to help their operations, but to terrify their enemies and normal Mexican citizens with videos of executions, images of victims after torture and killing, and to hunt down critics who denounce violence online. An expert in military intelligence said those same methods could be used to obtain information on the gangs, notably to locate offenders using tracking methods that search through photos and messages from cellular phones. Press freedom groups have condemned growing attacks and killings of people who use social networks to share information in violent areas of Mexico, where traditional media no longer dare to report on relentless drug-related violence” (AFP 2012).
- 28.
See, inter alia, the article by Symmes regarding this issue (Symmes 1998). The journalist remarks that “ […] the government of aging dictator Fidel Castro declared access to the Internet a ‘fundamental right’ of the Cuban people, and then made it impossible for ordinary Cubans to buy a computer” (Symmes 1998).
- 29.
See the ONI Regional Overview regarding North Africa and Middle East at http://opennet.net/research/regions/mena. Accessed 14 November 2011.
- 30.
See the ONI Country Profile concerning Egypt at http://opennet.net/research/profiles/egypt. Accessed 24 November 2011. See, also, Sect. 6.3.1.
- 31.
See the ONI Country Profile concerning Syria at http://opennet.net/research/profiles/syria. Accessed 24 November 2011. See, also, Sect. 6.2.5.
- 32.
See the ONI Country Profile regarding Tunisia at http://opennet.net/research/profiles/tunisia. Accessed 24 November 2011. See, also, Sect. 6.3.2.
- 33.
See the ONI Country Profile regarding Saudi Arabia at http://opennet.net/research/profiles/saudi-arabia. Accessed 24 November 2011. See, also, Sect. 6.2.4.
- 34.
See ONI Regional Overview regarding Sub-Saharan Africa at http://opennet.net/research/regions/ssafrica. Accessed 24 November 2011.
- 35.
See ONI Country Profile regarding Ethiopia at http://opennet.net/research/profiles/ethiopia. Accessed 24 November 2011.
- 36.
See the official web site of the Commission at http://trcofliberia.org/. Accessed 23 November 2011.
- 37.
See the EFF announcement at https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/11/south-african-bill-poses-grave-threat-press-freedom. Accessed 24 November 2011.
- 38.
The text of Article 32 of the South African Constitution is: “Access to information. Everyone has the right of access to any information held by the state; and any information that is held by another person and that is required for the exercise or protection of any rights. National legislation must be enacted to give effect to this right, and may provide for reasonable measures to alleviate the administrative and financial burden on the state”.
- 39.
See the ONI Regional Overview regarding United States of America and Canada at http://opennet.net/research/regions/united-states-and-canada. Accessed 24 November 2011.
- 40.
See the official web site of the Commission at http://www.chrc-ccdp.ca/default-eng.aspx. Accessed 14 November 2011.
- 41.
The text of Article 13, regarding hate messages, is the following (emphasis mine): “ (1) It is a discriminatory practice for a person or a group of persons acting in concert to communicate telephonically or to cause to be so communicated, repeatedly, in whole or in part by means of the facilities of a telecommunication undertaking within the legislative authority of Parliament, any matter that is likely to expose a person or persons to hatred or contempt by reason of the fact that that person or those persons are identifiable on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination. (2) For greater certainty, subsection (1) applies in respect of a matter that is communicated by means of a computer or a group of interconnected or related computers, including the Internet, or any similar means of communication, but does not apply in respect of a matter that is communicated in whole or in part by means of the facilities of a broadcasting undertaking. (3) For the purposes of this section, no owner or operator of a telecommunication undertaking communicates or causes to be communicated any matter described in subsection (1) by reason only that the facilities of a telecommunication undertaking owned or operated by that person are used by other persons for the transmission of that matter”.
- 42.
See the full text of the Act at http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/h-6/. Accessed 14 November 2011.
- 43.
See the announcement at https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/11/northern-exposure-unmasking-online-spying-canada. Accessed 23 November 2011.
- 44.
As Cavoukian remarks (Cavoukian 2011), these bills would regulate three important points: (i) Bill C-50 would make it easier for the police to obtain judicial approval of multiple intercept and tracking warrants and production orders, to access and track e-communications, (ii) Bill C-51 would give the police new powers to obtain court orders for remote live tracking, as well as suspicion-based orders requiring telecommunication service providers and other companies to preserve and turn over data of interest to the police, and (iii) Bill C-52 would require telecommunication service providers to build and maintain intercept capability into their networks for use by law enforcement, and gives the police warrantless power to access subscriber information.
- 45.
See Sect. 3.9.2.
- 46.
See the interesting work of Nordahl concerning contemporary exile journalism, including a case study of The Democratic Voice of Burma (Nordahl 2009).
- 47.
See another interesting analysis, by Dacanay, regarding Internet usage by Burmese ethnic migrants, especially marginalized women in Mae Sod and Internet divide problems (Dacanay 2010). The author notes (emphasis mine): “The Internet has ostensibly liberating effects on these women, but this paper proposes that there is more to the feeling of being free in the virtual world. There is currently a “project” of affirming, claiming, and molding traditional ethnic identities through the use of Internet. The paper imagines this as revolutionizing the discursive mode of resistance and rebellion by these marginalized women against the military regime in Burma. Using their agentic qualities, the women transform their social scripts as “marginalized” and “displaced” into “empowered” women who are informed, educated, and aware of their human rights”. The scholar remarks also that (emphasis mine): “Studies have shown how the Internet has provided liberating effects especially on individuals in conflict-situated areas […] Indeed, what became clear from our data was the importance of the Internet in providing a space or refuge to migrant women who are displaced because of the political situation in Burma and who now live in a quasi-hospitable and quasi hostile and restricting environment in Thai towns by the border. While the movements of their bodies are restricted their minds are free to explore and travel to far away places through the Internet. The Internet becomes a window to the outside world, so to speak” (Dacanay 2010: 1).
- 48.
The Report may be found at the address http://www.cpj.org/reports/2009/04/10-worst-countries-to-be-a-blogger.php. Accessed 23 October 2010.
- 49.
The blacklist can be viewed at http://12mars.rsf.org/i/Internet_Enemies.pdf. Accessed 23 October 2010.
- 50.
For a detailed history of political, legal and social events in Burma, and their connection with the Internet and the United States government, see the essay by Danitz and Strobel about networking dissent, the promotion of democracy in Burma and limitations that activist NGOs face when confronting resolute authoritarians (Danitz and Strobel 2001). The authors note that (emphasis mine): “The case of Burma raises intriguing questions about the effect of modern computer communications on the balance of power between citizens and elected officials, and among local, national, and international power structures and, ultimately, their effect on the conduct of diplomacy in the 21st century. Geographically dispersed but knitted together by the Internet, Burmese and non-Burmese activists from the United States as well as from Europe and Australia joined a long standing effort to bring democracy to Burma (a small, and to many, obscure Southeast Asian nation). Their global campaign raised constitutional and national policy questions in the United States, as a state government and local councils passed foreign policy legislation without consulting Washington. […] We offer evidence that the Internet was crucially influential in enabling civil society actors to force the passage of a series of laws regarding business and political dealings with Burma. The Internet was also used to sway international public opinion and pique the interest of more traditional news media. In particular, we find that, among its many and still unfolding uses, the Internet - by its very nature - lends itself as a potent tool for advocates organizing for action on international issues” (Danitz and Strobel 2001: 130–131).
- 51.
See the ONI Country Profile concerning Burma at http://opennet.net/countries/burma. Accessed 23 October 2011.
- 52.
See, for example, http://burmacampaign.org.uk. Accessed 23 October 2011.
- 53.
The text of Article 354 of the Constitution reads as follows: “Every citizen shall be at liberty in the exercise of the following rights, if not contrary to the laws, enacted for Union security, prevalence of law and order, community peace and tranquility or public order and morality: (a) to express and publish freely their convictions and opinions; (b) to assemble peacefully without arms and holding procession; (c) to form associations and organizations; (d) to develop their language, literature, culture they cherish, religion they profess, and customs without prejudice to the relations between one national race and another or among national races and to other faiths”. English text of the 2008 Constitution can be found at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf. Accessed 23 October 2011.
- 54.
The Burmese Penal Code can be viewed at the address http://www.blc-burma.org/html/Myanmar%20Penal%20Code/mpc.html. Accessed 23 October 2011.
- 55.
See the text of Section 130 (b): “Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, publishes anything tending to degrade, revile or to expose to hatred or contempt any Foreign State, Head of State, Ambassador or other dignitary of a Foreign State, with intent to disturb peaceful and friendly relationship between the Union of Burma and that Foreign State, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both”.
- 56.
See the text of Section 295 (a): “Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class of persons by words, either [through] spoken or written [means], or by visible representations, insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of that class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both”.
- 57.
See the text of Section 505: “Whoever makes, publishes or circulates any statement, rumour or report, (a) with intent to cause, or which is likely to cause, any officer, soldier, sailor or airman, in the Army, Navy or Air Force to mutiny or otherwise disregard or fail in his duty as such; or (b) with intent to cause, or which is likely to cause, fear or alarm to the public or to any section of the public whereby any person may be induced to commit an offence against the State or against the public tranquility; or (c) with intent to incite, or which is likely to incite, any class or community of persons to commit any offence against any other class or community, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both”.
- 58.
See the text of Article 6: “(1) Registration of printers and publishers. As enacted by other means in this law, according to paragraph Three, all printers and publishers having made and signed an agreement must apply to have their own business registered within the period of time specified according to the method of application designated by the appropriate registration official. (2) No-one may engage in either printing or publishing without a registration certificate issued in accordance with this law in compliance with the rules or requirements relating to the certificate”. The text of the law is at the address http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/Printers_and_Publishers_Registation_Act.doc. Accessed 23 October 2011.
- 59.
See the text of the Law that can be found at the address http://www.mcpt.gov.mm/mcpt/myanmar-computer-science-development-law.htm. Accessed 23 October 2011. See, for example, Article 26: “(a) The Ministry of Communications, Posts and Telegraphs may, with the approval of the Council determine by notification the types of computer to be imported, kept in possession or utilize only with the prior sanction of the Ministry. (b) In determining the types of computer under sub-section (a), fax-modem card installed computer which can transmit or receive data shall be primarily targeted. (c) In determining the types of computer under sub-section (a), it shall not apply to computers that are used only as aids in teaching, office work or business”; Article 27: “A person desirous of importing, keeping in possession or utilizing the type of computer prescribed in sub-section (a) of section 26 shall apply to the Ministry of Communications, Posts and Telegraphs in accordance with the stipulations to obtain prior sanction”; Article 28: “A person desirous of setting up a computer network or connecting a link inside the computer network shall apply to the Ministry of Communications, Posts and Telegraphs in accordance with the stipulations to obtain prior sanction”; Article 29: “The Ministry of Communications, Posts and Telegraphs may, after scrutinizing the applications submitted under section 27 or section 28 in accordance with the stipulations, grant prior sanction or refuse to grant prior sanction”; and Article 30: “A person desirous of keeping in possession or utilizing the type of computer prescribed under sub-section (a) of section 26, shall comply with the orders and directives issued from time to time by the Ministry of Communications, Posts and Telegraphs with respect to issuance of licence, prescribing the term of licence, licence fee and licence conditions”. Article 31 and 32 establish several sanctions: “31. Whoever imports or keeps in possession or utilizes any type of computer prescribed under sub-section (a) of section 26, without the prior sanction of Ministry of Communications, Posts and Telegraphs shall, on conviction be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend from a minimum of 7 years to a maximum of 15 years and may also be liable to a fine”; and Article 32: “ Whoever sets up a computer network or connects a link inside the computer network, without the prior sanction of the Ministry of Communications, Posts and Telegraphs shall, on conviction be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend from a minimum of 7 years to a maximum of 15 years and may also be liable to a fine”.
- 60.
The full text of the law can be found at http://www.blc-burma.org/html/myanmar%20law/lr_e_ml96_08.html. Accessed 23 October 2011.
- 61.
See the text of Article 3: “The objectives of this law are as follows: (a) to modernize and uplift the standard of video business; (b) to cause the emergence of video tapes which will be beneficial for the all-round development of the State and the preservation of Manmar cultural heritage; (c) to cause emergence of video tapes which contribute towards national solidarity and dynamism of patriotic spirit; (d) to prohibit and ban decadent video tapes which undermine Myanmar culture and Myanmar tradition; (e) to control and prevent malpractices which are caused trough video business”.
- 62.
See the text of Chapter III: “Chapter III - Licence for Possession - 4. Any person who holds and uses a television set or a video cassette recorder shall apply for licence for possession, in accordance with the stipulations to the relevant post office within 30 days from the date of receipt of the same. 5. (a) The applicant shall pay the fee payable out of the following fees in accordance with the stipulations to the relevant post office: (i) fee of the licence for possession; (ii) overdue fee; (iii) extension fee; (b) On receipt the prescribed fee the relevant post office shall issue the licence for possession to the applicant. 6. Upon the expiry of the tenure of the licence for possession, a person desirous of extending such tenure shall have the extension effected by paying to prescribed fee to the relevant post office. 7. The Ministry of Communications, Posts and Telegraphs shall determine the tenure and fee of the licence for possession, overdue fee and extension fee. 8. Any person who is desirous of possessing any satellite television receiver shall comply with the order and directives relating to import, possession, use, transfer, sale, issuance of licence, determination of licence fee and licence conditions, issued from time to time by the Ministry of Communications, Posts and Telegraphs”.
- 63.
The text of Chapter IX – Offences and Penalties is: “31. Whoever with the exception of a Government department and government organization operates the television transmission business without the premission of the Government shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 5 years or with fine. In addition, the property which relate directly to the offence shall also be confiscated. 32. Whoever commits one of the following acts shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 3 years or with tine which may extend to kyats 100,000 or with both. In addition, the property which relate directly to the offence shall also be confiscated: (a) operating video business for commercial purpose without a video business licence; (b) copying, distributing, hiring or exhibiting the video tape that has no video censor certificate and small-sized video censor certificate with the permitted serial number with the exception of cases exempted under this Law; (c) copying, distributing, hiring or exhibiting the video tape without abiding by the directive of the Video Censor Board to make excision, amend or erase; (d) exhibiting to the public the video tape imported or brought from a foreign country without video censor certificate; (e) exhibiting to the public the video tape imported or brought from a foreign country and which is permitted only for the family show. 33. Whoever commits one of the following acts shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 3 years or with fine which may extend to kyats 100,000 or with both:- (a) distributing, hiring or exhibiting the copied television programme transmitted by the government department or government organization, for commercial purpose; (b) copying, distributing, hiring or exhibiting for commercial purpose a video tape which has already obtained video censor certificate, without permission of the licence holder of video production business or video tape distribution business. 34. If any video business licence holder operates video business other than the kind for which he holds licence he shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 1 year or with fine which may extend to kyats 100,000 or with both. In addition, the property which relate directly to the offence shall also be confiscated. 35. If any video business licence holder transfers his video business licence to another person to operate he shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 6 months or with fine which may extend to kyats 50,000 or with both. 36. Whoever fails to abide by an order or directive issued by the Ministry of Information or Video Censor Board or the Video Business Supervisory Central Committee under this Law shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 6 months or with fine which may extend to kyats 50,000 or with both”.
- 64.
See the text: “33. Whoever commits any of the following acts by using electronic transactions technology shall, on conviction be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend from a minimum of 7 years to a maximum of 15 years and may also be liable to a fine: (a) doing any act detrimental to the security of the State or prevalence of law and order or community peace and tranquillity or national solidarity or national economy or national culture. (b) receiving or sending and distributing any information relating to secrets of the security of the State or prevalence of law and order or community peace and tranquillity or national solidarity or national economy or national culture. 34. Whoever commits any of the following acts shall, on conviction be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 5 years or with fine or with both: (a) sending, hacking, modifying, altering, destroying, stealing, or causing loss and damage to the electronic record, electronic data message, or the whole or part of the computer programme dishonestly; (b) intercepting of any communication within the computer network, using or giving access to any person of any fact in any communication without permission of the originator and the addressee; (c) communicating to any other person directly or indirectly with a security number, password or electronic signature of any person without permission or consent of such person; (d) creating, modifying or altering of information or distributing of information created, modified or altered by electronic technology to be detrimental to the interest of or to lower the dignity of any organization or any person. 35. Any certification authority or any of his officer or employee who violates any of the prohibitions contained in the order issued by the Control Board shall, on conviction be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 3 years or with fine or with both. 36. Whoever violates any of the prohibitions contained in the rules, notifications and orders issued under this Law shall, on convition be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 1 year or with fine or with both. 37. Whoever commits any of the following acts shall, on conviction be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 1 year or with fine or with both:- (a) knowingly misrepresents to the certification authority his identity or authorisation in applying for a certificate or in submitting for suspension or cancellation of a certificate; (b) obstructing or impeding or assaulting the Central Body and body or person assigned duty by it or the Control Board and body or person assigned duty by it which performs the functions and duties in accordance with this Law or failing to comply with the demand to perform in accordance with this Law. 38. Whoever attempts to commit any offence of this Law or conspires amounting to an offence or abets the commission of an offence shall be punished with the punishment provided for such offence in this Law”.
- 65.
See the study by Chowdhury on the role of Internet in Burma’s Saffron Revolution (Chowdhury 2008). According to the author (emphasis mine): “The 2007 Saffron Revolution in Burma was in many ways an unprecedented event in the intersection between politics and technology […] and […] the event marks a rare instance in which a government leveraged control of nationalized ISPs to entirely black out Internet access to prevent images and information about the protests from reaching the outside world” (Chowdhury 2008: 2).
- 66.
See, inter alia, a study by Mottaz regarding new media in closed societies and the role of digital technologies in Burma’s Saffron Revolution (Mottaz 2010). The author notes (emphasis mine): “The 2007 uprising is a unique example of a technology driven protest in a highly authoritarian state. […] Despite government restrictions, citizen journalists and digital activists have found innovative ways to circumvent restrictions. Many install foreign-hosted proxy servers, allowing users to access Gmail and other blocked sites. Hyper-encrypted e-mail services are also used to evade government censorship of e-mail content. According to experts, these circumvention techniques have been very successful and the junta has been unable to control their use. The outbreak of the Saffron Revolution demonstrates this […] Access to digital technologies in 2007 enabled activists to stay organized and informed. Mobile phones played a crucial role in keeping protestors connected by reducing communication times from weeks to mere seconds. Mobile phones played an indispensable role in the pro-democracy campaign. They permitted monks and activists to coordinate their protests to generate the most pressure on the regime. Mobile phones also allowed activists to stay in contact during the protests and warn each other about military movements […] Burmese bloggers also played a critical role in the uprising by providing citizens with information about the protests […] Due to the lack of broad Internet access in Burma, Internet initiatives found the most success when coupled with traditional forms of mass communication, particularly radio and satellite television. During the uprising, news updates from Internet blog sites were quickly transferred into television and radio broadcasts […] These technologies also allowed activists to connect with the international community. Pictures, video footage, and commentary reached international news agencies via the Internet within hours. The speed at which information about Burma’s democracy protests reached the outside world had a significant impact on the movement because the international community was able to quickly react to this information and support protestors by putting pressure on the Burmese regime” (Mottaz 2010: 3, 5).
- 67.
See the study by Thiha on the role of the local bloggers and of the Burmese blogosphere during the Saffron revolution (Thiha 2010). The author notes (emphasis mine): “As Burmese blogosphere is developed through Saffron Revolution, the blogs are still in revolutionist nature. It is require developing into cyberspace for political discussion. The relationship between political blogosphere and non-political blogosphere is still weak. Although we cannot identify the locations of the bloggers we can assume most of the bloggers are from outside Myanmar by interpreting the numbers of posts. Empowering and encouraging citizens inside Myanmar is required to increase participation and discussions in both cyberspace and blogospheres to improve equal participation. Burmese political blogosphere can be regard as the space that can criticize the government actions however; it is still not possible to interpret their political ideology as posts are only intended to against the regime. It is also too early to conclude that Burmese political blogosphere is representing the voice of citizens inside Myanmar as participations from inside Myanmar are low” (Thiha 2010: 8).
- 68.
For an overview of the technological framework see the Cuba Study Group article regarding how to empower the cuban people through access to technology (CSG 2010): “There are several obstacles to the development of information technology in Cuba, including the impact of economic sanctions by the United States. However, the primary reasons for Cuba’s underdevelopment in ICT stem from the Cuban government’s own policies, which aim to prioritize political control over economic development and information infrastructure” (CSG 2010: 220).
- 69.
See, inter alia, the article by Boas regarding Internet in Cuba and the United States of America policy (Boas 2000) and the Internet dilemma. The author remarks (emphasis mine): “Authoritarian leaders in the information age are confronted with an unmistakable dilemma. On the one hand, the Internet and associated information and communication technologies offer enormous economic potential for developing countries, and the increasingly interconnected global economy thrives on openness of information. On the other hand, the information revolution poses new challenges for regimes that rely on centralized political control” (Boas 2000: 57). The scholar notes, also, that (emphasis mine): “Networks of dissidents and reform-minded NGOs have shown that they can use new technological tools to place pressure on their governments, but their information-empowered activism is limited by their access to technology, a factor over which regimes can choose to retain full control” (Boas 2000: 66). Also interesting is the study by Fitzgerald concerning blacklisting and secondary boycotts (Fitzgerald 1998), and the essay by Bowman on export controls in the digital era (Bowman 2004).
- 70.
See the study by Hoffmann regarding how the Internet can change state-society relations in an authoritarian regime such as Cuba (Hoffmann 2011). The scholar writes that (emphasis mine): “A precondition for civil society activism to evolve is some degree of public sphere in which it can ‘breathe’. The state monopoly on mass media, as exercised by the Cuban state, has been a particuary thorough form of authoritarian control over the national public sphere. The comparative empirical analysis of civil society dynamics in the 1990s and in the 2000s has shown the notable impact of the digital, web-based media on the contours of the public sphere and has also demonstrated that this, in turn, impacts the activities, conception and organizational forms of societal actors” (Hoffmann 2011: 25).
- 71.
For a brief overview of Yoani’s activities, see the essay by Henken regarding the emergent blogosphere in Cuba (Henken 2011). The author remarks that: “Anyone who has read Generación Y over the past three and a half years will have noted Sanchez’s great faith in the power of a wide and growing variety of information and communication technologies (ICT) - including blogs, Twitter, Facebook, You Tube, as well as internet-ready Flipcams and smart phones that can send SMS texts and e-mails and record voice, photos, and video. For her, these technologies have the potential to help “level the playing field” between authoritarian governments and marginalized citizens – whether they be Iranian voters, Chinese dissidents, or Cuban bloggers. She also clearly believes that such ventures into cyberspace can help these citizens begin to create more public space where they can exercise the full rights and responsibilities of true citizens”. It is still too early to determine the depth of the impact of the Cuban blogging phenomenon. The fact that the government has blocked Cuba’s most influential independent blog, Yoani Sánchez’s Generación Y, now for more than 2 years, has repeatedly denied Sánchez permission to travel abroad, and has gradually augmented its media and physical attacks against her, all indicate that it is concerned about her growing influence. Her growing international profile and ability to sway global public opinion about the Cuban regime along with her increasingly audatious public activism for freedom of expression within the island make her simultaneously impossible to ignore and dangerous to repress. At the same time, given the extremely low level of Internet connectivity in Cuba and the fact that the government continues to control the totality of the island’s mass media, we are still far away from any so-called “blogostroika,” where the Internet and independent blogs can effectively challenge the state’s monopoly on information. For their part, neither Sánchez nor the rapidly expanding group of independent cyber-activists who work alongside her, show the least indication of ceasing to provoke the regime by living as full citizens with all the rights and duties the term implies. Sánchez openly admits that what began for her as an individual project of personal catharsis has been transformed over time into a collaborative international media project that seeks to go beyond the constraints of cyberspace in order create more free and independent public space within the island for open debate about Cuba’s many difficult challenges. Openly skeptical, Sánchez rejects “verbal violence,” cynicism, personal attacks, and the disqualification of those who think differently – all unfortunate characteristics with deep roots in Cuban political culture and commonplace on both sides of the Straits of Florida. Her goal is to create a pluralistic, respectful, and serious civil dialogue in her beloved patria. She intends to accomplish this goal through the transparent exercise of her particular brand of citizen cyber-journalism (Henken 2011: 125).
- 72.
See Sect. 1.4.
- 73.
See http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats3.htm. Accessed 19 November 2011.
- 74.
The full text of Article 21 reads: “Article 21 [Speech, Press, Assembly, Association, Honor, Public Morals] (1) All citizens shall enjoy freedom of speech and the press, and freedom of assembly and association. (2) Licensing or censorship of speech and the press, and licensing of assembly and association shall not be recognized. (3) The standards of news service and broadcast facilities and matters necessary to ensure the functions of newspapers shall be determined by Act. (4) Neither speech nor the press shall violate the honor or rights of other persons nor undermine public morals or social ethics. Should speech or the press violate the honor or rights of other persons, claims may be made for the damage resulting therefrom”.
- 75.
Article 3 states: “Article 3 provides: 1. The press shall respect the dignity and value of human beings and the basic democratic order; 2. The press shall perform its public duties by contributing to the formation of democratic public opinions concerning matters of public interest by means of news reports, commentary, and other methods; 3. The press shall not infringe upon the personal honor or rights of an individual, or public morality or social ethics; 4. The press shall not encourage or praise violence and other illegal actions which disrupt public order”.
- 76.
Article 47 of the Telecommunications Code states that it is illegal to “disseminate false news intended to damage the public interest.” The penalty for any violation can mean up to 5 years in prison. The electoral law was amended in 2004 to prohibit the dissemination via the Internet of defamatory statements about politicians running for office in an election campaign. The Penal Code, notably the provisions against insult and defamation – even when the statements turn out to be true – is also used against Internet users (Article 307).
- 77.
Article 53 declares: “a person in use of telecommunications shall not make communications with contents that harm the public peace and order or social morals and good customs”.
- 78.
See the decisions of the Korean Constitutional Court, Opinion 14–1 KCCR 616, 99Hun-Ma480, June 27, 2002, at http://www.ccourt.go.kr/home/english/decision_etc./decision2003.htm. Accessed 14 November 2011.
- 79.
See the Article 7 of the National Security Law, that prohibits promoting or encouraging anti-statist groups, including North Korea. In paragraph 5 of this Article, any publication in support of the enemy or the mere reprinting of a document on the subject is also prohibited. Article 8 also prohibits any contact or communication with anti-statist groups. Recently the police investigated a cybercafé from which pro-North Korean messages had allegedly been posted. The café’s owner was charged with violating the National Security Law.
- 80.
See the Korean Communitations Commission, the Korean Broadcasting Commission, the Korean Communitations Standard commission.
- 81.
See the text of Article 133: “Collection, Abandonment, and Deletion of Illegal Reproductions,” “the Minister of Culture, Sports, and Tourism would be authorized to shut down message boards that refuse to comply with more than three warnings to remove copyrighted content, while users who upload such content may also have their accounts canceled”
- 82.
See http://www.internetworldstats.com/middle.htm#sa. Accessed 21 November 2011.
- 83.
See http://www.info.gov.sa/English/eSectDetails.aspx?id=12. Accessed 21 November 2011.
- 84.
See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/791936.stm. Accessed 21 November 2011.
- 85.
See http://en.rsf.org/internet-enemie-saudi-arabia,39745.html. Accessed 21 November 2011.
- 86.
See http://en.rsf.org/saudi-arabia-information-minister-bans-live-01-02-2008,25340.html. Accessed 21 November 2011.
- 87.
See http://www.isu.net.sa/saudi-internet/contenet-filtring/filtring.htm. Accessed 21 November 2011.
- 88.
See http://www.kacst.edu.sa/en/Pages/default.aspx. Accessed 21 November 2011.
- 89.
See http://opennet.net/blog/2009/04/restriction-internet-use-middle-east-rise-internet-caf%C3%A9s-saudi-must-install-hidden-came. Accessed 21 November 2011.
- 90.
See http://en.rsf.org/saudi-arabia-human-rights-defender-held-since-22-07-2010,38000.html. Accessed 21 November 2011.
- 91.
See http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40046&Cr=Syria&Cr1=. Accessed 21 November 2011.
- 92.
See http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39935&Cr=syria&Cr1=. Accessed 21 November 2011.
- 93.
See http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/sy00000_.html. Accessed 21 November 2011.
- 94.
See http://www.ste.gov.sy/. Accessed 21 November 2011.
- 95.
See http://opennet.net/research/profiles/syria. Accessed 21 November 2011.
- 96.
See http://syriatel.sy/. Accessed 21 November 2011.
- 97.
See http://fr.rsf.org/. Accessed 21 November 2011.
- 98.
See http://www.syrian-es.com/. Accessed 21 November 2011.
- 99.
See http://www.infowar-monitor.net/?s=syria. Accessed 21 November 2011.
- 100.
See http://www.infowar-monitor.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/SEArmy-Figure-6.png. Accessed 21 November 2011.
- 101.
See http://www.infowar-monitor.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/SEArmy-Figure-7.png. Accessed 21 November 2011.
- 102.
See http://www.infowar-monitor.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/SEArmy-Figure-8.png. Accessed 21 November 2011.
- 103.
See http://opennet.net/research/profiles/syria. Accessed 21 November 2011.
- 104.
See http://telecomix.org/. Accessed 21 November 2011.
- 105.
See http://reflets.info. Accessed 21 November 2011.
- 106.
See http://www.bluecoat.com/. Accessed 21 November 2011.
- 107.
See http://reflets.info/bluecoats-role-in-syrian-censorship-and-nationwide-monitoring-system/. Accessed 21 November 2011.
- 108.
“Blue Coat does not sell to Syria and neither do we provide any kind of technical support, professional services or software maintenance. To our knowledge, we do not have any customers in Syria. U.S. companies are prohibited from selling to Syria. In addition, we do not allow any of our resellers, regardless of their location in the world, to sell to an embargoed country, such as Syria. We have seen logs posted that are allegedly from a Blue Coat appliance in use in Syria. From these logs, we see no firm evidence that would determine there is Blue Coat equipment in Syria; in fact, it appears that these logs came from an appliance in a country where there are no trade restrictions. In addiction, the log files appear to have come from a third party server that was storing log files uploaded from one of our appliances. The allegation that an organization penetrated one of our appliances through a security hole is flatly not true. There are no known vulnerabilities of our appliance that would allow such an action”.
- 109.
See http://tcxsyria.ceops.eu/95191b161149135ba7bf6936e01bc3bb. Accessed 21 November 2011.
- 110.
See http://hellais.github.com/syria-censorship/. Accessed 21 November 2011.
- 111.
See http://cyberdissidents.org/bin/dissidents.cgi?id=64&c=SY. Accessed 21 November 2011.
- 112.
See https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/11/sanctions-fail-stop-syrian-regime-still-harm-citizens. Accessed 23 November 2011.
- 113.
See the 2009 ONI Report Internet Filtering in Iran, http://opennet.net/research/profiles/iran
- 114.
See the report ONI “West censoring East. The use of western technologies by Middle East Censors” at the address http://opennet.net/west-censoring-east-the-use-western-technologies-middle-east-censors-2010-2011
- 115.
See Al Arabiya, New York Times, Global Voices and BBC web sites.
- 116.
See Facebook, Twitter, Myspace, Flickr and local language social network like Balatarin, Orkut and Bebo.
- 117.
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, (1979). See http://www.iranchamber.com/government/laws/constitution.php
- 118.
From the Preamble: “The mass-communication media, radio and television, must serve the diffusion of Islamic culture in pursuit of the evolutionary course of the Islamic Revolution. To this end, the media should be used as a forum for healthy encounter of different ideas, but they must strictly refrain from diffusion and propagation of destructive and anti-Islamic practices”.
- 119.
- 120.
See Chapter 2: Mission of the Press. Article 2: The following constitute the objectives of the press in the Islamic Republic of Iran: (…) d. To campaign against manifestations of imperialistic culture (such as extravagance, dissipation, debauchery, love of luxury, spread of morally corrupt practices, etc.) and to propagate and promote genuine Islamic culture and sound ethical principles.
- 121.
See Chapter 4: Limits of the Press. Article 6: The print media are permitted to publish news items except in cases when they violate Islamic principles and codes and public rights as outlined in this chapter: 1. Publishing atheistic articles or issues which are prejudicial to Islamic codes, or, promoting subjects which might damage the foundation of the Islamic Republic; 2. Propagating obscene and religiously forbidden acts and publishing indecent pictures and issues which violate public decency; 3. Propagating luxury and extravagance; 4. Creating discord between and among social walks of life specially by raising ethnic and racial issues; 5. Encouraging and instigating individuals and groups to act against the security, dignity and interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran within or outside the country; 6. Disclosing and publishing classified documents, orders and issues, or, disclosing the secrets of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic, military maps and fortifications, publishing closed-door deliberations of the Islamic Consultative Assembly or private proceedings of courts of justice and investigations conducted by judicial authorities without legal permit; 7. Insulting Islam and its sanctities, or, offending the Leader of the Revolution and recognized religious authorities (senior Islamic jurisprudents); 8. Publishing libel against officials, institutions, organizations and individuals in the country or insulting legal or real persons who are lawfully respected, even by means of pictures or caricatures; and 9. Committing plagiarism or quoting articles from the deviant press, parties and groups which oppose Islam (inside and outside the country) in such a manner as to propagate such ideas (the limits of such offenses shall be defined by the executive by-law). Note: Plagiarism means intentional ascription of all or a considerable part of the works and words of others to one’s own, even in the form of translation.
- 122.
See Article 7: The following activities are banned: a. Printing and publishing a publication without a license and a publication whose license has been cancelled, or, one which has been temporarily or permanently closed down by a court order. b. Publishing a publication the greatest part of whose items are incongruous to subjects which the applicant has undertaken to publish. c. Publishing a publication that may be mistaken in name, symbol or format for the existing publications or those which have been temporarily or permanently closed down. d. Publishing a publication without mentioning the name of its license holder and the legally responsible director or the address of the publication and its printing house. e. Publishing and printing houses, distribution and sales departments of publications are not permitted to publish and distribute publications which the Press Supervisory Board deems to be in violation of the principle stipulated in this by-law.
- 123.
See Islamic Penal Code of Iran (1996): http://mehr.org/Islamic_Penal_Code_of_Iran.pdf
- 124.
See Article 500: “Anyone who undertakes any form of propaganda against the State will be sentenced to between three months and one year in prison”.
- 125.
See Article 514: “Anyone who somehow insults the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Khomeini, or the Supreme Leader of the country should be sentenced to imprisonment from six months to two years”.
- 126.
See “Freedom on The Net 2011” of Freedom House, Country Reports (China), http://www.freedomhouse.org/images/File/FotN/China2011.pdf
- 127.
See Reporters Without Borders, “Internet Enemies”, March 2011, http://12mars.rsf.org/i/Internet_Enemies.pdfhttp://12mars.rsf.org/i/Internet_Enemies.pdf
- 128.
Ministry of Public Security, “National Development and Reform Commission issues national approval for the ‘Golden Shield’ construction project at management conference,” November 17, 2006, http://www.mps.gov.cn/cenweb/brjlCenweb/jsp/common/article.jsp?infoid=ABC00000000000035645.
- 129.
- 130.
See the web sites of Amnesty International, Reporters Without Borders, Human Right Watch, Wikipedia and Falun Gong web sites.
- 131.
As Masnik notes (Masnick 2012) “It’s no secret that Google has a troubled relationship with China: at one point leaving the market entirely, and later going back but with significant limitations, though where Google tried to be as transparent as possible about when information was being censored on behalf of the Chinese government”. Masnik reports an interesting (and discussed) statement of Google, published on the blog of the company, with sort of “strategies” to avoid censorships activities: “Last week, Google took another step, which was explained, somewhat cryptically, in a blog post about better search in mainland China. The company never comes out and says it, but it’s basically hinting strongly at the fact that the Chinese government is censoring certain searches… and doing so in a way that basically blocks access to Google for a certain amount of time, if they catch you doing a ‘questionable’ search”. (Masnick 2012). The way Google explains this strategy is interesting: “Over the past couple years, we’ve had a lot of feedback that Google Search from mainland China can be inconsistent and unreliable. It depends on the search query and browser, but users are regularly getting error messages like “This webpage is not available” or “The connection was reset.” And when that happens, people typically cannot use Google again for a minute or more… We’ve taken a long, hard look at our systems and have not found any problems. However, after digging into user reports, we’ve noticed that these interruptions are closely correlated with searches for a particular subset of queries”. Masnick notes that “Of course, they never say what that ‘subset of queries’ might be, but you can take a guess. The ‘solution’ is that, similar (though slightly different) to Google’s ‘autocomplete’, Google, when accessed by Chinese mainlanders, will make suggestions on alternative searches that won’t cause the user to be blocked from accessing Google” (Masnick 2012).
- 132.
Chin (Chin 2012) remarks that the censorship (and control) of the word Tiananmen caused several problems in China: “China’s Internet monitors have unleashed a broad clampdown on online discussion of the 23rd anniversary of the Tiananmen Square crackdown, restricting even discussion of the nation’s main stock market when the Shanghai Composite Index fell by 64.89 points—a number that made for an eerie allusion to the sensitive date: June 4, 1989. […] Censors minding China’s popular Twitter-like microblogging service Sina Weibo this weekend began blocking a number of terms that could refer to the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, an incident often referred to as June 4 or 64 in the Chinese-speaking world. […] Terms blocked by Sina Weibo included the Chinese characters for ‘Tiananmen’, ‘square’, and ‘candle’, and even seemingly innocuous words like ‘today’. It also included numbers that could allude to the event, including 23 as well as combinations of 4, 6, 8, and 9. The clampdown spread to the business and financial world—where censorship is less often a concern—when the benchmark Shanghai Composite Index first opened at 2346.98, containing all the tricky numbers, and then ended it down 64.89 points. Sina Weibo blocked use of the terms ‘index’ and ‘Shanghai Index’. […] Chinese stock investors monitor their share prices in Huaibei, east China’s Anhui province, on Monday. The Shanghai Composite closed down 64.89 on Monday, evoking the date of the Tiananmen Square crackdown on June 4, 1989, and prompting China’s Web monitors to block discussion of the stock market close online. A spokesman for Sina Weibo operator Sina Corp. didn’t immediately respond to a request to comment. Because Chinese officials often pressure companies themselves to strictly regulate content, it is assumed the censors blocking the searches are Sina’s own, but it was unclear whether the tighter reins of recent days were ordered up by Beijing. The Shanghai Composite Index includes hundreds of Chinese companies and would be nearly impossible to manipulate to reach a preset figure based on stock purchases or sales. A media representative at the Shanghai Stock Exchange said trading opened normally on Monday. He declined to comment further. Reuters quoted the exchange’s chief technology officer as saying the matter was being looked into”. (Chin 2012).
- 133.
As Weiping Li reports (Weiping Li 2012), in Taiwan in 2012 “On June 1st, Facebook suspended the accounts of several Hong Kong activists, causing speculation that the suspension was related to the 23rd anniversary of Tiananmen Protest in the absence of any other clear information or explanation from the company. Coincidentally, several Taiwanese activists and politicians also had their accounts suspended on the same day, which triggered Taiwanese users’ concern over the limitation on free speech. Ho Tsung-hsun, the activist who has long devoted to social movements in Taiwan, posted an article describing the incident on the citizen journalism platform Peopo. According to Ho, after he saw the notice page of deactivation on Facebook, he clicked the FAQ link and tried to look for the reason of the suspension. Facebook listed four general reasons for account deactivation which Ho claimed he violated none of them. He complained that the deactivation has seriously impacted his social movement campaigns. A Taiwanese political Facebook fan page “Xien Ma Tong” was also disabled and reactivated on the same day. The fan page was created to ridicule the Taiwan president Ma Ying-jeou. Another Facebook fan page “New Taiwan GoGoGO” which relates to a Taiwanese television station also reported that the messages could no be posted though the page was still being there on Facebook. Liu Jian-Kuo, a legislator from the Democratic Progress Party also said his Facebook account was suspended without any warning from Facebook. Taipei City Councilor Ho Zhi-Wei has written an official statement to Facebook, expressing his concern over Facebook’s unreasonable account deactivation which has resulted in hindrance to free speech. Global Voices co-founder Rebecca MacKinnon has communicated with executives at Facebook, requesting an explanation of the deactivation incidents in Hong Kong and Taiwan. They say that these incidents were due to a global technical problem that has since been fixed.” (Weiping Li 2012).
- 134.
- 135.
See “Notice Regarding the Pre-Installation of “Green” Online Filtering Software on Computers”, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology Notice No. 226 [2009], May 19, 2009, http://tech.sina.com.cn/it/2009-06-09/17073163327.shtml., unofficial translation at http://www.hrichina.org/public/contents/press?revision_id=169834&item_id=169820; Xinhua News Agency, “Anti-porn filter software stirs up disputes in China,” June 11, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-06/11/content_11522822.htm.
- 136.
See ONI Bullettin, “China’s Green Dam: The Implications of Government Control Encroaching on the Home PC”, June 12, 2009, http://opennet.net/chinas-green-dam-the-implications-government-control-enchroaching-home-pc.
- 137.
- 138.
See Article 35 Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration.
- 139.
See Article 33 All persons holding the nationality of the People’s Republic of China are citizens of the People’s Republic of China. All citizens of the People’s Republic of China are equal before the law. The state respects and guarantees human rights. Every citizen is entitled to the rights and at the same time must perform the duties prescribed by the Constitution and the law.
- 140.
Issued by the State Council 18 February 1994.
- 141.
Art. 17 “Regulations of the People’s Republic of China for the Safety Protection of Computer Information Systems”, del 18/02/1994.
- 142.
PRC Interim Regulations Governing the Management of International Computer Networks, February 12, 1996, issued by State Council Order No.195, signed by Premier Li Peng on February 1, 1996.
- 143.
Article 11: “Units providing international inward and outward channels and interactive and interfacing units shall establish a network management center to strengthen the management of their own units and their consumers according to the relevant laws and state regulation, to improve network information security management, and to provide good and safe services to consumers.” Article 13: “Units and individuals engaging in Internet business shall strictly enforce safety and security control systems according to relevant state laws and administrative regulations, and shall not make use of the Internet to conduct criminal activities – including activities prejudicial to state security and the leakage of state secrets – or to produce, retrieve, duplicate, and disseminate information prejudicial to public order or pornographic materials.”
- 144.
Measures of the PRC Regulations for the Safety Protection of Computer Information Systems, cit.
- 145.
Art. 5: No unit or individual may use the Internet to create, replicate, retrieve, or transmit the following kinds of information: 1. Inciting to resist or violate the Constitution or laws or the implementation of administrative regulations; 2. Inciting to overthrow the government or the socialist system; 3. Inciting division of the country, harming national unification; 4. Inciting hatred or discrimination among nationalities or harming the unity of the nationalities; 5. Making falsehoods or distorting the truth, spreading rumors, destroying the order of society; 6. Promoting feudal superstitions, sexually suggestive material, gambling, violence, murder, 7. Engaging in terrorism or inciting others to criminal activity; openly insulting other people or distorting the truth to slander people; 8. Injuring the reputation of state organs; Other activities against the Constitution, laws or administrative regulations.
- 146.
Art. 8 Units and individuals engaged in Internet business must accept the security supervision, inspection, and guidance of the Public Security organization. This includes providing to the Public Security organization information, materials and digital document, and assisting the Public Security organization to discover and properly handle incidents involving law violations and criminal activities related to computer information networks.
- 147.
PRC Telecommunications Regulations, October 11, 2000, issued by State Council Order No.291, signed by Premier Zhu Rongji on September 25, 2000.
- 148.
Measures for Managing Internet Information Services, issued by State Council Order No.292; signed by Premier Zhu Rongji on September 25, 2000.
- 149.
“Provisions on the Administration of Internet News Information Services” (Internet News Information Services Regulations) promulgated by the State Council Information Office and the Ministry of Information Industry on September 25, 2005. In inglese all’URL: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=24396.
- 150.
See, for example, Rules of the NPC Standing Committee on Safeguarding Internet Security, issued by the NPC Standing Committee on December 28, 2000.
- 151.
See Art. 14: An IIS providing services related to information, the publishing business, and e-announcements shall record the content of the information, the time that the information is released, and the address or the domain name of the Web site. An Internet service provider (ISP) must record such information as the time that its subscribers accessed the Internet, the subscribers’ account numbers, the addresses or domain names of the Web sites, and the main telephone numbers they use. An IIS provider and the ISP must keep a copy of their records for 60 days and furnish them to the relevant state authorities upon demand in accordance with the law. Art. 15: IIS providers shall not produce, reproduce, release, or disseminate information that contains any of the following: 1. Information that goes against the basic principles set in the constitution; 2. Information that endangers national security, divulges state secrets, subverts the government, or undermines national unity; 3. Information that is detrimental to the honor and interests of the state; 4. Information that instigates ethnic hatred or ethnic discrimination, or that undermines national unity; 5. Information that undermines the state’s policy towards religions, or that preaches the teachings of evil cults or that promotes feudalistic and superstitious beliefs; 6. Information that disseminates rumors, disturbs social order, or undermines social stability; 7. Information that spreads pornography or other salacious materials; promotes gambling, violence, homicide, or terrorism; or instigates crimes; 8. Information that insults or slanders other people, or infringes upon other people’s legitimate rights and interests; or 9. Other information prohibited by the law or administrative regulations. Art.16: When an IIS provider discovers that the information its Web site provides is clearly of a type listed under Article 15, it should immediately stop transmission, keep the relevant records, and report the situation to the relevant state authorities.
- 152.
See Articles 2, 11 e 15: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=24396.
- 153.
“State Secrets Protection Regulations For Computer Information Systems On The Internet” issued by the Bureau for the Protection of State Secrets (State Secrets Bureau) on January 25, 2001 but applied retroactively from January 1, 2000. V. in particolare artt. 8, 10 13 e 15.
- 154.
See Art. 105, par. 2, 1997 Criminal Code: “Anyone who uses rumor, slander or other means to encourage subversion of the political power of the state or to overthrow the socialist system, shall be sentenced to fixed term imprisonment of not more than five years.” English language text: www.archieve.org/details/cu31924077027237
- 155.
See “Corporate Complicity in Internet Censorship in China: Who Cares For The Global Compact or The Global Online Freedom Act?”, Surya Deva, in Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev., 255 (2007).
- 156.
- 157.
- 158.
Attacks to gMail account (especially) from China are a serious problem. As Weissman notes: “Google has announced, via their security blog, that they will now alert Gmail users if the company believes that a state-sanctioned cyber attack is being directed against them. Google explains that they believe it is their duty ‘to be proactive in notifying users about attacks or potential attacks so that they can take action to protect their information’.” When suspicious activity arises, Google will notify users with a pink band at the top of the Gmail window that states: ‘We believe state-sponsored attackers may be attempting to compromise your account or computer. Protect yourself now.’ Although Google refused to say whether this change was directed at any countries in particular, news organizations have previously accused Chinese hackers of using these kind of attacks against the US and other foreign organizations. Additionally, this new alert closely followed a revision to Google’s Chinese search that informs users as to whether their search terms are likely to lead to filtering. These new features represent the latest evolution in Google’s on-going struggle to provide service in China without becoming totally complicit in China’s censorship program. An example of their tête-à-tête includes when Google in 2010 redirected Chinese users to its Hong Kong site, “citing concerns over censorship and hacking.” (Weissman 2012).
- 159.
- 160.
The text of Article 23: “Article 23: Every citizen has the right to be protected from arbitrary interference in her or his personal life, from infringement on written, telephone, or other communications, and, likewise, from infringements on her or his honor or reputation.” The text of Article 26 is: “Article 26: Citizens of Turkmenistan have the right to freedom of conviction and the free expression of those convictions. They also have the right to receive information unless such information is a governmental, official, or commercial secret.”
- 161.
- 162.
- 163.
See Internet World Stats (Uzbekistan) at the address http://www.internetworldstats.com/asia/uz.htm. Accessed 24 October 2011.
- 164.
In 2011, the authors of an Internet Enemies Report, edited by Reporters Without Borders, at the address http://12mars.rsf.org/i/Internet_Enemies.pdf (accessed 24 October 2011) commented (italics mine): “Despite the European Union’s decision in late 2009 to lift the sanctions against Uzbekistan, the regime has not loosened its grasp on the Net – quite the contrary. This police state is still routinely preventing the dissemination of information online and all efforts to initiate a civil society – virtual or any other kind”. (RWB Report 2011: 46).
- 165.
For a plain overview of constitutional issues, see the Niyazova report concerning the substantial absence of free and independent media and of free speech in Uzbekistan (Niyazova 2008). The author notes: “It is noted that, in violation of its constitutional and international obligations in the field of human rights, the government of Uzbekistan prevents the dissemination of any information that is critical of the government and exerts pressure on journalists and individual citizens in the community”. (Niyazova 2008: 1).
- 166.
The text of Article 25 of the Uzbek Constitution is: “Everyone shall have the right to freedom and inviolability of the person. No one may be arrested or taken into custody except on lawful grounds”. http://www.gov.uz/en/constitution/. Accessed 23 October 2011.
- 167.
The text of Article 29 of the Uzbek Constitution is: “Everyone shall be guaranteed freedom of thought, speech and convictions. Everyone shall have the right to seek, obtain and disseminate any information, except that which is directed against the existing constitutional system and in some other instances specified by law”. http://www.gov.uz/en/constitution/. Accessed 23 October 2011.
- 168.
The text of Article 67 of the Uzbek Constitution is: “The mass media shall be free and act in accordance with the law. It shall bear responsibility for trustworthiness of information in a prescribed manner. Censorship is impermissible”. http://www.gov.uz/en/constitution/. Accessed 23 October 2011.
- 169.
In 2011 the authors of the Internet Enemies Report, cited above, edited by Reporters Without Borders, at the address http://12mars.rsf.org/i/Internet_Enemies.pdf (accessed 24 October 2011) commented: “The Centre for Monitoring Mass Communications (CMMC) closely monitors the content of Internet websites and audiovisual media. Reporting to the Uzbek Agency for Communications and Information (UzASCI), it is responsible for blocking the IP addresses of the sites or articles which it deems undesirable. […] Sensitive subjects include criticism of the government, information on the actual state of the economy, human rights and the social situation. It is not advisable to discuss the private business of the Karimov family or their daughters’ personal lives, the forced labour of children in cotton fields, or emergency situations. It is much too risky to mention petrol supply problems, inflation, the population’s impoverishment, and social unrest. Any reference to the Andijan massacre is simply removed. The population has long since stopped bringing up the subject in public – and even in private. Self-censorship is widespread” (RWB Report 2011: 46–47).
- 170.
“Law on protecting the professional activities of the journalist”, dated 24 April 1997.
- 171.
See Article 1 of the law (italics mine) including electronic information media: “The mass media are newspapers, magazines, journals, bulletins, news agencies, television (including cable, and broadcasting and cable television) and radio stations, documentary films, electronic information media, and other mass state and independent periodicals, which are published under a permanent name” and the explicit provision of Article 4 of the Law: “websites in generally-accessible telecommunications networks are considered media, and their formats have to be registered”.
- 172.
Article 19. 2004. Memorandum on the Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Mass Media. Commissioned by the Representative on Freedom of the Media of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. http://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/analysis/uzbekistan-law-on-freedom-of-information-June-.pdf. Accessed 24 October 2011.
- 173.
For example: Uzinfocom, the agency for the control of technology, UzSCINET, the agency for the academic research, UzCIA, the agency for communication and information, SNB, the agency for the internal security and UzPia, the agency for the press and information.
- 174.
In the 2011 Internet Enemies Report, cited above, by Reporters Without Borders (http://12mars.rsf.org/i/Internet_Enemies.pdf ) observes: “The one thousand or so cybercafés operating in the country are not evenly monitored. There is a widespread use of spyware. Tests conducted by Reporters Without Borders have shown that certain café managers reacted when anti- spyware software was installed on one of their computers, while in other cybercafés, such tampering went unnoticed. Some censorship circumvention tools may have been used in certain cafés, but not in others. Several OpenNet Initiative researchers were questioned in 2007 while they were testing website filtering systems. E-mails are also under surveillance, as are chat rooms, particular those of ICQ and Mail.ru Agent. Several people were supposedly arrested in January 2010 for their alleged membership in extremist religious organisations after they were apprehended based on the content of their chats on Mail. ru Agent”. (RWB Report 2011: 48).
- 175.
According to Regulation n. 221, 2005.
- 176.
According to Regulation n. 52, 1999.
- 177.
See http://www.chinhphu.vn/portal/page?_pageid=439,40237488&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL&pers_id=1093197&item_id=1093699&p_details=1. Accessed 15 November 2011.
- 178.
See http://www.chinhphu.vn/portal/page?_pageid=598,1&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL. Accessed 15 November 2011.
- 179.
See http://www.na.gov.vn/htx/English/#387gTwKHgoDA. Accessed 15 November 2011.
- 180.
See http://www.chinhphu.vn/portal/page?_pageid=439,1090502&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL. Accessed 15 November 2011.
- 181.
See http://english.mic.gov.vn/vbqppl/Lists/Vn%20bn%20QPPL/AllItems.aspx?curpage=1. Accessed 15 November 2011.
- 182.
For an overview regarding Internet connection in Vietnam see the Lam, Boymal and Martin essay concerning the techno-economic factors that determine the diffusion of the Internet in Vietnam (Lam et al. 2004). The authors remark that “it should be noted that, in the specific social and political context of the Vietnamese case, gathering relevant materials and statistical data is a very hard and time-consuming task owing to the prevailing culture of ‘secrecy’ and the scarcity of reliable statistical data and documentation on the topic”(Lam et al. 2004: 42).
- 183.
See http://www.chinhphu.vn/portal/page?_pageid=439,1096053&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL. Accessed 15 November 2011.
- 184.
See http://moj.gov.vn/vbpq/en/Lists/Vn%20bn%20php%20lut/View_Detail.aspx?ItemID=610. Accessed 15 November 2011. The text of Article 125 is: “Infringement upon other persons privacy or safety of letters, telephone and/or telegraph”, the text of Article 225 is: “Breaching regulations on operating, exploiting and using computer networks” and Article 226 “Illegally using information in computer networks”.
- 185.
- 186.
- 187.
- 188.
See http://moj.gov.vn/vbpq/en/Lists/Vn%20bn%20php%20lut/View_Detail.aspx?ItemID=4761. Accessed 15 November 2011.
- 189.
See http://www.most.gov.vn/. Accessed 15 November 2011.
- 190.
See http://www.most.gov.vn/Desktop.aspx/Bai-viet-Hoat-Dong-KHCN/Chien-luoc-quy-hoach-ke-hoach/CHIEN_LUOC_QUY_HOACH_KE_HOACH/. Accessed 15 November 2011.
- 191.
See http://www.chinhphu.vn/portal/page?_pageid=439,1090430&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL. Accessed 20 November 2011.
- 192.
See http://www.go.vn/. Accessed 20 November 2011.
- 193.
See http://australia.gov.au/. Accessed 19 November 2011.
- 194.
See http://www.aph.gov.au/index.htm. Accessed 19 November 2011.
- 195.
See the Federal Magistrates Court web site: http://www.fmc.gov.au/. Accessed 19 November 2011.
- 196.
See http://www.alp.org.au/. Accessed 19 November 2011.
- 197.
The public announcement of the Cyber White Paper by Senator the Hon. Stephen Conroy, Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate and Minister Assisting the Prime Minister on Digital Productivity, is at the address http://www.minister.dbcde.gov.au/media/media_releases/2011/198. Accessed 20 November 2011. The paper will cover a broad range of areas including consumer protection, cyber safety, cyber crime, cyber security and cyber defence.
- 198.
See the ACMA web site at the address http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB/HOMEPAGE/PC=HOME. Accessed 19 November 2011.
- 199.
See, inter alia, the United Nations Youth Association of Australia “Internet Censorship Blue Paper” of December 2008 (http://unyouth.org.au/assets/Documents/bluepapers/Blue-Paper-Censorship.pdf. Accessed 13 November 2010). The authors of this document “ […] strongly support the Government in its efforts to prevent access to, especially by young people, illegal material such as child pornography [but] are, however, concerned by the lack of clarity around what constitutes the “harmful and inappropriate” material the Government is also seeking to ban access to with its mandatory ISP-level filtering” (UNYA 2008: 1) and believe that better Internet education offers the best possible opportunities to limit the potential harm of dangerous online material (UNYA 2008: 2). The two main points discussed in this document regarding the filtering systems are: 1. The Government must explain why a ‘harmful and inappropriate material’ category is necessary and provide an unambiguous definition of ‘harmful and inappropriate’, and 2. ACMA’s blacklisting process must be subject to a transparent review and appeals system (UNYA 2008: 4). The three topical aspects of ISPs actions are: 1. It would only ever be appropriate to introduce ISP-level filtering when the technology causes no or only negligible network degradation. 2. ISP-level filtering should be used to enforce bans on blacklisted (i.e. illegal or prohibited) material but users should be empowered to decide for themselves what is harmful and inappropriate. This means either self-filtering or opting-in to the Government’s clean-feed. 3. Emphasis needs to be shifted onto better cyber-safety and general cyber education for both young people and parents (UNYA 2008: 8). Conclusions of the report are that: 1. The Government should provide full and frank reporting of its completed and any future live pilots. The Government should also disclose the objectives outlined for the pilot and the circumstances in which the pilot is being completed. 2. The Government must clarify the future of its plans for internet censorship to allow for greater public debate of the issues surrounding its policy. 3. Internet censorship can threaten human rights, rights Australia is obligated to guarantee under international law. Education to ensure that Australians can make responsible and informed choices is a better approach to reducing potential harm than censorship (UNYA 2008: 9–10).
- 200.
Available at http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/general/constitution/. Accessed 20 November 2011.
- 201.
Available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2004B00465. Accessed 20 November 2011.
- 202.
Available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/cfacga1995489/. Accessed 20 November 2011.
- 203.
On 18 March 2009 WikiLeaks published a document, “Australian government secret ACMA internet censorship blacklist”, with a list containing 2,395 webpages or site variations derived from those secretly banned by the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) and used by a government approved censorship software maker in its “ACMA only” censorship mode. In December 2008, WikiLeaks released the secret Internet censorship list for Thailand, remarking that of the sites censored in 2008, 1,203 sites were classified as “lese majeste”, criticizing the Royal family. Similar to Australia, the Thai censorship system was originally presented as a mechanism to prevent the child pornography.
- 204.
See the essay written by a young Australian scholar (Travaglione 2009) remarking that “ […] the government’s decision to impose legislative filters on internet content constitutes an unnecessary, illegitimate and irrational attempt by the Government to control information flow in the private sphere. Regulation of the internet is both technically impossible and morally reprehensible, creating a greater scope for internal government corruption. Alternatives such as voluntary internet filters offer consumers true choice as well as offering a superior means of protecting children from potential harm over the internet; allowing parents to truly regulate the content to which their children are exposed without unnecessary government intervention” (Travaglione 2009: 11).
- 205.
See the official web site of the Parliament at the address http://www.althingi.is/vefur/upplens.html. Accessed 19 November 2011.
- 206.
See the constitutional history of the Parliament at the address http://www.althingi.is/pdf/Althingi2010_english.pdf. Accessed 19 November 2011.
- 207.
See the official Government’s web site at the address http://www.government.is/. Accessed 19 November 2011.
- 208.
See the text of the Constitution of the Republic of Iceland at http://www.government.is/constitution/. Accessed 19 November 2011.
- 209.
See the web site of the President of Iceland at http://www.forseti.is/. Accessed 19 November 2011. The English language version is at the address http://english.forseti.is/. Accessed 19 November 2011.
- 210.
See the web site of the Supreme Court at http://www.haestirettur.is/. Accessed 19 November 2011.
- 211.
See the Law n. 33, 17 June 1944, as amended 30 May 1984, 31 May 1991, 28 June 1995 and 24 June 1999.
- 212.
See at http://www.althingi.is/lagas/nuna/kaflar/kaflar.html. Accessed 19 November 2011.
- 213.
See at http://www.althingi.is/lagas/139a/1940019.html. Accessed 19 November 2011.
- 214.
See at http://www.althingi.is/lagas/139a/2000077.html. Accessed 19 November 2011.
- 215.
See at http://www.althingi.is/lagas/nuna/1996050.html. Accessed 19 November 2011.
- 216.
The text of Article 71: “Everyone shall enjoy freedom from interference with privacy, home, and family life. Bodily or personal search or a search of a person’s premises or possessions may only be conducted in accordance with a judicial decision or a statutory law provision. This shall also apply to the examination of documents and mail, communications by telephone and other means, and to any other comparable interference with a person’s right to privacy. Notwithstanding the provisions of the first paragraph above, freedom from interference with privacy, home and family life may be otherwise limited by statutory provisions if this is urgently necessary for the protection of the rights of others.”
- 217.
The text of Article 73: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and belief. Everyone shall be free to express his thoughts, but shall also be liable to answer for them in court. The law may never provide for censorship or other similar limitations to freedom of expression. Freedom of expression may only be restricted by law in the interests of public order or the security of the State, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights or reputation of others, if such restrictions are deemed necessary and in agreement with democratic traditions.”
- 218.
Amended by Act 76/1997 (entered into force on 1 July 1997), L. 83/2000 (entered into force on June 2, 2000, except Article 1. which took effect on 1 January 2001), L. 23/2006 (entered into force on May 3, 2006; EEA Agreement: XX. Annex Directive 2003/4/EC), L. 161/2006 (entered into force on 1 January 2007), L. 88/2008 (entered into force on 1 January 2009 unless interim provisions. VII, which took effect on 21 June 2008) and L. 55/2009 (entered into force on 1 May 2009).
- 219.
See the text at http://immi.is/Icelandic_Modern_Media_Initiative. Accessed 19 November 2011.
- 220.
See the text at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/environment/general_provisions/l28056_it.htm. Accessed 19 November 2011.
- 221.
See the data published on the web site of the The Boston Consulting Group (Report 2010). Digital Consumers in Brazil, Russia, India, China and Indonesia. http://www.bcg.com/documents/file58645.pdf. Accessed 16 October 2011.
- 222.
See the official web site at http://www.trai.gov.in. Accessed 16 October 2011.
- 223.
See Department of Information Technology and National Policy of Information Technology. http://india.gov.in/allimpfrms/alldocs/16391.pdf. Accessed 16 October 2011.
- 224.
See Freedom House (2011). Freedom on the Net 2011. India. http://www.freedomhouse.org/ images/File/FotN/India2011.pdf. Accessed 16 October 2011.
- 225.
See the text of the Constitution of India at the address http://india.gov.in/govt/documents/english/coi_part_full.pdf. Accessed 16 October 2011. The text of Article 19 is: “[…] (1) All citizens shall have the right (a) to freedom of speech and expression; (b) to assemble peaceably and without arms; (c) to form associations or unions; (d) to move freely throughout the territory of India; (e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; and […] (g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. (2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. (3) Nothing in sub-clause (b) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause. (4) Nothing in sub-clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order or morality, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause. (5) Nothing in sub-clauses (d) and (e) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub-clauses either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe. (6) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to,— (i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or (ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise”.
- 226.
See The Information Technology (Amendment) Act 2008 at http://www.mit.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/downloads/itact2000/it_amendment_act2008.pdf. Accessed 16 October 2011.
- 227.
The text of Article 34 of The Information Technology (Amendment) Act 2008 is: “Art. 34 (Section 69 A 1): Where the Central Government or any its officers specially authorized by it in this behalf is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do, in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign State or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above, it may subject to the previsions of sub – section (2), for reasons to be recorded in writing, by order, direct any agency of the government or intermediary to block for access by the public or cause to be blocked for access by the public any information generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in any computer resource”.
- 228.
See The Information Technology (Amendment) Act 2008. Art. 34.
- 229.
See The Information Technology (Amendment) Act 2008. Art. 4, letters D and H.
- 230.
See GSR 315(E) Dated 11 April 2011: Information Technology (Guidelines for Cyber Cafe) Rules, 2011 at http://www.mit.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/GSR315E_10511(1).pdf. Accessed 16 October 2011.
- 231.
See the ONI Country Profile regarding India at http://opennet.net/research/profiles/india. Accessed 16 October 2011.
- 232.
See http://www.cert-in.org.in/. Accessed 16 October 2011.
- 233.
See Notification no. GSR. 181(E), dated February 27, 2003 at http://www.mit.gov.in/content/it-act-notification-no-181. Accessed 16 October 2011.
- 234.
See the cited ONI Country Profile regarding India.
- 235.
See the Report by Freedom House (2011). Freedom on the Net 2011.
- 236.
See the cited ONI Country Profile regarding India.
- 237.
See the Google Transparency Report at http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/governmentrequests/. Accessed 19 November 2011.
- 238.
See Freedom House (2011). Freedom on the Net 2011.
- 239.
See the Right to Information Act, No. 22 of 2005. http://www.fra.org.in/laws/rti.pdf. Accessed 16 October 2011.
- 240.
See manisar, d. (2006). Freedom of information around the world. http://www.freedominfo.org/wp-content/uploads/documents/global_survey2006.pdf
- 241.
See the Right to Information Act, No. 22 of 2005. Art. 4, comma 2: “It shall be the constant endeavour of every public authority to provide as much information suo motu to the public at regular intervals through means of communication, including internet so that the public have minimum resort to the use of this Act to obtain information”.
- 242.
Centre for Internet and Society (2011). Report on Open Government Data in India. http://www.cis-india.org/openness/publications/ogd-report (Accessed 16 October ). The Indian government portal may be accessed at http://india.gov.in/ (accessed 16 October 2011).
- 243.
White House. Fact Sheet on United States and India Announce Partnership on Open Government, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/us-india_open_government_partnership.pdf (Accessed 16 October 2011).
- 244.
See the United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (March 2008): “The government does not require Web sites to register as mass media, and unregistered Web sites were not subject to administrative sanctions. Postings on the Internet were subject to the same restrictions that applied to other types of expression, and some bloggers were charged with inciting hatred for their Internet postings”. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100581.htm . Accessed 15 October 2011.
- 245.
See http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats4.htm . Accessed 13 October 2011.
- 246.
See http://opennet.net/research/regions/commonwealth-independent-states . Accessed 14 October 2011.
- 247.
The text of Article 24 is: “(1) The collection, storage, utilization and dissemination of information about a person’s private life without his consent are not permitted. (2) Organs of State power and organs of local self-government and their officials are obliged to ensure that each person has the opportunity to see documents and materials directly affecting his rights and freedoms unless otherwise provided by law”. The text of Article 29 is: “Article 29. (1) Each person is guaranteed freedom of thought and speech. (2) Propaganda or agitation exciting social, racial, national, or religious hatred and enmity is not permitted. Propaganda of social, racial, national, religious, or linguistic supremacy is prohibited. (3) No one may be compelled to express his opinions and convictions or to renounce them. (4) Each person has the right freely to seek, receive, pass on, produce, and disseminate information by any legal method. The list of information constituting a State secret is determined by federal law. (5) The freedom of mass information is guaranteed. Censorship is prohibited”.
- 248.
The text of Article 23 is: “Everyone shall have the right to inviolability of private life, personal and family secrecy, and defence of his or her honour and reputation. 2. Everyone shall have the right to privacy of correspondence, telephone conversation, postal, telegraph, and other communications. Limitation of this right shall be permitted only on the basis of a sudicia decision”.
- 249.
See http://www.lexadin.nl/wlg/legis/nofr/oeur/lxwerus.htm . Accessed 10 October 2011.
- 250.
See Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Resolution No. 16, 2010, “On the Judicial Practice Related to the Statute of the Russian Federation ‘On the Mass Media’”.
- 251.
See Article 15 of the Russian Constitution: “1. The Constitution of the Russian Federation shall have the supreme juridical force, direct action and shall be used on the whole territory of the Russian Federation. Laws and other legal acts adopted in the Russian Federation shall not contradict the Constitution of the Russian Federation. 2. The bodies of state authority, the bodies of local self-government, officials, private citizens and their associations shall be obliged to observe the Constitution of the Russian Federation and laws. 3. Laws shall be officially published. Unpublished laws shall not be used. Any normative legal acts concerning human rights, freedoms and duties of man and citizen may not be used, if they are not officially published for general knowledge. 4. The universally-recognized norms of international law and international treaties and agreements of the Russian Federation shall be a component part of its legal system. If an international treaty or agreement of the Russian Federation fixes other rules than those envisaged by law, the rules of the international agreement shall be applied”.
- 252.
See Article 17 of the Russian Constitution: “1. In the Russian Federation recognition and guarantees shall be provided for the rights and freedoms of man and citizen according to the universally recognized principles and norms of international law and according to the present Constitution. 2. Fundamental human rights and freedoms are inalienable and shall be enjoyed by everyone since the day of birth. 3. The exercise of the rights and freedoms of man and citizen shall not violate the rights and freedoms of other people”.
- 253.
See http://www.medialaw.ru/e_pages/laws/russian/personal-data-en.htm. Accessed 19 November 2011.
- 254.
See, inter alia, Ej.ru (Ezhednevnyi Zhurnal), Newtimes.ru, Grani.ru, Gazeta.ru, Kommersant.ru, EkhoMoskvy.ru and NovayaGazeta.ru.
- 255.
See Anand Varghese, “Mapping the Russian Blogosphere” (Peace Brief No. 72, US Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, December 20, 2010).
- 256.
For a preliminary overview regarding the telecommunications sector in North Korea see Noland’s study concerning telecommunications policies in that country and the decision to authorize Orascom, a foreign cellular provider (Egyptian), to provide nationwide cellular service (Noland 2008). The author remarks that “The country faces both external and self-imposed internal constraints on telecommunications modernization, however. Externally, North Korea is one of the few remaining socialist states and the most militarized country in the world. It is embroiled in a diplomatic conflict over its nuclear ambitions. The upshot is that it is subject to Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) restrictions under the Wassenaar Agreement, impeding its ability to import state-of-the-art technology.” (Noland 2008: 3). See also the interesting Nanto and Chanlette-Avery essay concerning a policy analysis of North Korea (Nanto and Chanlette-Avery 2010) and Hyang Kim’s more focused article regarding the North Korea’s “cyberpath” (Hyang Kim 2004). The author explains that the absence of cyber openness for IT development is a result of the leadership’s political consideration of the negative impacts such openness would have on regime stability (Hyang Kim 2004: 191). Important political issues are also described in the Ko, Lee and Jang study regarding political and economic implications of the Internet in North Korea (Ko et al. 2009).
- 257.
See the English translation of the text of the Constitution at the address http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/kn00000_.html. Accessed 16 October 2011.
- 258.
See the Preamble to the Constitution: Comrade Kim Il Sung founded the immortal Juche idea, organized and guided an anti-Japanese revolutionary struggle under its banner, created revolutionary tradition, attained the historical cause of the national liberation, built up a solid basis of construction of a sovereign and independent state in the fields of politics, economy, culture and military, and founded the DPRK.
- 259.
The text of Article 119 is: “The Cabinet has duties and authority to: 1. adopt measures to execute state policy. 2. Institute, amend, and supplement regulations concerning state management based on the Constitution and departmental laws. 3. Guide the work of the Cabinet commissions, ministries, direct organs of the Cabinet, local people’s committees. 4. Set up and remove direct organs of the Cabinet, main administrative economic organizations, and enterprises, and adopt measures to improve the State management structure. 5. Draft the State plan for the development of the national economy and adopt measures to put it into effect. 6. Compile the State budget and adopt measures to implement it. 7. Organize and exercise works in the fields of industry, agriculture, construction, transportation, communications, commerce, trade, land management, city management, education, science, culture, health, physical training, labor administration, environmental protection, tourism and others. 8. Adopt measures to strengthen the monetary and banking system. 9. Do inspection and control work to establish a state management order. 10. Adopt measures to maintain social order, protect State and social cooperation body’s possession and interests, and to guarantee citizens’ rights. 11. Conclude treaties with foreign countries, and conduct external activities. 12. Abolish decisions and directions by economic administrative organs, which run counter to the Cabinet decisions or directions”.
- 260.
The text of Article 67 is: “1. Citizens are guaranteed freedom of speech, the press, assembly, demonstration and association. 2. The State guarantees the conditions for the free activities of democratic political parties and social organizations.”
- 261.
Computer Software Protection Law, June 2003.
- 262.
Software Industry Law, June 2004.
- 263.
Concerning the control of Internet cafés see the brief report “Controlling Internet Cafè in North Korea” by Yang Yung, at the address http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00300&num=206. Accessed 19 November 2011. The reporter writes: “It is known that internet connection is good for computer games and email but only connects within North Korea, and the connection does not reach to outside information”.
- 264.
See Chen, Ko and Lee remarks regarding this statement: “The North Korean leader, Kim Jong Il, says there are three kinds of fools in the twenty-first century – people who smoke, people who don’t like music, and people who don’t know how to use a computer. […] Ironically, despite Kim’s self-proclaimed interests in modern information technology, North Korea remains almost completely cut off from the Internet. […] The North Korean government has strategically developed its IT industry since the mid-1990s in an effort to leapfrog its economic development. The regime has subsequently built a closely monitored domestic intranet and some propaganda web sites, as well as encouraged social elites such as government officials, engineers, scientists, and university students to make use of digital technology in order to catch up with the global trend of developing virtual networks that allow people to share knowledge and exchange information. However, network access remains extremely limited in North Korea; only no more than a few thousand people in Pyongyang have direct but heavily censored access to the Internet via a pipeline through China – their main task is to plunder the web for technical information to be fed to the domestic intranet” (Chen et al. 2010: 650).
- 265.
See, inter alia, Chen et al. 2010.
- 266.
See the web site of the Korean Central News Agency at the address http://www.kcna.kp/. Accessed 19 November 2011.
References
AFP. 2012. Cartel web presence could be used against them. http://news.asiaone.com/News/Latest%2BNews/World/Story/A1Story20120531-349519.html. Accessed 10 June 2012.
Amnesty International. 2010. Report: Restrictions of freedom of expression in Cuba. http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR25/005/2010/en/62b9caf8-8407-4a08-90bb-b5e8339634fe/amr250052010en.pdf. Accessed 26 Sept 2011.
Anh Tuân, Nguyên. 2007. From VietNet to VietNamNet: Ten years of electronic media in Vietnam. http://www.hks.harvard.edu/presspol/publications/papers/discussion_papers/d43_nguyen.pdf. Accessed 15 Nov 2011.
Ariffin, L.J. 2012. Rais backs Dr M call for curbs to Internet freedom. http://my.news.yahoo.com/rais-backs-dr-m-call-for-curbs-to-065031693.html. Accessed 10 June 2012.
Bambauer, Derek E. 2008. Filtering in Oz: Australia’s foray into Internet censorship. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1319466. Accessed 20 Nov 2011.
Benkler, Yochai. 2011. A free irresponsibile press: Wikileaks and the battle over the soul of the networked fourth estate. Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 46: 311–397. http://www.benkler.org/Benkler_Wikileaks_current.pdf. Accessed 14 Nov 2011.
Beutz Land, Molly. 2008. Protecting rights online. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1295448. Accessed 14 Nov 2011.
Boas, Taylor C. 2000. The dictator’s dilemma? The Internet and U.S. policy toward Cuba. The Washington Quarterly 23(3): 57–67.
Bowman, Gregory W. 2004. E-mails, servers, and software: U.S. export controls for the modern era. Georgetown Journal of International Law 35: 319–378.
Burleigh, M. 2012. Iran to crack down on web censor-beating software. http://phys.org/news/2012-06-iran-web-censor-beating-software.html. Accessed 10 June 2012.
Burns, Alex, and Ben Eltham. 2009. Twitter free Iran: An evaluation of twitter’s role in public diplomacy and information operations in Iran’s 2009 election crisis. http://vuir.vu.edu.au/15230/1/CPRF09BurnsEltham.pdf. Accessed 19 Nov 2011.
Butt, Danny (ed.). 2005. Internet governance. Asia-Pacific perspectives. New Delhi: Elsevier. http://www.apdip.net/publications/ict4d/igovperspectives.pdf. Accessed 23 Nov 2011.
Cason, James C. 2003. The human rights situation in present-day Cuba. Human Rights Review 2003: 46–55.
Cavoukian, Ann. 2011. Ontario’s privacy commissioner on the online spying bills. http://openmedia.ca/blog/ontarios-privacy-commissioner-online-spying-bills. Accessed 23 Nov 2011.
Chen, Cheng, Kyungim Ko, and Ji-Yong Lee. 2010. North Korea’s Internet strategy and its political implications. The Pacific Review 23(5): 649–670.
Chin, J. 2012. Talk of Tiananmen muzzled on Chinese web. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303506404577445901268141694.html. Accessed 10 June 2012.
Chowdhury, Mridul. 2008. The role of the Internet in Burma’s saffron revolution. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1537703. Accessed 23 Oct 2011.
CSG Cuba Study Group. 2010. Empowering the Cuban people through access to technology. http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/empowering-cubans-through-technology. Accessed 23 Oct 2011.
Dacanay, Nikos. 2010. Internet centers/usage by Burmese ethnic migrants in Mae Sod: Traversing the borders of Internet divide and recasting ethnic identities. http://www.upf.edu/amymahan/_pdf/Paper_for_ICTD4_Conference_October_30_2010.pdf. Accessed 23 Oct 2011.
Danitz, Tiffany, and Warren P. Strobel. 2001. Networking dissent: Cyber activists use the Internet to promote democracy in Burma. In Networks and Netwars: The future of terror, crime, and militancy, ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, 129–169. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation.
Deibert, Ronald, John Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski, and Jonathan Zittrain. 2012. Access contested. Security, identity, and resistance in Asian cyberspace. Cambridge/London: The MIT Press.
Del Riego, A., and Adrianna C. Rodriguez. 2011. Ladies in white: The peaceful march against repression in Cuba and online. Harvard Human Rights Journal 24(1): 221–240.
Deva, Surya. 2007. Corporate complicity in Internet censorship in China: Who cares for the global compact or the global online freedom act? http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=964478. Accessed 13 Nov 2011.
Duncombe, Constance. 2010. The twitter revolution? Social media, representation and crisis in Iran and Libya. http://law.anu.edu.au/coast/events/apsa/papers/151.pdf. Accessed 13 Nov 2011.
Fitzgerald, Peter L. 1998. Pierre goes online. Blacklisting and secondary boycotts in U.S. trade policy. Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 31: 1–96.
Freedom House. 2011. Report: Freedom on the Net 2011. Cuba. http://www.freedomhouse.org/images/File/FotN/Cuba2011.pdf. Accessed 26 Sept 2011.
Goldstein, Joshua. 2007. The role of digital networked technologies in the Ukrainian orange revolution. http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/Goldstein_Ukraine_2007.pdf. Accessed 10 Nov 2011.
Gómez, R. 2008. The role of blogs in breaking the media’s embargo and telling the truth about Cuba: Comment. http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume18/pdfs/henrygomez.pdf. Accessed 26 Sept 2011.
Gong, Rachel. 2011. Internet politics and state media control: Candidate weblogs in Malaysia. Sociological Perspectives 54(3): 307–328.
Henken, Ted. 2011. The Internet and emergent blogosphere in Cuba: Downloading democracy, booting up development, or planting the virus of dissidence and destabilization? http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume20/pdfs/henken.pdf. Accessed 23 Oct 2011.
Hill, David T. 2002. East Timor and the Internet: Global political leverage in/on Indonesia. Indonesia 73: 25–51.
Hoffmann, Bert. 2011. Civil society 2.0?: How the Internet changes state-society relations in authoritarian regimes: The case of Cuba. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=126011. Accessed 23 Oct 2011.
HRW Human Rights Watch. 2012. Thailand: Internet trial a major setback for free speech. http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/05/30/thailand-internet-trial-major-setback-free-speech. Accessed 12 June 2012.
Hyang Kim, Yoo. 2004. North Korea’s cyberpath. Asian Perspectives 2004 28(3): 191–209. Online at the address http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v28n3-h.pdf. Accessed 19 Nov 2011.
Jacobi, Emily. 2011. Burma: A modern anomaly. In Mobile technologies for conflict management. Online dispute resolution, governance, participation, ed. Marta Poblet, 141–157. Dordrecht/Heidelberg/London/New York: Springer.
Kee, J. 2012. Bad laws won’t stop cyber crime. http://www.loyarburok.com/2012/05/28/bad-laws-stop-cyber-crime/. Accessed 10 June 2012.
Kitzberger, Philip. 2010. The media activism of Latin America’s leftist governments: Does ideology matter? http://www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/wp151_kitzberger.pdf. Accessed 20 Nov 2011.
Ko, Kyungmi, Heejin Lee, and Seungkwon Jang. 2009. The Internet dilemma and control policy: Political and economic implications of the Internet in North Korea. The Korean journal of defense analysis 21(3): 279–295. Online at the address http://kida.re.kr/data/kjda/RKJD_A_408893_P.pdf. Accessed 19 Nov 2011.
Lam, Dieu, Jonathan Boymal, and Bill Martin. 2004. Internet diffusion in Vietnam. Technology in Society 26: 39–50.
Lessig, Lawrence. 1999. Code and other laws of cyberspace. New York: Basic Books.
MacKinnon, R. 2012. Google confronts the Great Firewall. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/31/google_confronts_china_again. Accessed 12 June 2012.
MANISAR, D. 2006. Freedom of information around the world. http://www.freedominfo.org/wp-content/uploads/documents/global_survey2006.pdf
Masnick, M. 2012. Google cryptically alerts the world that it will nudge Chinese searchers away from censorship. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120602/02512019184/google-cryptically-alerts-world-that-it-will-nudge-chinese-searchers-away-censorship.shtml. Accessed 11 June 2011.
Moon, Richard. 2008. Report to the Canadian human rights commission concerning Section 13 of the Canadian human rights act and the regulation of hate speech on the Internet. http://www.chrc-ccdp.ca/pdf/moon_report_en.pdf. Accessed 20 Nov 2011.
Mottaz, Laura. 2010. New media in closed societies: The role of digital technologies in Burma’s saffron revolution. Democracy and Society, 7.2. http://www.democracyandsociety.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/MottazSaffronRevolution7.22.pdf. Accessed 23 Oct 2011.
Nanto, Dick K., and Emma Chanlette-Avery. 2010. North Korea: Economic leverage and policy analysis. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32493.pdf. Accessed 19 Nov 2011.
Nguyen, Tuyen Thanh, and Don Schauder. 2007. Grounding e-government in Vietnam: From antecedents to responsive government services. http://www.jbsge.vu.edu.au/issues/vol02no3/Nguyen.pdf. Accessed 15 Nov 2011.
Niyazova, Umida. 2008. The absence of free and independent mass media and the total destruction of freedom of speech in Uzbekistan. http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session3/UZ/CEJU_UZB_UPR_S3_2008_CentreofExtremeJournalisminUzbekistan_ENG_uprsubmission.pdf. Accessed 23 Oct 2011.
Noland, Marcus. 2008. Telecommunications in North Korea: Has Orascom made the connection? http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/noland1208.pdf. Accessed 19 Nov 2011.
Nordahl, Jade Josefine. 2009. Waves of democracy. Contemporary exile journalism: A case study of the democratic voice of Burma. https://www.uio.no/english/research/interfaculty-research-areas/culcom/publications/master/2010/nordahl.html. Accessed 23 Oct 2011.
OpenNet Initiative, Cuba Country Profile. 2007. http://opennet.net/research/profiles/cuba. Accessed 26 Sept 2011.
Otero, Gerardo, and Janice O’Bryan. 2002. Cuba in transition? The civil sphere’s challenge to the castro regime. Latin American Politics and Society 44(4): 29–57.
Pelsinger, Shawn. 2010. Liberia’s long tail: How web 2.0 is changing and challenging truth commissions. Human Rights Law Review 10(4): 730–748.
Randall, Jesse. 1996. Of cracks and crackdown: Five translations of recent Internet postings. Indonesia 62: 37–51.
Rodan, Garry. 1998. The Internet and political control in Singapore. Political Science Quarterly 113(1): 63–89.
RWB. 2011. Internet enemies report by reporters without borders. http://12mars.rsf.org/i/Internet_Enemies.pdf. Accessed 24 Oct 2011.
Sahar Khamis and Katherine Vaughn. 2011. Cyberactivism in the Egyptian revolution: How civic engagement and citizen journalism tilted the balance. Arab Media and Society. Summer 2011. Issue 13. http://www.arabmediasociety.com/?article=769
Smart, Jason, Kyle Tedeschi, Daniel Meakins, Peter Hannay, and Christopher Bolan. 2008. Subverting national Internet censorship – An investigation into existing tools and techniques. http://openduck.com/2008/12/01/paper-subverting-national-internet-censorship-an-investigation-into-existing-tools-and-techniques/. Accessed 20 Nov 2011.
Sohrabi-Haghighat, M. Hadi, and Shohre Mansouri. 2010. ‘Where is my Vote?” ICT politics in the aftermath of Iran’s presidential election. International Journal of Emerging Technologies and Society 8(1): 24–41.
Sutter, J.D. 2012. The woman who defied Saudi’s driving ban and put it on YouTube. http://edition.cnn.com/2012/06/10/world/meast/sharif-saudi-women-drive/index.html. Accessed 10 June 2012.
Symmes, Patrick. 1998. Che is dead. http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/6.02/cuba.html. Accessed 24 Nov 2011.
Tamayo, J.O. 2012. Yoani Sanchez files demand against Cuban Interior Minister. http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/05/31/2826570/yoani-sanchez-files-demand-against.html. Accessed 12 June 2012.
Thiha, Amara. 2010. Revolution through cyberspace: Burmese blogosphere and saffron revolution. http://www.gg.rhul.ac.uk/ict4d/ictd2010/posters/ICTD2010%20Thiha.pdf. Accessed 23 Oct 2011.
Travaglione, Karina. 2009. Internet censorship in Australia – A ‘clean-feed’? http://www.mannkal.org/downloads/scholars/internet-censorship-in-australia.pdf. Accessed 15 Nov 2011.
UNYA. 2008. United Nations youth association of Australia Internet censorship blue paper. http://unyouth.org.au/assets/Documents/bluepapers/Blue-Paper-Censorship.pdf. Accessed 18 Nov 2011.
Vedres, Balázs, László Bruszt, and David Stark. 2005. Organizing technologies: Genre forms of online civic association in Eastern Europe. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 597: 171–188.
Venegas, C. 2010. Digital dilemmas. The state, the individual, and digital media in Cuba. New Brunswick/London: Rutgers University Press.
Li, Weiping. 2012. Taiwan: Facebook’s deactivation of user accounts triggered free speech concerns. http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2012/06/08/taiwan-facebooks-deactivation-of-user-accounts-triggered-free-speech-concerns/. Accessed 10 June 2012.
Weissman, C.G. 2012. Google shifts policy toward state-sponsored intrusion. http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/herdict/2012/06/08/google-shifts-policy-toward-state-sponsored-intrusion/. Accessed 10 June 2012.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Ziccardi, G. (2013). Digital Activism, Internet Control, Transparency, Censorship, Surveillance and Human Rights: An International Perspective. In: Resistance, Liberation Technology and Human Rights in the Digital Age. Law, Governance and Technology Series, vol 7. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5276-4_6
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5276-4_6
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-007-5275-7
Online ISBN: 978-94-007-5276-4
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)