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Abstract

On January 28, 2006, The Washington Post reported that “hundreds of very live Americans are walking around with pieces of the wrong dead people inside of them.” The macabre news came while media and police unraveled how a tissue recovery company called Biomedical Tissue Services illegally had harvested bone, tendons, and skin from funeral homes and sold the tissue as implant grafts to hospitals and dental clinics. Informed consent sheets were forged, and papers documenting age, cause of death, and disease history were made up to make the grafts appear safe. The most famous body enrolled in this unwarranted recycling of parts was that of Alistair Cooke, a British broadcaster especially known for his Letter from America program running for 58 years on BBC. He died at the age of 95 in 2004 from a lung cancer that had spread to his bones, which were nevertheless harvested by Biomedical Tissue Services. The horror of what eventually turned out to be more than 20,000 recipients having received implants with fake recovery papers—pieces of the wrong dead people—led many Anglophone newspapers to report on the new “tissue-processing industry.” In one such report, The New York Times noted that the “tissue-processing industry, once limited to whole organs, has evolved quickly as techniques have developed to make use of muscle, bone, tendon and skin in therapies and research.” In this way the bones of Alistair Cooke directed attention to something new. However, there is something slightly peculiar about the notion of bone and skin transplants as a recent addition to transplant medicine: bone has been transplanted for more than a 100 years. Why are bone transplants portrayed as new and why does an old and established medical procedure suddenly become ethically controversial? There is also something intriguing about the notion of “pieces of the wrong dead people.” What is the relationship between a piece of bone and a person—and what makes some relationships right and others wrong? When is something inside one body to be considered part of somebody else? Furthermore, the very term “tissue-processing industry” has an effect which makes it different from other “industries.” What does the industrial and commercial setup around products that come from bodies imply for the framing of this story and its effect on readers? The New York Times might assume that the reason they had not heard about bone transplants before is because it is “new,” but we clearly need a more accurate understanding of what is at stake. I suggest that the newness relates to a current reconfiguration of relations between three interrelated domains: the “body,” the “person,” and the “market.” This book is about analyzing this reconfiguration—conceptually, historically, and ethnographically—as a process of change emerging through exchange.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    BBC News (2005, 2008), Bone (2008), Powell and Segal (2006); see also Cheney (2006) and Warren (2006).

  2. 2.

    The New York Times (Brick 2005).

  3. 3.

    For example, Caplan (2007) and Taylor (2005a).

  4. 4.

    Beck (2008) and Medical News Today (2009).

  5. 5.

    Irin (2009); Kale (2008); see also Scheper-Hughes (2000, 2001a, 2005).

  6. 6.

    See, for example, Goodwin (2006).

  7. 7.

    Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2001, 2005, 2011).

  8. 8.

    Waldby and Mitchell (2006).

  9. 9.

    Lock (2002); see also Haddow (2005) and Kent et al. (2006).

  10. 10.

    Squier (2004:2).

  11. 11.

    Waldby (2000:19); see also Waldby (2002, 2006). Sarah Franklin (2007) has noted similar semantic overlaps in relation to the notion of stock, and Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero (2009) have described how species refer to classification, biology, and money.

  12. 12.

    Eiss and Pedersen (2002:283).

  13. 13.

    Knowles (1999).

  14. 14.

    See Taylor (2005b); note also how Cecily Palmer refers to tissue samples as ambiguous: “Human and object, subject and thing” (Palmer 2009:15).

  15. 15.

    A short personal history of the concept: I first heard the word mentioned in a commentary that Stefan Helmreich made at the AAA Conference in San Francisco in 2008. Helmreich had picked it up from historian Hillel Schwartz and seen it being used at an art show to refer to “unique objects” (http://www.schmidtartcenter.com/previous-exhibitions.html, last accessed May 13, 2011). At the time I had long struggled with finding a proper term for the phenomena that this book explores, and inspired by Leigh Star’s work (with coauthors) on boundary objects (Bowker and Star 1999; Star 1989; Star and Griesemer 1989), I had tried out, for example, the term human boundary object (Hoeyer 2010b). However, implicitly this terminology seemed to insist on preexisting boundaries and entities, and it designated the ubject as an object. I have also considered using existing terms such as actant or cyborg (which are however both too broad), quasi-object/quasi-subject (which is not specific enough and either necessitates emphasizing one over the other or is too long), bio-objects (which overemphasize both biology and objecthood), or, as suggested by Bharadwaj, bio-crossings (which also place too much weight on biology), or abject in Butler’s Kristeva-inspired sense (which however focuses on the morally repugnant which need not be the case with what I call ubjects). Ubject first seemed like a fun term to play around with, and then at some point, I realized that it did exactly what I needed it to do for me. I sincerely thank Helmreich for introducing it to me!

  16. 16.

    There is a long-standing debate in anthropology about emic and etic concepts. Should one take local (emic) words and develop an ethnowgraphic understanding of what they entail, thus building an ethnographically grounded theoretical understanding of a particular phenomenon, or should one seek to establish (etic) universal terms for comparisons across contexts? Recently the weight has been on the emic approach, but though I do not claim any universal relevance for my conceptual approach, I suggest that it can be helpful when studying your own intellectual landscape to define a vocabulary that distances itself from and defamiliarizes some of the assumptions underlying the usual parlor.

  17. 17.

    The anthropological literature has mostly opted for the concept of property relations rather than “ownership” in descriptions of the relationships between and among persons and things (Hann 1998; Strathern 1999). According to this tradition, we must see property relations as complex webs of relations, not just between a person and a commodity but among persons expressing their entitlements vis-à-vis each other and the resources surrounding them.

  18. 18.

    See, for example, Charo (2004) and Grubb (1998). Courts are involved in settling these issues at a very practical level (Fox and McHale 2001), of course, but the property status of body parts attracts many academic legal reflections too (Björkman and Hansson 2006; Bovenberg 2006; Grubb 1998; Hardcastle 2009; Laurie 2002; Skegg 1975).

  19. 19.

    Fox (2000). Others seem intrigued rather than annoyed by the anxiety generated by the blurring of things and persons (Hyde 1997). See also Alain Pottage (2004:5) who notes “that persons and things have multiple genealogies, and … their uses are too varied to be reduced to one single institutional architecture. Each form or transaction constitutes persons/things in its own way.”

  20. 20.

    Rose (1994).

  21. 21.

    For some, entitlements denote something resting with persons in the same way as the notion of rights has been used. I wish to emphasize that entitlements cannot exist in a social vacuum; they are always social entitlements. Entitlements can include noncommercial entitlements such as a right to give informed consent and conventional commercial entitlements such as intellectual property rights (IPR)—both administrative entitlements to decide who may use, for example, cell lines in their research and entitlements to take custody of such material.

  22. 22.

    Bergström (2000).

  23. 23.

    When exploring morality, Signe Howell (1997) (see also Strathern 1997) has suggested focusing on moral reasoning as a continual process rather than looking for underlying, presumably stable values. It is important moreover to remember that people’s moral values operate beyond the spoken word.

  24. 24.

    See discussion in Hoeyer (2008).

  25. 25.

    For an interesting and thoughtful introduction to biopolitics, see Lemke (2009).

  26. 26.

    See in particular The History of Sexuality (Foucault 1986, 1992, 1994). The development in governmental logics is succinctly described in a lecture on governmentality (Foucault 1991), and the mechanisms involved in shaping spaces for action with different implications for different people enrolled into medical settings laid out with gruesome clarity in (especially chapter 5 of) The Birth of the Clinic (Foucault 1973).

  27. 27.

    Anthropologist David Graeber has encircled three streams of thought converging in the current uses of the word value: what is proper [ethics], what is desired so that people want to do something to get it [power], and what is meaningful difference [truth]—and I have in brackets indicated how they relate to the Foucaultian axes (Graeber 2001).

  28. 28.

    In fact I have published work in many different traditions. I think it is important to play around with genres and disciplinary traditions and for each topic chose how far you can go if you wish to reach a particular audience. In a sense, I think it radicalizes Foucaultian insights to avoid internalizing genre and custom as truths and instead operate in many different genres including those of a more positivist approach. I have conducted surveys and written more philosophical papers, all dependent on who I wanted to engage with a particular topic. Nevertheless, the willingness to write in different traditions (and sometimes use expressions that are slightly at odds with your normal thinking) reflects this ultimately fluid ontology which I do believe ought to stimulate multiple forms of inquiry rather than buttress a particular genre.

  29. 29.

    Latour (1986).

  30. 30.

    The Foucaultian study of power relations and perceptions of body and self comprises a huge corpus of literature, which it would take a book of its own to summarize (cf. Lemke 2009). A little strain of this literature involves the concrete politics and policies of bodily donations, which is an aspect I have consciously downplayed to allow more focus on the performativity of the moral agency feeding into such policies.

  31. 31.

    A fascinating study of the interplay of EU and British legislation which explores a number of the issues related to the debate at the center of this book can be found in Julie Kent’s book on the regulation of regenerative medicine, Regenerating Bodies (Kent 2012).

  32. 32.

    See, for example, Cooper (2008) and Rajan (2006); see also discussion in Rose (2007) and Franklin (2003, 2007). Mitchell and Waldby (2010) argue that neglect of economic aspects is related to a tendency for analysts to focus too narrowly on the state and issues of citizenship.

  33. 33.

    Rabinow (1992:170).

  34. 34.

    Bynum (1995:17). See also Bynum (1991). Kathrine Park suggests that the notion of strong material continuity identified by Bynum is a feature primarily of Northern European theology at the time, which is actually partly explaining why anatomical dissection developed in Italy and not, for example, England or the German cities (Park 1995).

  35. 35.

    Jackson (1996) and Merleau-Ponty (2002:504).

  36. 36.

    Mol (1998) and Mol and Law (2004).

  37. 37.

    Latour (1993, 2004) and Serres (1982).

  38. 38.

    Gottweis et al. (2008:271). The quote was couched by Ingrid Metzler. Gottweis’ approach to life science governance is a general source of inspiration for the biopolitical approach taken here (Gottweis 1998).

  39. 39.

    Freud (1978:241).

  40. 40.

    See the interesting work compiled in Niewöhner and Scheffer (2010). Langstrup and Winthereik (2010) among others in that volume exemplify how you might construe objects of comparison that are not presumed stabile or easily transferable.

  41. 41.

    Strathern (2004).

  42. 42.

    Metaphors of fluidity are widely used in the STS literature to capture ontological emergence. John Law has (with coauthors) suggested that such metaphors might be too dependent on notions of continuity, unlike a metaphor of fire which can jump, disappear, and reappear (Law and Mol 2001; Law and Singleton 2005). I like wetlands for their specific, slobbery, material connotations, however (besides, taking it as a place in which to move, the sneaking dangers of a wetland are slightly more attractive than the burn of a fireplace). Furthermore, it is attractive considering Doyle’s use of the term wetware to characterize bodily material in contrast to informational data (Doyle 2003).

  43. 43.

    Foucault (1997:231–2).

  44. 44.

    Jackson (1998).

  45. 45.

    Nietzsche (2000:236).

  46. 46.

    Mason and Laurie (2001:715). On the term “organ markets,” see, for example, Kaserman and Barnett (2002) and on “fertility market,” see Spar (2006).

  47. 47.

    See, for example, Becker (2009), Cherry (2005), Eisendrath (1992), Krawiec (2009), Satel (2008b), Schlitt (2002), and Taylor (2005a).

  48. 48.

    Cherry (2005:23).

  49. 49.

    Hardcastle (2009).

  50. 50.

    Herring and Chau discuss this point in great depth (Herring and Chau 2007). See below.

  51. 51.

    Mason and Laurie (2001:722).

  52. 52.

    Cf. Laurie (2002) and Mason and Laurie (2001).

  53. 53.

    Goodwin (2006). Along similar lines Reichardt (2009) suggests that by prohibiting sale, the state exploits the people willing to donate for altruistic reasons.

  54. 54.

    Fabre (2006).

  55. 55.

    Similar arguments have been suggested by Friedlaender (2002) and Roff (2011).

  56. 56.

    Cherry (2005:152).

  57. 57.

    Goodwin (2006), Satel (2008a), and Taylor (2008).

  58. 58.

    Satel (2008b:1).

  59. 59.

    Taylor (2005a:1 and 3).

  60. 60.

    Kaserman and Barnett (2002:84 and 98).

  61. 61.

    Cherry (2005), Taylor (2005a), and Wilkinson (2003).

  62. 62.

    Satel (2008b).

  63. 63.

    Kaserman and Barnett (2002).

  64. 64.

    Epstein (2008).

  65. 65.

    Kaserman and Barnett (2002:5).

  66. 66.

    See, for example, Taylor (2005a). Taylor’s argument is different from Cherry’s above in that it does not focus on the moment of selling as central to autonomy but on how new sources of income provide consumer autonomy.

  67. 67.

    Huang et al. (2008:32).

  68. 68.

    Kaserman and Barnett (2002:20).

  69. 69.

    Kaserman and Barnett (2002:69).

  70. 70.

    Bovenberg (2006) and Hardcastle (2009). Some scholars also argue that you can propagate a property model without supporting a right to sale. Property rights need not be affiliated with market modes of allocation (see Chap. 2).

  71. 71.

    Kant (1997:157).

  72. 72.

    Ibid.

  73. 73.

    See, for example, Munzer (1994, 1993). Munzer is skeptical toward Kant in one respect, however. He thinks Kant might fall prey to what he calls the fallacy of division: what goes for the whole need not go for the parts. The source of dignity is the ability for reason, Munzer writes, and since individual organs are not capable of reason, they could in principle be treated like things. Still, he argues that selling part of your body would exhibit lacking self-respect.

  74. 74.

    Perley (1992).

  75. 75.

    Dickenson (2005, 2007) and Radin and Sunder (2005); see also Moniruzzaman (2012), Muraleedharan et al. (2006), and Scheper-Hughes (2000).

  76. 76.

    Dickenson picks her examples to support her case and neglect the widespread use of male bodies in war, the overuse of men in clinical trials, and the way in which male gametes are objectified and exchanged with very limited concern for donor health interests.

  77. 77.

    Titmuss’ (1997) argument is often repeated; see, for example, Murray (1987).

  78. 78.

    Healy (2006).

  79. 79.

    The general shift is described in Copeman (2005). Recent policies in the EU as well as the USA advocate gift models without any dedicated attempts of controlling the calculation of recovery costs (Hoeyer 2010a).

  80. 80.

    Margaret Radin (1996), in particular, has theorized the concept of commoditization. Mostly, however, social scientists refer to commoditization without explicitly theorizing the concept as such.

  81. 81.

    Dickenson (2007:6).

  82. 82.

    Andrews and Nelkin (2001), Everett (2002), Klinenberg (2001), Linke (2005), Morgan (2002), Parry and Gere (2006), Ridgeway (2004), Rose (2001), Scheper-Hughes (2000), and Sharp (2000).

  83. 83.

    Holland (2001:263).

  84. 84.

    Wilkinson (2000); see also discussion in Wilkinson (2003).

  85. 85.

    Some exceptions prevail. Schlich (2007), for example, specifically delineates his concept of commodification to the kind of gaze on the human body described by Wilkinson.

  86. 86.

    The following quotes are from pages 2 and 4 in Sharp (2007).

  87. 87.

    Sharp (2007). See also Sharp (2000).

  88. 88.

    Ibid.:74.

  89. 89.

    Ibid.:49.

  90. 90.

    Scheper-Hughes (2000, 2001b); see also Dickenson above.

  91. 91.

    Rose (2001).

  92. 92.

    Cunningham (1998) and McAfee (2003).

  93. 93.

    Herring and Chau (2007). See also the anthropological discussion of this issue in Strathern and Lambek (1998).

  94. 94.

    Hyde (1997:11).

  95. 95.

    Harris (1996).

  96. 96.

    Harris (1996).

  97. 97.

    Almeling (2007, 2009) and Parry (2008).

  98. 98.

    Mauss (2000). See also Ferguson (1988) and Frow (1997).

  99. 99.

    Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2011).

  100. 100.

    Kopytoff (1986); see also Everett (2002) and Everett (2007).

  101. 101.

    Consider, for example, the differences revealed through work on embryos as research objects (Morgan 2002), rumors about exchange of shrunken heads or blood as elements in power struggles (Rubenstein 2007; Weiss 1998), penis theft as a theological topic (Smith 2002), and relics as representatives of ecclesiastical authority (Esmark 2002)—and ­consider how ubjects are sometimes desired while at other times disposed of and meant to go away.

  102. 102.

    Notice, for example, Bop Simpson’s work on gifting of body parts in Sri Lanka (Simpson 2004).

  103. 103.

    Mauss (2000); for the shifting readings of Mauss’ essay over time, see Sigaud (2002).

  104. 104.

    Thompson (2005).

  105. 105.

    Tutton (2004).

  106. 106.

    Waldby and Mitchell (2006:22–26).

  107. 107.

    See also Parry and Gere (2006).

  108. 108.

    Ubject exchange involves much more than monetary and dignitary interests. One thing I will not go into much detail with but which constitutes another good example has been pointed out by legal scholar Jane Kaye (2006): storage of tissue bits interacts with legal systems due to potential forensic uses. The protection of the law is at stake in a very different sense than that captured by the pro and con market arguments.

  109. 109.

    Parry (2004) similarly argues that property relations and market forms are changed in the process of finding ways to negotiate entitlements to DNA. See also Calvert (2008).

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Hoeyer, K. (2013). Introduction. In: Exchanging Human Bodily Material: Rethinking Bodies and Markets. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5264-1_1

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