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Norms in Technology pp 207–221Cite as

Naturalness, Artefacts, and Value

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Part of the book series: Philosophy of Engineering and Technology ((POET,volume 9))

Abstract

Most of us have an intuitive understanding of the ontology of artifacts – we have a grasp of what an artifact is. An archetypal technical artifact consists of some tangible physical stuff that someone has modified to make it useful for some practical purpose – such as when wood and metal are treated and shaped to make a hoe, or when a piece of plastic is molded to make a canoe. I believe that this intuitive understanding is neatly captured by the following definition of (technical) artifacts proposed by Peter Kroes and Anthonie Meijers: They are “(i) designed physical structures, which realize (ii) functions, which refer to human intentionality” (Kroes and Meijers 2006, p. 2).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    As developed in Naess (1989), Ch. 4.

  2. 2.

    Leopold reuses large parts of the 1933 text in “The Land Ethic.” He had been thinking and writing about some of the issues covered in the essays long before that, in unpublished work. See, e.g. Norton (1996).

  3. 3.

    See also Vogel (2002) and references given there. Vogel himself points out his own, deliberate ambiguity in the use of the phrase “the nature of artefacts” in Vogel (2003, p. 150).

  4. 4.

    For a discussion, see Preston (2008).

  5. 5.

    Malfunctioning is itself a difficult notion, which bears upon the understanding of the nature of artefacts, including the issue of how to individuate them. I will not go into this discussion here, however. See, e.g., Franssen (2006, p. 46f).

  6. 6.

    There are, however, a number of authors who take the issue seriously. For a recent discussion, with relevant references, see Sheehan (2009). Cf. also Takala (2003). We will return to Chapman’s own version of the naturalness argument below.

  7. 7.

    http://www.ilhoon.com/main.html (accessed February 8th 2011).

  8. 8.

    Hansson (2003). For a discussion of a version of the naturalness argument in the context of risk management, the so-called natural-occurrence view of the de minimis principle, see Sandin (2005).

  9. 9.

    Sylvan ([1973] 2009). Richard Sylvan was known as Richard Routley when the original paper appeared in 1973. He has published under both names.

  10. 10.

    For an analysis of living artefacts, see also Siipi (2003).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Uppsala, Sweden

    Per Sandin

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  1. Per Sandin
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Correspondence to Per Sandin .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Industrial engineering & Innovation sc., Philosophy & Ethics, Eindhoven University of Technology, Den Dolech 2, Eindhoven, 5612 AZ, Netherlands

    Marc J. de Vries

  2. Div. Philosophy, Royal Institute of Technology (KTH), Teknikringen 78 B, Stockholm, 100 44, Sweden

    Sven Ove Hansson

  3. , Philosophy, Eindhoven University of Technology, PO Box 513, Eindhoven, 5600 MB, Noord-Brabant, Netherlands

    Anthonie W.M. Meijers

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Sandin, P. (2013). Naturalness, Artefacts, and Value. In: de Vries, M., Hansson, S., Meijers, A. (eds) Norms in Technology. Philosophy of Engineering and Technology, vol 9. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5243-6_13

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