Abstract
Suppose you accept a moral norm according to which it is wrong to harm a person. How should you then reason about a case in which someone will be harmed with a probability less than one? How exactly are we to draw the line between morally acceptable risks and risks that should not be accepted? The aim of this chapter is to suggest a novel answer to this question, which we believe can be rendered compatible with both consequentialist and non-consequentialist positions in normative ethics.
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Notes
- 1.
For a discussion of how how this proposal can be rendered compatible with consequentialist moral theories, see Peterson (2013).
- 2.
- 3.
For a similar example, see Jackson (1991).
- 4.
The locus classicus is Bales (1971).
- 5.
The term deontic status refers to whether the action is right or wrong, permissible or obligatory, and so on.
- 6.
Ibid. p. 57.
- 7.
Ibid. p. 77.
- 8.
Ibid., p. 213.
- 9.
We are aware that there are other competing solutions to this paradox but mention Jeffrey’s solution for illustrative purposes.
- 10.
Perhaps the distinction could be upheld in a moral context by introducing degrees of truth. It may very well be entirely true that it is obligatory to some degree to rescue the people aboard a sinking cruise liner even if this is dangerous, but this is not equivalent to saying that it is true to some degree that it is entirely obligatory to rescue the people.
References
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Peterson, M., Espinoza, N. (2013). Risk and Degrees of Rightness. In: de Vries, M., Hansson, S., Meijers, A. (eds) Norms in Technology. Philosophy of Engineering and Technology, vol 9. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5243-6_12
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