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Models of God and Alternative Ultimate Realities pp 287–298Cite as

Open Theism and Other Models of Divine Providence

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Abstract

In this paper I define ‘open theism’ as a version of ‘broadly classical theism’ distinguished by commitment to a causally, epistemically, and providentially open future. After clarifying open theism, I then compare and contrast the open theistic model of divine providence with its chief competitors: theological determinism, Molinism, and process theism.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This paper draws on material from Rhoda (2008, 2010a, b). Rhoda (2008) was read at the Models of God mini-conference at the 2007 Pacific APA.

  2. 2.

    The medieval Jewish philosopher Levi ben Gerson, a.k.a. Gersonides (1288–1344 CE) is perhaps the earliest clear proponent of open theism. See Gersonides (1987). The Christian scholar Calcidius (4th c. CE) has also been floated as an early open theist, but the attribution is less clear. See Den Boeft (1970) for details. Still earlier anticipations of open theism can be found in both Cicero (106–43 BCE) and Alexander of Aphrodisias (late 2nd to early 3rd c. CE). For Cicero, see his De Fato and De Divinatione. For Alexander, see Sharples (1983).

  3. 3.

    Pinnock et al. (1994).

  4. 4.

    See, for example, Coffman (2001) and Olsen (2003).

  5. 5.

    See Pinnock et al. (1994: 156) and Cobb and Pinnock (2000). My use of ‘he’ in reference to God is due merely to terminological conservatism and is not meant to imply that God has a gender or that masculine metaphors are more revealing of God’s essence than feminine ones.

  6. 6.

    See Pinnock et al. (1994: esp. chs. 2–4).

  7. 7.

    The final sentence distinguishes open theism from process theism.

  8. 8.

    I use ‘causally necessary’ and ‘unpreventable’ interchangeably. Somewhat roughly, a state of affairs (event) is causally necessary or unpreventable as of time t if and only if it obtains (occurs) in all logically possible worlds having the same causal history as the actual world up to and including t. Similarly, a proposition is causally necessary as of time t if and only if it is true in all logically possible worlds having the same causal history as the actual world up to and including t. On my usage, it follows that logically and metaphysically necessary truths or states of affairs are also causally necessary.

  9. 9.

    Restriction to the causally relevant actual past is needed to avoid begging the question against Ockhamism, which affirms a causally open future while positing as part of the actual past something (viz., divine foreknowledge) that entails a unique causally possible future. For a good primer on Ockhamism see the essays in Fischer (1989).

  10. 10.

    See, e.g., Pinnock et al. (1994: 156).

  11. 11.

    They believe this on the basis of philosophical arguments like Pike’s (1965) and Edwards’ (2009 [1754]: II.12).

  12. 12.

     <p>  is short for ‘the proposition that p’ (i.e., the proposition named by the sentence enclosed in angle brackets).

  13. 13.

    Borges (1998: 119–128).

  14. 14.

    In Rhoda (2008) I ended my analysis of open theism’s core commitments with (4). Subsequent discussions with Joseph Jedwab convinced me to add (5).

  15. 15.

    The distinction between strong and weak actualization comes from Plantinga (1974: 173). S strongly actualizes F iff S’s actions are causally sufficient for, and known by S to be causally sufficient for, F’s coming to pass. S weakly actualizes F iff S’s actions are counterfactually sufficient for, and known by S to be counterfactually sufficient for, F’s coming to pass.

  16. 16.

    Westminster Confession of Faith 3.1.

  17. 17.

    The term ‘freewill theism’ comes from Basinger (1996).

  18. 18.

    Craig (2001).

  19. 19.

    Creel (2005 [1986]: 9–12).

  20. 20.

    This seems to be Sanders’s (1997: 196–197, and note 117) view. He clearly wants to go further than Creel in the extent to which he attributes passibility to God.

  21. 21.

    For a more detailed presentation of this argument for alethic openness, see Rhoda et al. (2006) and Rhoda (2010b). For related arguments that a causally open and alethically settled future requires an ontically settled future, see Rea (2006) and Finch and Rea (2008).

  22. 22.

    Swinburne (1993: 180), Hasker (1989: 187, 2001: 111).

  23. 23.

    See, e.g., Ware (2000).

  24. 24.

    For detailed exposition of Molinism, see Flint (1998) and Freddoso (1988).

  25. 25.

    For detailed exposition of process theism, see Cobb and Griffin (1976).

  26. 26.

    Freddoso (1988: 3) nicely states the doctrine of meticulous providence as follows: “God, the divine artisan, freely and knowingly plans, orders, and provides for all the effects that constitute His artifact, the created universe with its entire history, and executes His chosen plan by playing an active causal role sufficient to ensure its exact realization.”

  27. 27.

    By ‘unavoidable’ here I of course mean unavoidable for God.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Library and Information Science, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, USA

    Alan R. Rhoda

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  1. Alan R. Rhoda
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Correspondence to Alan R. Rhoda .

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  1. Dept. Philosophy, University of Toledo, W. Bancroft Street 2801, Toledo, 43606, Ohio, USA

    Jeanine Diller

  2. Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978, Israel

    Asa Kasher

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Rhoda, A.R. (2013). Open Theism and Other Models of Divine Providence. In: Diller, J., Kasher, A. (eds) Models of God and Alternative Ultimate Realities. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5219-1_24

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