Abstract
This chapter discusses Landgrebe’s work as Husserl’s assistant particularly on Ideen II, and then considers the body as nexus of nature and spirit on one level and the regions of material nature and human world respectively on a macrocosmic level. It traces the development of Husserl’s thought that Landgrebe would witness during his time in Freiburg and the course this will take in his career, and closes with a description of Aron Gurwitsch’s phenomenological analysis of marginal consciousness and its role in perception in general.
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Notes
- 1.
In Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, ed. E. Husserl et al. (Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1928).
- 2.
Landgrebe thanks this organization in his “Editor’s Forward to the 1948 Edition” of Experience and Judgment and discusses the development of this book. See Experience and Judgment, ed. Ludwig Landgrebe, trans. J. Churchill and K. Ameriks (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 3–8. Erfahrung und Urteil (Prague: Academia-Verlag, 1938).
- 3.
The facts pertaining to the preparation of Ideen II come from the “Translator’s Introduction” of Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989), xi–xvi.
- 4.
While this is Landgrebe’s first essay, it would not be published until Eugen Fink’s Festschrift in 1965. Ludwig Landgrebe, “The Phenomenology of Corporeality and the Problem of Matter,” The Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl: Six Essays, ed. and trans. Donn Welton, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), 33–49; “Die Phänomenologie der Leiblichkeit und das Problem der Materie,” Beispiele: Festschrift für Eugen Fink zum 60. Geburtstag, ed. L. Landgrebe (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), 291–305.
- 5.
Ibid., 45. Author’s emphasis.
- 6.
Ibid., 37. There he goes on to write: “The physicist does not construct a world which would lie behind the world of sensible things, but instead he has developed a method which determines these same things and occurrences in an unconditional universal manner, which holds true for all thinking subjects.”
- 7.
Ibid., 38–39. My emphasis.
- 8.
Ibid., 39. Farther on Landgrebe writes: “This means that sensations, especially the kinaesthesen belonging to them, not only constitute the material thing as the correlate to external perception, but also constitute the body at the same time.”
- 9.
Landgrebe quotes Husserl’s Ideen II on this point. Rojcewicz and Schuwer translate this as “self-forgetfulness of the personal ego,” Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book, trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), 193.
- 10.
Ludwig Landgrebe, “Regions of Being and Regional Ontologies in Husserl’s Phenomenology,” in The Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl: Six Essays, ed. Donn Welton (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), 149–175; “Seinsregion und regionale Ontologen in Husserls Phänomenologie,” Studium Generale 9 (1956): 313–34. Cf 151–53.
- 11.
Landgrebe, “Regions of Being,” 154. On the next page he goes on to write: “It is to be noted, therefore, that talk about regions of being is meaningful only with reference to this necessary and essential correlation with the mode of consciousness in which existents of a respective region arrive at givenness.”
- 12.
Landgrebe, “Regions of Being,” 156.
- 13.
Landgrebe, “Regions of Being,” 166.
- 14.
Landgrebe, “Regions of Being,” 166.
- 15.
Landgrebe, “Regions of Being,” 170.
- 16.
The final chapter of Ideen II is “The Ontological Priority of the Spiritual World over the Naturalistic.”
- 17.
Landgrebe, “Regions of Being,” 169–70.
- 18.
Landgrebe, “Regions of Being,” 173.
- 19.
Landgrebe, “Regions of Being,” 170–71.
- 20.
Landgrebe, “Regions of Being,” 172.
- 21.
See Landgrebe’s “Husserls Abschied vom Cartesianismus,” Philosophische Rundschau 9 (1962): 133–77; “Husserl’s Departure from Cartesianism,” The Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl: Six Essays, ed. Donn Welton, trans. R.O. Elveton (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), 66–121.
- 22.
See footnote 2 above.
- 23.
In this regard, see Dieter Lohmar, “Zu der Entstehung und den Ausgangsmaterialien von Edmund Husserls Werk Erfahrung und Urteil,” Husserl Studies 13 (1996): 31–71.
- 24.
See Dorion Cairns, “Nine Fragments on Psychological Phenomenology,” ed. Lester Embree, Fred Kersten, and Richard M. Zaner, Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 41 (2010): 3. Also see Lester Embree’s “Dorion Cairns, Empirical Types, and Field of Consciousness” in the present volume.
- 25.
At this time Landgrebe wrote his “The World as a Phenomenological Problem,” trans. Dorion Cairns, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1/1 (1940): 38–58.
- 26.
Aron Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness: Theme, Thematic Field, and Margin, Vol. III, The Collected Works of Aron Gurwitsch (1901–1973), Phaenomenologica 194, ed. Richard Zaner and Lester Embree (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), 335–36; hereafter CWAG III.
- 27.
Aron Gurwitsch, Constitutive Phenomenology in Historical Perspective, Vol. I, The Collected Works of Aron Gurwitsch (1901–1973), Phaenomenologica 192, ed. Jorge García-Gómez (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), Chapter 3, §9; hereafter, CWAG I.
- 28.
See also CWAG III, 334.
- 29.
Aron Gurwitsch, “Phenomenology of Thematics and of the Pure Ego: Studies of the Relation between Gestalt Theory and Phenomenology,” Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology, Vol. II, The Collected Works of Aron Gurwitsch (1901–1973), Phaenomenologica 193, ed. Fred Kersten (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), 298; hereafter, CWAG II.
- 30.
CWAG III, 442.
- 31.
CWAG III, 443.
- 32.
See CWAG III, 447–48, where Gurwitsch writes: “The self-awareness of an act of consciousness thus turns out to be a necessary condition for the existence of this act. That every act of consciousness carries self-awareness with it, so that this self-awareness accompanies us throughout all our conscious life, is more than a merely empirical fact, ascertained with utmost empirical generality; it is an a priori condition for consciousness.”
- 33.
CWAG III, 446, emphasis added.
- 34.
CWAG III, 448, where Gurwitsch writes: “Thus by its very existence, every act of consciousness fulfills a condition of its possibly being grasped by an act of reflection; in other words, owing merely to its existence, every act of consciousness is open to reflective apprehension.”
- 35.
See CWAG III, 449, for a discussion of self-awareness and reflection.
- 36.
CWAG III, 453. See CWAG III, 450–55, for a discussion of the temporal structure of consciousness. See also CWAG III, 338, where he writes: “Every act of consciousness occurs in phenomenal time and thus is subject to the laws of phenomenal temporality, that is, it must necessarily exhibit the essential structure of phenomenal temporality.”
- 37.
CWAG III, 337.
- 38.
CWAG I, Chapter 3, §9.
- 39.
CWAG III, 337–38.
- 40.
CWAG III, 453–55.
- 41.
CWAG I, Chapter 3, §9. CWAG III, 457, where Gurwitsch writes: “Whatever the theme of our mental activity, we cannot help being aware of a certain sector of the perceptual world, viz., our present perceptual environment, no matter how unconnected this sector may be, where relevancy is concerned, with that with which we are actually dealing.”
- 42.
CWAG II, 295.
- 43.
CWAG III, 494.
- 44.
CWAG III, 477–78.
- 45.
“No feature, tinge, or aspect of the theme (the latter taken as it stands before our minds in a phase of the thematic process) derives from the actual bodily condition or is modified by an alteration of this condition. This condition, although given all the time with more or less distinctness, is nevertheless experienced as being of no material concern or relevancy to them; it is concomitant with but not integrated into the thematic process,” “On Thematization,” ed. Lester Embree, Research in Phenomenology 4 (1974): 29.
- 46.
CWAG III, 477–78.
- 47.
“The Phenomenological and Psychological Approach to Consciousness,” CWAG II, 110–11.
- 48.
CWAG III, 483; he is making this point contra Max Scheler’s position that we have consciousness of the body as a whole, which is prior to any somatic experience.
- 49.
CWAG III, 484–85.
- 50.
CWAG III, 482.
- 51.
CWAG III, 482–83.
- 52.
Gurwitsch does mention the body in the sections concerning marginal consciousness in his dissertation (CWAG II). The other two places include “Marginal Consciousness,” CWAG III, and Gurwitsch-Schutz 1985.
- 53.
Gurwitsch, Schutz 1985: 101.
- 54.
CWAG, 474.
- 55.
CWAG, 484.
- 56.
CWAG III, 501–503.
- 57.
CWAG III, 503.
- 58.
CWAG III, 504.
- 59.
CWAG III, 503.
- 60.
CWAG III, 504.
- 61.
CWAG III, 508.
- 62.
CWAG III, 508.
- 63.
CWAG III, 507–508.
- 64.
CWAG II, 301. See also CWAG III, 499.
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Marcelle, D. (2013). Ludwig Landgrebe and the Significance of Marginal Consciousness. In: Embree, L., Nenon, T. (eds) Husserl’s Ideen. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 66. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5213-9_13
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