Abstract
In this paper I focus on a fundamental legal dilemma that the legacy of systematic injustice characteristically creates following periods of civil conflict and repressive rule. In the aftermath of injustice there is often a strong urge to punish those who committed morally egregious acts of injustice, but it is challenging to find legal grounds for such punishment. To explain this dilemma I summarize the case of the grudge informer. I then survey the different justifications for punishment found in the literature, concentrating on the idea that it is important to (re-)build a just order and sense of justice within transitional communities. To provide resources for understanding what constitutes a just order and for evaluating punishmentâs contribution to this order, I articulate a conception of just political relationships, which are realized in a just order. I then return to the case of the grudge informer and explain how punishment may facilitate the creation of a just order by fostering some of the social and moral conditions that underpin it.
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Notes
- 1.
One of the central questions in the philosophy of law concerns the relationship between law and morality. Legal positivists maintain that there is no necessary connection between a ruleâs morality and its legality; legal status is a separate issue from moral status. By contrast, natural law theorists and advocates of the internal morality of law link the status of a rule as a legal rule with moral criteria.
- 2.
The term ânormative shiftâ comes from Teitel (2000).
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References
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Acknowledgments
This paper was written during my period as a Laurance S. Rockefeller Visiting Faculty Fellow at the Princeton University Center for Human Values (UCHV), an opportunity for which I remain grateful. Opinions and findings presented are mine and do not necessarily reflect the views of the UCHV.
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Murphy, C. (2013). Political Reconciliation, Punishment, and Grudge Informers. In: MacLachlan, A., Speight, A. (eds) Justice, Responsibility and Reconciliation in the Wake of Conflict. Boston Studies in Philosophy, Religion and Public Life, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5201-6_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5201-6_8
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