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Subjective Measures of Consciousness

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Part of the book series: Studies in Brain and Mind ((SIBM,volume 5))

Abstract

Reports seem like a straightforward and unproblematic way assess whether subjects are conscious of a stimulus. However, several researchers have suggested that some sort of introspective training is necessary for subjects to generate more accurate reports about the nature of their experiences. The prospects of such training are evaluated here. It is argued that none of the methods outlined here can deal with the methodological criticisms made against the first introspectionist movement in psychology, or the subsequent issues raised by the application of Signal Detection Theory to human perceptual systems. Alternative measures that combine aspects of subjective reports and Signal Detection Theory, based on confidence ratings, are considered and also argued to be problematic as measures of consciousness.

This chapter is an extended version of ‘New Problems with Old Measures in the Science of Consciousness’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 63:3, pp. 627-648, 2012 [ ]. Reused with kind permission from Oxford University Press.

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Correspondence to Elizabeth Irvine .

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Irvine, E. (2013). Subjective Measures of Consciousness. In: Consciousness as a Scientific Concept. Studies in Brain and Mind, vol 5. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5173-6_2

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