Abstract
This chapter is about The Truthmaker Problem for Presentism. I spell out a solution to the problem that involves appealing to indeterministic laws of nature and branching semantics for past- and future-tensed sentences. Then I discuss a potential glitch for this solution, and propose a way to get around that glitch. Finally, I consider some likely objections to the view offered here, as well as replies to those objections.
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Notes
- 1.
For more on The A-Theory and its rival, The B-Theory, see Prior, Past, Present and Future and Markosian, “How Fast Does Time Pass?”
- 2.
For more on Presentism, see Markosian, “A Defense of Presentism.”
- 3.
The Truthmaker Problem for Presentism is discussed (although not always by that name) by various writers. See, for example, Bigelow, “Presentism and Properties”; Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, pp. 35–42; and Keller, “Presentism and Truthmaking.”
- 4.
See, for example, Lewis, “Truthmaking and Difference-Making.”
- 5.
Or perhaps the stuff.
- 6.
See, for example, Cameron, “Truthmakers.”
- 7.
I have included the word ‘things’ in this formulation of The Truthmaker Principle for stylistic reasons, but for a version of the principle that is neutral between a thing ontology and a stuff ontology, we could simply delete that word, while allowing our quantifiers to range over both things and stuffs.
- 8.
These examples are from Sider, Four-Dimensionalism.
- 9.
For more on The Problem of Singular Propositions About Non-present Objects, see Markosian, “A Defense of Presentism.”
- 10.
For similar proposals, at least with respect to future-tensed sentences, see Peirce, Collected Papers of C.S. Peirce, 5.459 and 6.368; Lukasiewicz, “On Determinism;” Prior, Past, Present and Future, Ch. VII; and Thomason, “Indeterminist Times and Truth-value Gaps.”
- 11.
For a more detailed exposition of the tensed conception of semantics, see Markosian, “How Fast Does Time Pass?”
- 12.
See, for example, Prior, Past, Present and Future.
- 13.
See Armstrong, What is a Law of Nature?; Dretske, “Laws of Nature;” and Tooley, “The Nature of Laws.”
- 14.
For examples of such proposals, see Prior, Past, Present and Future, Ch. VII, and Thomason, “Indeterminist Time and Truth-value Gaps.”
- 15.
For more on indeterminism with respect to the past and the idea of an open past, see Lukasiewicz, “On Determinism;” and Markosian, “The Open Past.”
- 16.
I am grateful to Peter Forrest for pressing this objection during a presentation of an earlier version of this material.
- 17.
See, for example, Smith, “Truthmaker Realism;” and Merricks, Truth and Ontology (esp. p. 29). I am grateful to Andrea Borghini and Giuliano Torrengo for raising this objection.
- 18.
Or better still: (1b) It has been the case that there is an x and there is a y such that x and y are dinosaurs.
- 19.
See, for example, Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity.
- 20.
See, for example, Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds.
- 21.
See, for example, Markosian, “A Defense of Presentism.”
- 22.
I am grateful to Ted Sider for raising this objection in conversation.
- 23.
It is worth noting, however, that in making this reply to the objection, I am committing myself to a rejection of the principle that if P1F1φ is true at a point, p, then F1φ must also be true at every point one unit to the left of p. But the rejection of such “disquotation-like” principles was already built into the semantics for tensed sentences being offered here.
References
Armstrong, David. 1983. What is a law of nature? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bigelow, John. 1996. Presentism and properties. In Philosophical perspectives, vol. 10, ed. James Tomberlin, 35–52. Cambridge: Blackwell.
Cameron, Ross, Truthmakers. In The Oxford handbook of truth, ed. Michael Glanzberg. Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
Dretske, Fred. 1977. Laws of nature. Philosophy of Science 44: 248–268.
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Lewis, David. 2001. Truthmaking and difference-making. Noûs 35: 602–615.
Lukasiewicz, Jan. 1967. On determinism. In Polish logic, ed. Storrs McCall, 19–39. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Smith, Barry. 1999. Truthmaker realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77: 274–291.
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Acknowledgements
Earlier versions of this material were presented at the University of Leeds and the University of Sydney in 2005. I am grateful to both audiences for helpful discussions. Also, the core ideas of this paper appeared in my 1990 doctoral dissertation at the University of Massachusetts. I am grateful to the members of my dissertation committee – Gary Matthews, Fred Feldman, Ed Gettier, and Angelika Kratzer – and also to David Cowles, Cranston Paull, Tom Ryckman, and Ted Sider for helpful discussions. I am also grateful to Andrea Borghini, Giuliano Torrengo, and an anonymous referee for comments on the penultimate draft.
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Markosian, N. (2013). The Truth About the Past and the Future. In: Correia, F., Iacona, A. (eds) Around the Tree. Synthese Library, vol 361. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5167-5_8
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