Abstract
A main challenge for philosophers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was to construct judgements as acts of decision or position (thesis) rather than as acts of combination or synthesis. Let us call this the thetic view. Franz Brentano (1838–1917) is usually regarded as the best supporter of this view, since he takes advantage of the Kantian-Herbartian notion of ‘position’ (Setzung) to break with the traditional definition of judgement as symplokè (Martin 2006, 64 sq.; see Brentano 2008, 335). Generally speaking I think this usual line of interpretation is quite correct, yet it could benefit from a more detailed account of the Brentano reception. What I would like to suggest is this: At stake in Brentano’s legacy is not just the rejection of the synthetic view but also the way in which the thetic dimension is itself conceived. There are, in fact, various ways of constructing judgements as thetic or positional phenomena. Brentano’s notion of ‘existential assertion’ is not the only way to do so.
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- 1.
Windelband’s theory is not discussed in recent literature on judgement, except in Stelzner/Kreiser (2004, 183–202) and in Gabriel (2007). It is not even mentioned in Wayne Martin’s historical-critical reconstruction (2006). As Hans Sluga recently suggested, it is arguable that ‘Martin’s critical discussion of the synthetic theory of judgement would have gained a great deal if he had paid attention to Windelband and Rickert’ (Sluga 2008, 119; Seron 2006).
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- 3.
Of course (S2) is also a propositional content, and, as such, it can be subject to an epistemic assessment as well. In that case we would have to consider two distinct assessments: on the one hand, the ethical assessment of the thing itself, which is said to be <good>, and on the other hand, the epistemological assessment of the whole propositional content <this thing is good>, which is asserted as being true.
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This thesis has had a lot of logical and ontological implications (see Leclercq 2008). Regarding logical implications, it appears that the particular affirmative judgement is the most fundamental judicative form while the universal affirmative is the most complicated one, since it would involve a double negation.
- 5.
This difference has been rightly pointed out by Antonelli (2011, LXVII).
- 6.
This claim is controversial. See, e.g. Hillebrand (1891, 33): ‘The viewpoint Windelband defends here would lead to huge consequences. For, as soon as one begins to transfer features of judicative material (Urtheilsmaterie) to judicative function (Urtheilsfunction), any unified explanation of the judicative function directly disappears.’
- 7.
Hillebrand 1891, 26–27: ‘Since what is characteristic to his [= Brentano’s] theory consists in the fact that he considers judging as a specific kind (idion genos) of psychic phenomena, meanwhile all the other theories believe that one has to regard it simply as a certain composition of psychic elements belonging to an other kind (allo genos), we can refer to the first one as an idiogenetic theory of judgement and to all the other ones as allogenetic theories of judgement.’
- 8.
Windelband’s pupil, Heinrich Rickert, who maintains that Brentano’s theory of judgement has ‘great merits’ but that his classification of psychological phenomena is ‘highly questionable’, also endorses this criticism. See Rickert 6(1928, 169): ‘No doubt, Franz Brentano, who has discussed our issue in a detailed way and has clearly shown that judging is not representing, has great merits in this respect. But the details of his psychological theory are insignificant for our epistemological problem and his classification of psychic phenomena, taken as a whole, is even highly questionable’. The reference to Brentano’s theory of judgement is again treated even more negligibly in Lask 1912 and is completely absent in Bauch (1923, 156), where the name of Brentano is simply no longer mentioned. This suggests that the links connecting Windelband’s theory of judgement to Brentano’s were progressively broken off by his heirs.
- 9.
Note that, unlike Kant (KrV, A70/B95) and like Christoph Sigwart (1 1873, 170, 192, 258 = 3 1904, 216, 238–239, 311), Windelband does not recognise quantity and modality as relevant division principles: Relation is ‘the only division principle of judgements beside quality’ (Windelband 1900, 46). On Windelband’s appraisal of Kant’s so-called table of judgements, see Gabriel (2007).
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Dewalque, A. (2013). Windelband on Beurteilung . In: van der Schaar, M. (eds) Judgement and the Epistemic Foundation of Logic. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 31. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5137-8_7
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