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Act-Horizon

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Book cover The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl

Part of the book series: Phaenomenologica ((PHAE,volume 207))

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Abstract

Acts are not separate or independent things within the stream of mental life and concretely occurs with antecedent, simultaneous, and subsequent acts. Each act includes an expectancy of the future stream in which the same thing will be given if the expectancy is not frustrated. And the seen has how the same can under specified circumstances be touched, heard, etc. in its horizon. “Horizon” is not the border line between land and sky usually referred to, but rather a zone or area of potential givenness in the future determined by the past. The horizon includes also what is cointended with an object, the awareness and the recollecting of it included. The full sense of an intended object correlates with many acts, as is the full sense of any determination of it. Phantasy helps explore these horizons.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Cf. pp. 23ff. on the concept of “inner horizon.”

  2. 2.

    Pp. 25ff.

  3. 3.

    Cf. Chap. 16.

  4. 4.

    Cf. especially Chaps. 13 and 14.

  5. 5.

    Cf. p. 24.

  6. 6.

    On the notion of foundedness, see Chap. 6.

  7. 7.

    Cf. Chap. 9.

  8. 8.

    Cf. pp. 30ff. and Chap. 18.

  9. 9.

    Cf. “Color” is here not the genus color nor even the infima species of color which is exemplified in the color of this individual surface. Rather it is the individual color of this individual surface. The act of objectivating the color-moment in the objective sense, is not per se an act of grasping the color of the object as an individual instance either of color in general, or of a particular species of color—though normally acts of these sort are superimposed on the act here in question. We are concerned here, however, with an act of grasping the individual explicate constituted by an act of explicating an individual into its individual moments.

  10. 10.

    Strictly speaking, it is grasped through a latent noematic moment, which if it were objectified and patent, would be grasped as “an aspect.”

  11. 11.

    Cf. p. 31ff.

  12. 12.

    Pp. 48.

  13. 13.

    In order to clarify the sense of the term “horizon,” particularly in the phrase “phantasy-object horizon,” we have anticipated themes of later analyses. The nature of validity and possibility will be considered in Chaps. 8, 9, and 10.

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© 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Cairns, D., Embree, L. (2013). Act-Horizon. In: Embree, L. (eds) The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl. Phaenomenologica, vol 207. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5043-2_5

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