Abstract
Conceptualization is a noetico-noematic stratum in any complete spontaneous act, but the way of givenness and the attentional mode are not conceptualized. Verbal expression is not necessary, but the thetic quality, objective sense, and intended object of the conceptualized act are identical with the pre-conceptual founding act. With conceptualization further variations in attention are possible. Syntactical activity is also not necessary, so a child’s use of “dog” is already conceptual. The same holds for proper names. Yet syntactically founded conceptualization is far more important. With expression, be it simple or complex, others can be involved. What is expressed is not spatio-temporal and thus is ideal. Expressions can range from empty to fulfilled.
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Notes
- 1.
On symbolization in general, cf. 265.
In the Ideen Husserl characterizes the conceptualizing stratum as the “stratum of the logos,” and also as the stratum of (logical) significance (Bedeuten and Bedeutung) whereby the word significance Bedeutung indicates a special stratum in what he calls the sense (Sinn). Another characterization or term employed by Husserl for the same stratum is “Expression.” Thereby he means something to which verbal expression, even “inner speech” is non-essential, but at the same time something which alone is the direct significance of a verbal expression, in case there is any. “Logical significance is an expression. The verbal sound can be called an expression only because the significance belonging to it expresses. The expressing lies originally in the significance.” (Cf. Ideen, pp. 256–57) In spite of this, we shall avoid using the term “expression” here, and also the term “significance.” Choosing rather the terms “conceptualizing stratum,” and “concept,” since Husserl also uses the terms Begriff and Begrifflich in the same sense.
- 2.
Cf. Chap. 4, pp. 49ff.
- 3.
Cf., however, Ideen p. 263f. where the possibility of “incorrect” conceptualization is cited, namely in the case where a doubtful wish is conceptualized simply by the “would that,” i.e., as if it were a certainty wish. This would seem to imply that the modality of the thetic quality may be wrongly conceptualized or not conceptualized.
- 4.
It has already been pointed out that not every object which is a “symbol,” in the widest sense, is an ideal object.
- 5.
The color may well be a symbol, as e.g., in copies of the New Testament where the words attributed to Jesus are printed in red. But the color is then a symbol of the intended “source” of the embodied sentences. It is not an expression of any moment of the thesis itself. On the other hand, the color might well be an expression of, e.g., the modality of a thesis. Instead of writing “It is certainly raining,” I might adopt the convention of expressing certainty by using red symbols, and simply write (in red) “It is certainly raining” to express the same thesis.
- 6.
Cf. Chap. 19, p. 212.
- 7.
Cf. Chap. 4, pp. 49ff.
- 8.
Some confusion arises if we allow ourselves to think here of the essentially aesthetic object. The structures which we are describing and comparing are independent of all aesthetic experience. Analysis of the latter would reveal that in aesthetic enjoyment “of a picture” there may be four different enjoyed objects: (1) the picture, (2) the depicted, (3) the symbolized, (4) the embodiment of the picture. It is possible, of course, to enjoy aesthetically a perceived or phantasied object without intending it as an embodiment of an ideal object, just as it is possible to enjoy an ideal object without intending it as a symbol or depiction. But the aesthetic is irrelevant to our present theme.
- 9.
This is not, of course, to deny that the structure of the proposition is analogous to that of the fact. Indeed, the two form a synthesis of identity when the fact is evident. Still this similarity of structure does not make the proposition a picture of the fact in the literal sense. A proposition is a picture of a fact only in the way a daughter may be the “picture” of her mother.
(The footnote is the author’s.)
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Cairns, D., Embree, L. (2013). Conceptualization and Expression. In: Embree, L. (eds) The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl. Phaenomenologica, vol 207. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5043-2_23
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