Austin and Scandinavian Realism

Mindus, Patricia

doi:10.1007/978-94-007-4830-9_5

Patricia Mindus³

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 103))

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Abstract

The imperative theory of law exemplified in the work of John Austin is the object of much criticism in the movement of Scandinavian legal realism (SLR). The very core notions of command, sovereignty and will are targeted. This paper explores the Scandinavian readings of Austin’s theory, chiefly by reconstructing the main arguments of Axel Hägerström’s criticism of the will–theory and Karl Olivecrona’s reading of the imperative character of law. Special attention is paid to the affinities between the various outlooks and to their core differences. On one hand, strong resemblances can be discovered in the common methodological afflatus and respect for Hume’s principle. On the other hand – apart from contrasting opinions on minor aspects (such as tacit consent grounding custom) – among the unbridgeable divergences mention should be made of the view on morals: Austin embraced a form of cognitivism, while the Scandinavians supported a strict form of non-cognitivism. In order to assess the originality of the Scandinavian attack on the imperative theory of law, the aim of the paper is to test to what extent it stimulated the seminal work on the question of law’s authoritative dimension in SLR.

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Notes

1.
All translations from Swedish, German, Italian and Spanish are mine, where nothing else is indicated.
2.
The so-called Uppsala school of philosophy, unified by the method of conceptual analysis (in Hägerström’s sense, or as Phalén’s “denunciation of dialectics”) is a separate group from that of Scandinavian legal realism, even though Hägerström surely counts as inspirational source for both. Folke Schmidt’s The Uppsala School of Legal Thinking from 1978 (one of the few accounts in English from the 1970s) made the two groups overlap, creating some confusing ideas in non-Scandinavian scholars. See Folke Schmidt, The Uppsala School of Legal Thinking, Scandinavian Studies in Law, vol. 22 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1978) and Patricia Mindus, A Real Mind. The Life and Work of Axel Hägerström (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009) at 70.
3.
We shall not engage here in the long-seller on the various forms of positivism and the arranging of authors into subgroups of different colouring. It is enough to stress that the main representatives of Scandinavian legal realism have been classified both inside and outside positivism: For instance, Claes Peterson [“Uppsalaskolan och politiseringen av rättsvetenskapen” (2003) 3 Juridisk Tidskrift 580–585] considered Hägerström to represent a quite undramatic expression of the tradition of legal positivism, whereas Enrico Pattaro proposed a reading of Scandinavian legal realism as alternative to positivism. See Enrico Pattaro, “Il realismo giuridico come alternativa al positivismo giuridico” (1971) 1 Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia del Diritto 61–126; Enrico Pattaro, A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence – The Law and the Right (vol. I) (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005).
4.
John V. Orth, “Casting the Priests Out of the Temple: John Austin and the Relation between Law and Religion” in The Weightier Matters of Law: Essays in Law and Religion. A Tribute to Harold J. Berman ed. by John Witte and Frank S. Alexander (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988) 230–249.
5.
Johan Strang, “Why Nordic Democracy?” in Rhetorics of Nordic Democracy [Studia Fennica Historica 17] ed. by Johan Strang and Jussi Kurunmaki (Helsinki: Suomen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 2010) 83–113.
6.
Alf Ross, Hvorfor Demokrati? (København: Munksgaard, 1946) [Eng. trans. in Scandinavian Democracy ed. by Jospeh Albert Lauwerys (Copenhagen: Danish Institute/Norwegian Office of Cultural Relations/The Swedish Institute, 1958)].
7.
Wilfrid E. Rumble, The Thought of John Austin. Jurisprudence, Colonial Reform and the British Constitution (London: The Athlone Press, 1985) at 6.
8.
Wilfred Löwenhaupt, Politisches Utilitarismus und bürgerliches Rechtdenken. John Austin (1790–1859) und die “Philosophie des positiven Rechts” (Berlin: Dunker & Humblot, 1972).
9.
Rumble, The Thought of John Austin, supra note 7 at 193.
10.
To be accurate, in the first volume of Die Unwissenschaftlichkeit der Rechtswissenschaft, Austin’s theory is briefly discussed at 191–198 but mainly in its relation to Bergbohm and Holland; and in the second volume I should mention a quick reference on page 231 to Austin’s Lecture XXV and the idea of unlawful intention. In Legal Thinking Revised I only counted six references (at 24, 92, 142–43, 337 and 397), which is far less then Thon or Jhering, and Austin only appears here in relation to Bentham.
11.
Mindus, A Real Mind, supra note 2.
12.
Vilhelm Lundstedt, Legal Thinking Revised: My Views on Law (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1956) at 337.
13.
Vilhelm Lundstedt, Die Unwissenschaftlichkeit der Rechtswissenschaft (Berlin: Rothschild 1932–36, vol. 1) at 197.
14.
Vilhelm Lundstedt, Law and Justice [1950] (Stockholm/Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1952) at 43; cf. Lundstedt, Legal Thinking Revised, supra note 12 at 142–43.
15.
Rumble, The Thought of John Austin, supra note 7 at 1.
16.
Henry James Sumner Maine, Lectures on the Early History of Institutions [reprint fac. sim. 7th ed. 1914] (London: Dawsons of Pall Mall, 1966) at 343.
17.
A lengthy list could be drafted, especially in relation to Hart, but I shall limit my references to the following (not always very well-known but not less worthy of praise) comparisons: with Hobbes and Bentham, Mario A. Cattaneo, Il positivismo giuridico inglese (Milano: Giuffré, 1962); José Juan Moreso, “Cinco diferencias entre Bentham y Austin” (1989) 6 Anuario de Filosofía del Derecho 351–357; with American realism, see Wilfrid E. Rumble, “The Legal Positivism of John Austin and the Realist Movement in American Jurisprudence” (1981) 66 Cornell Law Review 986–1031; with Hermann Heller, see Ernesto Garzón Valdéz, “Hermann Heller y John Austin. Un intento de comparación” (1983) 57 Sistema 31–50; with Joseph Story, see Michael H. Hoeflich “John Austin and Joseph Story: Two Nineteenth Century Perspectives on the Utility of the Civil Law for the Common Lawyer” (1985) 29 The American Journal of Legal History 36–77. No comparison, as far as I have been able to establish, has ever been attempted between Austin and Scandinavian legal realism.
18.
References can be found at 26, 31–33, 39, 45, 51, 57, 59 ff., 70, 73, 79, 82 ff., 120–125, 154–56, 186.
19.
Alf Ross, Theorie der Rechtsquellen. Ein Beitrag zur Theorie des positiven Rechts auf Grundlage dogmenhistorischer Untersuchung (Leipzig/Wien: Deuticke, 1929) at 79.
20.
The “English doctrine” is presented on the background of, and in relation to, the German tradition: See Ross, Theorie der Rechtsquellen, supra note 19 at 90 “Die englische Schule dagegen entstand in Kontinuation der positiven, analytischen Schule,” even though “auf der anderen Seite übte die englische, analytiche Schule (…) so gut wie gar keinen Einfluß auf den Kontinent aus. Austins Name blieb unbekannt” (Ibid. at 77). A criticism of Austin’s account of the sources of law can be found in ibid. at 91.
21.
Dennis Lloyd, Introduction to Jurisprudence (London: Stevens & Sons, 1965) at 292.
22.
Hägerström dedicated quite some work to discussing Austin’s theses: Without attempting to offer any exhaustive list of references to Austin in Hägerström (which would require significant effort in going through the archive of unpublished manuscripts), it is sufficient here to recall the essay Representationsidéens djupare grundvalar now in Axel Hägerström, Rätten och staten. Tre föreläsningar om rätts- och statsfilosofi, ed. Martin Fries (Stockholm: Natur & Kultur, 1963) esp. at 171 ff.; part of the second section in the essay collection from 1963 on The State and Its Forms (ibid. at 120–153); see also Axel Hägerström, Rätten och viljan. Två uppsatser av Axel Hägerström ed. by Karl Olivecrona (Lund: Gleerup, 1961) at 63 ff. and at 78–82 and 95. For the English reader, in Inquiries, apart from the essay Is Positive Law an Expression of Will?, we should mention the critique of Austin’s doctrine according to which tacit consent grounds custom: see Axel Hägerström, Inquiries into the Nature of Law and Morals (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1953) at 60 ff.; the attack on the imperative theory (ibid. at 201–209) where he never actually quotes Austin but his presence is nonetheless felt. In parallel with some of Austin’s themes, Hägerström suggested an analysis of the notion of command (ibid. at 106–143) and discussed the conative power of habit (ibid. at 155 ff.). Generally, Hägerström’s account of the experience of duty may be read on the background of Austin’s theory (ibid. at 105–141).
23.
Hägerström, Rätten och staten, supra note 22 at 120; cf. Hägerström, Inquiries, supra note 22 at 257.
24.
Karl Olivecrona, Introduction in Hägerström, Rätten och viljan, supra note 22 at 15.
25.
Karl Olivecrona, Law as Fact 2nd ed. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1971) at 32 and 67.
26.
Karl Olivecrona, Law as Fact 1st ed. (Copenhagen/London: Munksgaard/Milford, 1939) at 27; see also Olivecrona, Law as Fact 2nd ed., supra note 25 at vii.
27.
Alf Ross, On Law and Justice (London: Stevens & Sons, 1958) at 1.
28.
See infra section 5.4.
29.
John Stuart Mill, “Austin on Jurisprudence” in Id. Dissertations and discussions, Vol. III (London: Longmans, 1867) at 209.
30.
John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined [1832] ed. by Wilfrid E. Rumble (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) at 157.
31.
Axel Hägerström, Philosophy and Religion (London: Allen & Unwin, 1964) at 87.
32.
Mindus, A Real Mind, supra note 2 chapter 2; and my “À l’origine du non-cognitivisme moderne: Axel Hägerström” (2008) Analisi & Diritto 159–176. For a discussion of the connection between this outlook and forms of naturalism especially in Ross and Olivecrona, see Torben Spaak, “Naturalism in American and Scandinavian Realism: Similarities and Differences” in De Lege. Uppsala-Minnesota Colloquium: Law, Culture and Values ed. by Mattias Dahlberg (Uppsala: Iustus förlag, 2009) 33–83.
33.
Samuel Enoch Stumpf, “Austin’s Theory of the Separation of Law and Morals” (1961) 14 Vanderbilt Law Review 117–149; from the historical perspective, see also Richard Cosgrove, “The Reception of Analytic Jurisprudence: The Victorian Debate on Separation of Law and Morality” (1981) 74 Durham University Journal 47–56.
34.
Brian H. Bix, “John Austin” in Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/austin-john/#2 (last accessed 22/04/2012) at 6.
35.
Austin, The Province, supra note 30 at 158.
36.
Rumble, The Thought of John Austin, supra note 7 at 81.
37.
Austin, The Province, supra note 30 at 55; Cattaneo, Il positivismo giuridico inglese, supra note 17 at 255.
38.
Axel Hägerström, Socialfilosofiska uppsatser (Stockholm: Bonnier, 1939) at 215.
39.
Austin, The Province, supra note 30 at 159.
40.
Olivecrona, Law as Fact 2nd ed. supra note 25 at 57.
41.
Ibid.
42.
Ibid. at 58.
43.
See §1 in section 5.5. on the core differences.
44.
This is Austin’s view of legal concepts but it was challenged already by Binding, Zitelmann, Jellinek and many more because it focuses on what we would today label comparative law, i.e. the study of the permanence of a specific institution, say marriage, across the spectrum of national legal systems rather than across the spectrum of legal disciplines; a distinction, it has been stressed, that sets the methodological difference between allgemeine Rechtslehre and philosophy of law. For this distinction see Åke Frändberg, “Den allmänna rättsläran – tidlös och ständigt aktuell” in his Rättsordningens idé (Uppsala: Iustus, 2005) 9–20, at 10–12.
45.
Quote from Rumble, The Thought of John Austin, supra note 7 at 73–74.
46.
Austin, The Province, supra note 30 at 15.
47.
Konrad Marc-Wogau, Studier till Axel Hägerströms filosofi (Falköping: Prisma, 1968) at 7.
48.
Axel Hägerström, “Begreppet viljeförklaring på privaträttens område” (1935) Theoria 1: 32–57 and 2: 121–138, at 99.
49.
Axel Hägerström, “Kritiska punkter i värdepsykologien i värdepsykologien” in Festskrift tillägnad Erik Olof Burman (Uppsala: Appelgrens boktr., 1910) at 16.
50.
Maine, Lectures, supra note 16 at 7.
51.
Gunnar Oxenstierna, Vad är Uppsalafilosofien? (Stockholm: Bonnier, 1938); Harry Meurling, “Om begreppsanalys” in Festskrift tillägnad Axel Hägerström den 6 September 1928 av filosofiska och juridiska föreningarna i Uppsala ed. by Efraim Liljeqvist (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1928) 330–336.
52.
Alan R. White “Austin as a Philosophical Analyst” (1978) 64:3 ARSP 379–399; Gerard Maher, “Analytical Philosophy and Austin’s Philosophy of Law” (1978) 64:3 ARSP 401–415; Moreso, “Cinco diferencias entre Bentham y Austin” supra note 17.
53.
Mohamed El Shakankiri, “Analyse du langage et droit chez quelques juristes anglo-américains de Bentham à Hart” (1970) 15 Archives de Philosophie du Droit 113–149.
54.
Silvana Castignone, Diritto, linguaggio, realtà. Saggi sul realismo giuridico (Torino: Giappichelli, 1995), esp. at 151–216 and 293–318; Johan Strang, “Two Generations of Scandinavian Legal Realists” (2009) Retfaerd 12:1.
55.
Torben Spaak, “Karl Olivecrona’s Legal Philosophy: A Critical Appraisal” (2010) 24 Ratio Juris 155–92.
56.
Gustav Hugo, Lehrbuch des Naturrecht als einer Philosophie des positiven Rechts (Berlin: Mylius, 1798).
57.
John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, or The Philosophy of Positive Law ed. by Robert Campbell (4th edition, rev., London: John Murray, 1873) [Bristol: Thoemmes Press reprint, 1996, two vols.] at 33.
58.
Hägerström, Inquiries, supra note 22 at 84.
59.
Isabel Turégano Mansilla, Derecho y moral en John Austin (Madrid: Centro de estudios politicos y constitutionales, 2001), esp. 127–216.
60.
William Loutit Morison, “Some Myth about Positivism” (1958) 68 The Yale Law Journal 294–304, esp. at 221; and Morison, John Austin (London: Edward Arnold, 1982).
61.
Olivecrona, Law as Fact 2nd ed. supra note 25 at 32.
62.
Ibid. at 40.
63.
Julius Stone, Legal System and Lawyer’s Reasoning (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1964) at 74.
64.
Olivecrona, Law as Fact 2nd ed. supra note 25 at 32.
65.
Quote from K. J. M. Smith, James Fitzjames Stephen: Portrait of a Victorian Rationalist (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988) at 44.
66.
Ross, Theorie der Rechtsquellen, supra note 19 at 83.
67.
Ibid. at 85.
68.
Austin, The Province, supra note 30 at 25.
69.
Ibid. at 18.
70.
Morris R. Cohen, Law and the Social Order (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1933) at 249.
71.
Hägerström, Inquiries, supra note 22 at 34.
72.
Hägerström also held command and duty not to be correlative terms. This line of argument was developed in a lengthy phenomenological assessment of command and duty from 1917 that I will not touch upon here. For more information, C.D. Broad, “Hägerström’s Account of Sense of Duty and Certain Allied Experiences” (1951) 26 Philosophy 99–113; Bo Petersson, Axel Hägerströms värdeteori (Uppsala: Filosofiska föreningen vid Uppsala universitet, 1973); Enrico Pattaro, Il realismo giuridico scandinavo, vol. I: Axel Hägerström (Bologna: Cooperativa libraria universitaria editrice, 1974) esp. chapter 3; Dieter Lang, Wertung und Erkenntnis. Untersuchungen zu Axel Hägerströms Moraltheologie (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1981); Castignone, Diritto, linguaggio, realtà, supra note 54 at 223–240.
73.
Hägerström, Inquiries, supra note 22 at 56.
74.
A complete reconstruction in Mindus, A Real Mind, supra note 2 in chapter 4.
75.
Hägerström, Inquiries, supra note 22 at 18; cf. Axel Hägerström, Är gällande rätt uttryck av vilja? in Festskrift tillägnad prof. Vitalis Norström på 60-årsdagen den 29 januari 1916 (Göteborg: Elanders Boktryckeri, 1916) 171–210, at 172.
76.
Hägerström, Inquiries, supra note 22 at 101.
77.
Ibid. at 20; cf. Är gällande rätt, supra note 75 at 62.
78.
Hägerström, Inquiries, supra note 22 at 21; cf. Är gällande rätt, supra note 75 at 175; Rätten och staten, supra note 22 at 126 and 132.
79.
Hägerström, Inquiries, supra note 22 at 21; cf. Hägerström, Är gällande rätt, supra note 75 at 175.
80.
Ibid. at 25; cf. Hägerström, Är gällande rätt, supra note 75 at 179.
81.
Ibid. at 41.
82.
Ibid. at 25; Hägerström, Är gällande rätt, supra note 75 at 180.
83.
Hägerström, Conception of a Declaration of Intention, supra note 48 at 25.
84.
Hägerström, Inquiries, supra note 22 at 27.
85.
Ibid. at 24; cf. Hägerström, Är gällande rätt, supra note 75 at 178.
86.
Hägerström, Rätten och staten, supra note 22 at 265; cf. also Axel Hägerström, Der römische Obligationsbegriff im Lichte der allgemeinen römischen Rechtanschauung, volume II, Über die Verbalobligation ed. by Karl Olivecrona (Uppsala: SKHVSU Almqvist & Wiksell, 1941) at 13.
87.
Hägerström, Inquiries, supra note 22 at 41.
88.
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651) part 2, chap. 26.
89.
Austin, The Province, supra note 30 at 212.
90.
Hägerström, Inquiries, supra note 22 at 21; Rätten och viljan, supra note 22 at 175.
91.
Ibid. at 60.
92.
Ibid. at 63.
93.
Ibid. at 150.
94.
Axel Hägerström, Moralpsykologi ed. by Martin Fries (Stockholm: Natur & Kultur, 1952) at 185.
95.
Hägerström, Inquiries, supra note 22 at 36; cf. Hägerström, Är gällande rätt, supra note 75 at 191. On the analogy with the machine and its implications for SLR, see my “Social Tools and Legal Gears: Hägerström on the Nature of Law” in Axel Hägerström and Modern Social Thought ed. by Sven Eliaeson et al. (Oxford: Bardwell Press, forthcoming, 2013).
96.
Max Lyles, A Call for Scientific Purity. Axel Hägerström’s Critique of Legal Science (Stockholm: Rönnells, 2006) at 338.
97.
Hägerström, Inquiries, supra note 22 at 35; Hägerström, Är gällande rätt, supra note 75 at 190.
98.
Ibid. at 30; Hägerström, Är gällande rätt, supra note 75 at 184.
99.
Ibid. at 34; Hägerström, Är gällande rätt, supra note 75 at 88. In Hägerström’s jargon, a constitutional state is not a state inspired by the political doctrine of constitutionalism; it is a political organization with a developed system of sources of law where law is applied in an orderly and constant way, in opposition to pure despotism and mob-rule.
100.
Hägerström, Inquiries, supra note 22 at 31.
101.
Ibid. at 42.
102.
The English version states “rules that had actual power in the realm of ideas” but I prefer the original version, since the Aristotelian terms of the English translation easily mislead. Hägerström intended a form of power that Max Weber would have called “ideological.” The grip of such an ideological power can be tested de facto, just as today we have sociological research on values.
103.
Hägerström, Inquiries, supra note 22 at 31–32.
104.
Hägerström, Rätten och staten, supra note 22 at 223.
105.
Hägerström, Inquiries, supra note 22 at 39.
106.
Ibid. at 38–39.
107.
Olivecrona, Law as Fact 2nd ed. supra note 25 at 43.
108.
Ibid. at 79–80.
109.
Ibid. at 47.
110.
Ibid. at 32.
111.
Ibid. at 45.
112.
Ibid. at 46.
113.
Karl Olivecrona, “Legal Language and Reality” in Essays in Honor of Roscoe Pound ed. by Ralph A. Newman (Indianapolis, IN: The American Society for Legal History, 1962) 151–191, at 158.
114.
Olivecrona, Law as Fact 2nd ed. supra note 25 at 120.
115.
Ibid. at 118–120.
116.
Ibid. at 121.
117.
Ibid. at 120.
118.
Cf. Austin, The Province, supra note 30 at 21.
119.
Olivecrona, Law as Fact 2nd ed. supra note 25 at 122.
120.
Ibid.
121.
Herbert L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961) at 19.
122.
Ibid. at 124.
123.
Ibid. at 125.
124.
Ibid.
125.
Ibid. at 126.
126.
Ibid. at 129.
127.
Ibid. at 129.
128.
Ibid. at 130.
129.
José Juan Moreso usually uses this label and it has become legion among lawyers in the Neo-Latin speaking world: see his “Positivismo jurídico, relativismo moral y liberalismo politico” in (2012) Teoria Politica 103–110; and generally his La Constitución: modelo para armar (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2009). I object to this position in “Doppiando il Capo Horn della scienza del diritto: Sull’oggettivismo post-metafisico quale fondamento del positivismo inclusivo” in (2012) Teoria Politica 143–160.
130.
Cattaneo, Il positivismo giuridico inglese, supra note 17 at 276; cf. Mario A. Cattaneo, “John Austin” (1978) 8:1 Materiali per una cultura giuridica 11–95.
131.
See Mindus, A Real Mind, supra note 2 in chapter 3.
132.
See note 129.
133.
Andrew D.E. Lewis, “John Austin (1790–1859) Pupil of Bentham” (1979) 2 The Bentham Newsletter 19.
134.
Quote from Rumble, The Thought of John Austin, supra note 7 at 60.
135.
Krzysztof Dybowski, “John Austin – Positivist or Utilitarist?” (1992) 78 ARSP 407–411; René Sève, “La théorie du droit de John Austin: le positivisme tel qu’il devrait être?” (1988) 13 Cahiers de philosophie politique et juridique de l’Université de Caen 69–84.
136.
Quote from Rumble, The Thought of John Austin, supra note 7 at 60.
137.
Rumble, The Thought of John Austin, supra note 7 at 107–108.
138.
Austin, The Province, supra note 30 at 16.
139.
Ibid. at 15.
140.
Ibid. at 14.
141.
Moreso, “Cinco diferencias entre Bentham y Austin,” supra note 17; José Juan Moreso, La teoría del derecho de Bentham (Barcelona: PPU, 1992). On Bentham and SLR, see Francesco Ferraro and Francesca Poggi, The “Real” Bentham. Bentham and Legal Realism (in Analisi & Diritto, 2012 forthcoming).
142.
Turégano Mansilla, Derecho y moral, supra note 59 at 445.
143.
Hägerström, Kritiska punkter, supra note 49 at 61–62.
144.
Austin, The Province, supra note 30 at 14.
145.
Axel Hägerström, Moralfilosofins grundläggning ed. by Thomas Mautner (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1987) at 45.
146.
Rumble, The Thought of John Austin, supra note 7 at 76.
147.
Austin, The Province, supra note 30 at 4.
148.
Ibid. at 60.
149.
Hägerström, Inquiries, supra note 22 at 152.
150.
Roger Cotterrell, Scholar in Law: English Jurisprudence from Blackstone to Hart (New York: NYU Press, 1996) at 70.
151.
Alexander Peczenik, “Den skandinaviska rättsrealismen” in Rättsfilosofi: samhälle och moral genom tiderna ed. by Joakim Nergelius (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2001) 117–127, esp. 122–124; Johan Strang, “Axel Hägerström och Gunnar Myrdal. Om den svenska värdenihilistiska traditionen” (2003) 1 Historisk Tidskrift för Finland 43–61, at 43; Jacob Sundberg, “A Chair in Jurisprudence” in Perspectives on Jurisprudence – Essays in Honor of Jes Bjarup ed. by Peter Wahlgren Scandinavian Studies in Law, vol. 48 (Stockholm: Jure, 2005) 432–464, at 434.
152.
Arduino Agnelli, John Austin, alle origini del positivismo giuridico (Torino: Giappichelli, 1959) at 112.
153.
Norberto Bobbio, Il positivismo giuridico (Giappichelli: Torino, 1979) at 172; on the centrality of sanctions in Austin and more generally in positivism, see Colin Tapper, “Austin on Sanctions” 1965 The Cambridge Law Journal 271–287; Frederick Schauer, “Was Austin Right After All?: On the Role of Sanctions in a Theory of Law” (2010) 23 Ratio Juris 1–21.
154.
Bobbio, Positivismo giuridico, supra note 153 at 181.
155.
Austin, The Province, supra note 30 at 118.
156.
Bobbio, Positivismo giuridico, supra note 153 at 182–83.
157.
Ibid. at 182.
158.
See Enrico Pattaro, ”From Hägerström to Ross and Hart” (2009) 22:4 Ratio Juris 532–48.
159.
Hägerström, Rätten och staten, supra note 22 at 212–13.
160.
Ibid. at 207.
161.
Ibid.
162.
See Torben Spaak, “Norms that Transfer Competence” (2003) 16 Ratio Juris 89–104.
163.
See Eugenio Bulygin, ”On Norms of Competence” (1992) 11 Law and Philosophy 201–216; and Francesca Poggi, Norme permissive (Torino: Giappichelli, 2004).
164.
Herbert L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd ed.) ed. by Penelope A. Bulloch and Joseph Raz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) at 41.
165.
Hägerström, Rätten och staten, supra note 22 at 221.
166.
Alf Ross, Towards a Realistic Jurisprudence. A Criticism of the Dualism in Law (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1946) at 108–09.
167.
Bobbio, positivismo giuridico, supra note 153 at 182.
168.
Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, trans. by Anders Wedberg [first published 1945] (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publ., 2006) at 29.
169.
E.g. see the famous remark on the Gorgon of power in Hans Kelsen, in Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer (Berlin: Gruyter, 1927) vol. 3, 54–55.
170.
Needless to add that the analogy was suggested by the famous comparison of Olivecrona in the first edition of Law as Fact (1939) which states that legislation is like a hydroelectric power plant; the attitudes of the ‘bulk of the population’ corresponds to the current; in the power plant the current is converted to electricity and distributed to the grid covering the territory of the state. This is a metaphor applied to legislation, i.e. to statutes originating in the state apparatus.
171.
See infra chapter 8.
172.
Max Weber, Politics as Vocation in Essays in Sociology ed. by Bryan S. Turner (London: Routledge Sociology Classics, 1991) 77–78.
173.
This image was suggested to me by Torben Spaak.
174.
Weber, Politics as Vocation, supra note 172 at 93.
175.
Olivecrona, Law as Fact 1st ed. 1939 at 134.
176.
Ross, On Law and Justice, supra note 27 at 53. Ross’ embracing of the modern coercion theory also reverberated on his conception of the State, no longer reducible to Jhering’s Zwangsgewalt: “A national law system is a body of rules concerning the exercise of physical force” (Ibid. at 52).

Acknowledgements

Besides the participants in the UCL conference John Austin and His Legacy, I also thank the participants of the Uppsala Seminar in Philosophy of Law and the Uppsala Seminar in Practical Philosophy where previous versions of this paper were presented in 2011, and in particular I would like to thank Torben Spaak and Åke Frändberg for insightful comments.

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Patricia Mindus

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Patricia Mindus

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Mindus, P. (2013). Austin and Scandinavian Realism. In: Freeman, M., Mindus, P. (eds) The Legacy of John Austin's Jurisprudence. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 103. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4830-9_5

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