Abstract
The paper takes up a general conceptual discussion and, favoring a compatibilist framework, asks whether the manifold conceptions of free will may lead to the question of which of the enduring disputes are substantial ones about the same issue and which are perhaps only terminological ones due, for instance, to equivocal use of concepts. Firstly, five competing views on how to approach the problem of free will are discussed: 1) presupposition of a fixed reference of freedom of the will which has to be explained adequately; 2) formulation of a list of necessary and sufficient conditions for free will; 3) conceptual analysis of our intuitions on free will; 4) analysis of our social practice of attributing responsibility from a pragmatic point of view; and, finally, 5) criticism of other approaches in order to pinpoint the most plausible aspects to be used in any attempt to conceptualize the notion of free will. The paper then argues for an evaluative and substantive approach regarding those aspects of freedom of the will which matter in our practical disputes and a number of these aspects are discussed in detail, thereby presenting a complex account of what is (really) at stake in discussions on freedom of the will and autonomy.
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Notes
- 1.
Regarding the question of free will as an ontological question in a wide sense leaves open whether free will should be regarded as a non-natural, a natural, or a social entity which, like property or marriage, is constructed by mutual recognition. Even if “free” is regarded as a value predicate, there must be states of will it is applied to.
- 2.
- 3.
Jackson (1998), 31.
- 4.
Jackson (1998), 31–33, 44–45.
- 5.
It is in a similar spirit that Peter Bieri (2001, 161, 367) appeals to our conceptual intuition, but for him this is only one way to conceive freedom of will; the other, connected way is articulation of our experience of freedom.
- 6.
As far as willing or deciding can be regarded as an action, “free will” can be subsumed under what Jackson describes as “free action”.
- 7.
Bieri (2001) analogously refers to paradigmatic examples and thought experiments.
- 8.
For Jackson, one example is “the general coincidence in intuitive responses” and, therefore, the change in the conception of knowledge according to Gettier’s examples for possible cases. Jackson (1998), 32.
- 9.
Jackson (1998), 35.
- 10.
Jackson (1998), 44.
- 11.
Jackson (1998), 44–45. Bieri also believes that philosophical theory should not ignore the pre-theoretical concept. But he wants to prevent a simple change of subject and admits that the contours of the pre-theoretical concept may be vague and that it leaves room for different theories which may be compatible with the pre-theoretic concept, but not with each other. (2001, 373–374).
- 12.
- 13.
It would be artificial or even wrong to subsume all our mental occurrences under the class of social practices, but they are, admittedly, influenced to a certain degree by our social practices.
- 14.
I regard the good as a basis for norms.
- 15.
“Free” seems to be neither a thin concept like “good” or “right” nor a thick concept like “modest” or “friendly” or “aggressive”, but something between. “Free” entails more information than “good”, implying not only a positive evaluation, but also the absence of constraints, hindrances, obstacles, impediments, or dependencies which lead to a bad condition of will, to a condition it should not be in. However, what we are looking for is not the evaluative meaning of the word “free” in “free will”, which might be analysed conceptually as “without (certain) obstacles” or “without (certain) dependencies”, but rather the different shapes of will which could or should be regarded as without (certain) obstacles and dependencies and, therefore, as free or good.
- 16.
As will become clear in the following, my criterion for a distinction between mere desire and will is the capacity for self-consciousness, which may be connected with the acquisition of a language.
- 17.
“was sich zu wünschen lohnt”, Bieri (2001), 416.
- 18.
Jackson (1998), 45.
- 19.
Frankfurt (2006), 15. There seems to be a shift from the claim of something being the will we legitimately require or reasonably hope for to the claim of something being the freedom (of will) we legitimately require or reasonably hope for. But actually both claims amount to the same evaluative or normative problem.
- 20.
The experience of lacking alternative possibilities of willing – volitional necessity, according to Harry Frankfurt – may, for instance, be valuable in contexts of care and love, but not in all contexts, whereas, the other way round, the experience of having alternative possibilities of willing may be a sort of experience important for some kinds of willing (coffee or tea), but not for others; as forms of experience of indifference or of too many options, it may even be a bad condition for will.
- 21.
Compare Baumann (manuscript).
- 22.
Besides that, important information should not be missing.
- 23.
The term “objective” is used for values or norms which do not entail positive mental states, like pleasure or approval, as well as for values or norms which are independent of the factual or counterfactual evaluations or other mental states of the concerned persons. Richardson (2001).
- 24.
Kant, KrV AA B, 31; in a similar way, Hegel determines negative freedom of will as the absolute possibility of being able to abstract from each determinatiion in which he finds himself or has put himself (“absolute Möglichkeit, von jeder Bestimmung, in der Ich mich finde oder die Ich in mich gesetzt habe, abstrahieren zu können”), GPhR 50.
- 25.
It is the transition from the first dynamis to the second dynamis or first entelechia, in the sense Aristotle used these distinctions in De Anima II 1, 412a27; 412b.
- 26.
In legal contexts, the age beginning from which we count people as accountable is fixed for pragmatic reasons.
- 27.
Frankfurt (2006), Lecture One.
- 28.
Frankfurt (2006), 8.
- 29.
- 30.
If it is, as Frankfurt claims, a “default condition” that we do not feel alienated with regard to our will, it can be disputed, as between Plato and Aristotle, whether this is an indifferent or pleasant state. While our evaluation consists in the belief that the will a person experiences as her own is insofar in a good condition, the evaluative experience of the willing person entails a motivational attitude – either to continue or to change willing.
- 31.
Frankfurt (1988), 159–177.
- 32.
Frankfurt (1999), 129–141.
- 33.
Bieri (2001), 381–416.
- 34.
It is not only, but explicitly, in situations in which we are not inclined towards certain alternatives of willing because of our indifference towards them, that we experience and believe that we could decide to go to cinema or to take a walk or to meet friends. Whether such an experience of alternate possibilities of willing is evaluated positively or indifferently is situation-dependent. If these were the only experiences of our will, we would indeed lead a sad and deficient life.
- 35.
Frankfurt (1999), 129–141; 155–180.
- 36.
- 37.
Or, as in the case of necessary will, as lacking capacities.
- 38.
Oshana (1998).
- 39.
- 40.
A short history of the concept of responsibility can be found in Bayertz (1995), 3–71.
- 41.
Bayertz (1995), 10f.
- 42.
This does not exclude the libertarian assumption that the will is a sort of causa sui.
- 43.
Kant distinguishes, though not consistently, between ascription (bloße Zuschreibung), which refers to the causal origin, and imputation (Zurechnung), which refers to practical laws. 1990, 66.
- 44.
Historically, the subjects of responsibility were constrained, the areas of responsibility extended.
- 45.
A famous example is Plato, Nomoi IX, 873e–874a; Evans (1906). It is difficult to ascertain whether Kelsen was right with his assumption that our concept of causality is the result of a transfer of the principles of guilt and retribution onto nature (Kelsen 1941, 279–281), whether the implicit attribution of accountability and responsibility to entities we regard as animate or to animals only had the weak sense of treating them as causal origins of bad consequences, and whether, as Nietzsche thought (1878, 62f, 102, 105), it was only in the course of history that further conditions were added, such as intention, foreseeability, capacity, and opportunity to avoid the deed, subjective conditions which, in turn, were later ignored in cases of absolute liability.
- 46.
- 47.
Rheinwald (2003), 175–198.
- 48.
Actually, we do not require practical deliberation in each situation because humans have acquired habits as comprised consequences of past deliberations; what we require is that a person be willing, as if she had deliberated adequately.
- 49.
That a person was not aware of her capacities and opportunities because she was tired, afraid, or drunken or that her will was weak for a moment may be accepted as an excuse in private life, but not before court, though this might lead to a lesser penalty and be regarded as attenuating circumstances. For Kant, the degrees of imputation are dependent on the degree of freedom and lack of obstacles, Kant (1990), 71.
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Merker, B. (2013). Freedom and Normativity – Varieties of Free Will. In: Kühler, M., Jelinek, N. (eds) Autonomy and the Self. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 118. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4789-0_2
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