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Autonomy and the Self pp 3–22Cite as

Freedom Without Choice?

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Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies Series ((PSSP,volume 118))

Abstract

The paper addresses a fundamental issue in clarifying the concept of autonomy, namely its relation to the concept of freedom, and argues for an analysis within a libertarian framework. Starting with a brief clarification of the concept of freedom in general, based mainly on the idea of being unhindered, this general idea is explored further by discussing two main dimensions: 1) freedom as openness to alternatives (possibility criterion) and 2) freedom in the sense of an available option being “natural” or “essential” to the agent in question (criterion of naturalness). In subsequently discussing the title-giving question directly, it is asked whether invoking only the second dimension while disregarding the first—generally done by compatibilists—can provide us with plausible cases of freedom without choice. In analyzing various relevant cases of personal freedom, covering freedom of action as well as freedom of will, the answer is then mostly negative. Apart from cases like theoretical rationality or language, all cases of personal freedom mattering most for personal autonomy rely on the first criterion as well, i.e. the agent has to be able to choose between different alternatives. Only then can we understand ourselves as free and autonomous persons.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    A. Huxley (1936), 123.

  2. 2.

    F.M. Dostoevski The brothers Karamazov, bk. V, ch. 5.

  3. 3.

    E. Fromm (1941), chs. 5–6.

  4. 4.

    G. Seebaß (1993, 1997, 2006, 2007).

  5. 5.

    See Hobbes, Th. (1966), vol. III, 196; vol. IV, 273f., 275f.; vol. V, 367f., and A. Schopenhauer (1977), 43f.

  6. 6.

    Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, bk. III, 1–2; compare in addition G. Seebaß (2007), 124–126, 213–216.

  7. 7.

    See in particular Origen, De principiis, bk. II, 9; H.S. Benjamins (1994), 113ff., 138ff.; L. de Molina (1988), 24ff., 168ff.; L.T. Zagzebski (1991), ch. 5; R. Gaskin (1993), and H. Frankfurt (1988), ch. 1.

  8. 8.

    D. Widerker (2006).

  9. 9.

    For a succinct critique of the Origen-Molina-Frankfurt argument, see G. Seebaß (2006), 217, 364. Widerker’s argument is more sophisticated in some respects. But both of his new scenarios (“Z-Persons” and “Brain-Malfunction-W”, cf. 169ff.) depend on tacit premises which will lead, spelled out completely, straight into the dilemma either to deny that the person in question is free or to acknowledge the existence of open alternatives, contrary to what was intended.

  10. 10.

    For an early example of this general line of thought, compare C.W. Snell (1789), 56–58. More detailed and philosophically influential are the arguments given by M. Planck (1965), 139–168, 301–317, 334–349, 350–362, and D.M. MacKay (1967).

  11. 11.

    J. Locke, An essay concerning human understanding, bk. II, ch. 21, § 10.

  12. 12.

    See A. Augustinus,De libero arbitrio, bk. III: 2,14  −  4,41, and De civitate Dei, bk. V, 9–10. Many of the contemporary “compatibilists” in philosophy believe, erroneously, that the conditional analysis was invented in 1912 by G.E. Moore (cf. 1965, ch. VI). In fact, however, there are many predecessors in theology and philosophy as well (cf. G. Seebaß 1997, 240; 2006, 175f., 221, 245f., 364–366).

  13. 13.

    For an extended argument to this effect and a detailed critique of the conditional analysis, see G. Seebaß (2006), ch. 7.

  14. 14.

    For a critique of Augustine’s formal argument to the effect that volition is free ipso facto, see W. Rowe (1964), and G. Seebaß (1997), 239ff. For a detailed critique of the idea of saving volitional freedom by relying on the mere fact of extended, sophisticated deliberation and reflection, see G. Seebaß (2006), 223–238.

  15. 15.

    J.-J. Rousseau (1977), 67, cf. also (1990), 236–241.

  16. 16.

    For an analysis of various relevant factors involved in processes of this kind, see, e.g., M. Bratman (1987) and N. Roughley (2008), chs. 8–9.

  17. 17.

    G.W. Hegel (1976), 52–57 (§§ 6–7).

  18. 18.

    See, e.g. H. Frankfurt (1999), B. Williams (1995), and G. Watson (2004), 88–122. Despite all such respectable claims and arguments, I am still unconvinced by these and highly skeptical about the existence of strict “volitional necessities” (see Sect. 7 below, and, for a critique of Frankfurt’s theses, E. Tugendhat (1992), 464ff., and G. Seebaß (2006), 118, 126f., 322f., 325).

  19. 19.

    Most famous perhaps by W. Shakespeare, Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, act III, scene 1, and F. Schiller, Wallensteins Tod, act III, scene 4.

  20. 20.

    Compare for this possibility, e.g., G.C. McCallum (1967), 331f., and I. Berlin (1978).

  21. 21.

    See J. Locke, loc. cit., bk. II, ch. 21, § 23, and J.-P. Sartre (1962), 587, 699; (1986), 28–30.

  22. 22.

    Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, bk. III, 2: 1110b25  −  1111a1.

  23. 23.

    See, e.g., I. Kant (1902)  ff., Bd. V, 30, A. Schopenhauer (1977), 82f., and for a critique of relevant recent positions, G. Watson (2004), 93ff.

  24. 24.

    Apart from a few exceptions (most prominent Thomas Hobbes), philosophers have not confined themselves to biological life but have included basic needs. The question of which needs are “basic” has also been answered differently and often in a very generous way. Some authors are willing to include, e.g., even the needs of addicts (see G. Watson 2004, 84ff., and J. Schälike 2010, 89f.).

  25. 25.

    Contempt of biological limitations is exemplified by the old human dream of flying as well as by the old myths of Cockaigne or the Fountain of Youth. Indignant unwillingness to surrender to the constraints of basic needs (sleep, supply of food and water, etc.) is a common reaction of men absorbed in their strife for an exceptional goal (of sports, arts, science, etc.) and can be observed even in younger children. Moreover, Kant went so far as to claim that every man, as a rational being, must want to be freed of any natural inclinations and needs whatsoever (I. Kant 1902  ff., Bd. IV, 428, 454f.; Bd. V, 86f.).

  26. 26.

    The most blatant recent example is suicide terrorism, of course. But there have always been multifarious instances of fanaticism (or heroism, if you prefer) showing that men are quite willing to sacrifice their own lives for their country, families and closest friends as well as for their most intimate personal ideas, e.g., scientific, artistic, religious ideas, or various others.

  27. 27.

    This general conclusion is plausible enough, I hope, although this cannot be argued in detail here. For a further argument in support my claim, cf. Sect. 8, note 34, below.

  28. 28.

    Aristotle, Politica, bk. I, 2; Ethica Nicomachea, 1097b11.

  29. 29.

    Cf. note 18 above and for some relevant recent references to Luther’s dictum G. Watson (2004), 100ff.

  30. 30.

    Note that the very talk of a “cogent” argument seems to convey a sense of overwhelming “rational compulsion” which a free man possibly might deny.

  31. 31.

    At least this is claimed for evidence not entirely “clear and distinct” (see R. Descartes 1999, vol. I, 204, 205f., 207; vol. II, 39ff., 45, 48; vol. III, 244–246, and for a critical discussion A. Kenny (1972)).

  32. 32.

    For a detailed analysis of intentions and intentional action relevant to these points, see N. Roughley (2008), pt. II, and, for a relevant account of akrasia, G. Seebaß (2005).

  33. 33.

    Of course, the impossibility to attend concerts and TV programs at the same time is not normally thought to be “unnatural” and detrimental to human freedom. Here my discontented personal reaction to an unhappy temporary coincidence would seem to be immoderate or grossly exaggerated. Still, there are other cases where such reactions are justified. To take an extreme case, think of a really cruel dilemma which might be created by relentless nature as well as by criminal human intent, e.g., the dilemma to sacrifice either your own life or the life of your beloved child or spouse.

  34. 34.

    I have argued for these claims in detail in G. Seebaß (2006), ch. 9.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany

    Gottfried Seebaß

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  1. Centre for Advanced Study in Bioethics, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität, Geiststraße 24-26, Münster, 48151, Germany

    Michael Kühler

  2. Philosophische Fak., Fachgruppe Philosophie, Universität Konstanz, Universitätsstr. 10, Konstanz, 78464, Germany

    Nadja Jelinek

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Seebaß, G. (2013). Freedom Without Choice?. In: Kühler, M., Jelinek, N. (eds) Autonomy and the Self. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 118. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4789-0_1

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