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Conservation of Natural Resources: Which Matters – Having a Regulation or the Size of the Penalty Imposed?

  • Maria Claudia LopezEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Human-Environment Interactions book series (HUEN, volume 1)

Abstract

In this chapter, I investigate through a public good in rural Colombia how different institutional arrangements, particularly different external regulations, with a common characteristic—an external regulator with a weak enforcement capacity—derive into different contributions and compliances. I tested two monetary regulations and found that high penalties very often do more harm than good. I also found that low penalties and public and private reminders were very effective at increasing cooperation and rule compliance.

Keywords

Institutional Arrangement Regulation Treatment Group Project External Regulation Social Optimum 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Facultad de Estudios Ambientales y RuralesPontificia Universidad JaverianaBogotáColombia

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