Abstract
This chapter considers the relationship between the concepts and conceptions of law and the rule of law. It begins by arguing that the ideal embedded in the concept of the rule of law cannot be logically derived from merely combining the content of the concept rule with the content of the concept law. The rule of law has content that transcends both the atomic concepts of rule and law of which the more complex concept is constructed, as well as the formal assertion that law rules, regardless of its relationship to certain principles, including both negative and positive liberties. In that sense, it reconsiders the relationship not only between the rule of law and concept of freedom by recalling the distinction between two concepts of liberty but also between the rule of law and constitutional democracy. Finally, it concludes by suggesting that the tendency to reduce the democratic principle to the majority rule (or majority principle), i.e. to whatever pleases the majority, as part of the positive liberty, is contrary both to the negative liberty and to the rule of law itself.
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- 1.
Vid. v.gr. MacCormick (2007, 2): “Law taken in this sense [i.e. as an institutional normative order] is obviously a central important feature of states as such and, in particular, of constitutionalist states or ‘law-states’.”
- 2.
Vid. v.gr. MacCormick (2007, 3): “This [i.e. the distinction between politics and public Law] has much to do with sustaining the character of a state as a law-state. (‘Law-state’ is here used to refer to a state-under-law, or a constitutionalist state, in which the exercise of power is subjected to effective constitutional constraints and the rule of law obtains, it is equivalent to the German term ‘Rechtsstaat’.)”
- 3.
Since we consider that RoL is equivalent to SoL, as we will insist in the following part, hereinafter we will refer explicitly to RoL, but mutatis mutando it applies implicitly to SoL.
- 4.
At the end of the day it seems to be a false dilemma: we must be governed both by the best laws (reason) and by the best human beings (passion). It is in the case of an actual or eventual conflict between them that the laws and reasons ought to prevail over human beings and passion.
- 5.
It is worth pointing out that we agree with Atienza that the (good) legislator must begin by using clear and precise language to avoid problems related to ambiguities and vagueness (R1) and must carry on by inquiring about the coherency and completeness of the legal system to avoid contradictions and gaps (R2). However, we are at variance with him in the order of the pragmatic and teleological rationalities, and hence, have inverted their places. Our explanation is simple: the legislator must continue by drafting at least one end (R3) into law, but it may be the case of establishing more than two ends – or sets of interests, purposes or values – (R4) and not the other way around. Finally, the legislator must guarantee an overall justified principle embedded into the law or at least not violated by it (R5).
By the same token, the (good) adjudicator must begin by asking about the clarity and precision of the language used (R1); and, only when the language is neither clear nor precise, must carry on by inquiring about the coherency and completeness of the legal system (R2). Analogously, only when the language and legal system appear to be incoherent or incomplete, the adjudicator must go on to request an end (R3), as in the case when there are more than two ends – or sets of interests, purposes or values – equally available, by appealing to the better one (R4). Finally, only when their consequences and effects are illegitimate, the adjudicator must strive to secure an overall legitimate principle (R5).
- 6.
Although this adage and its twin Fiat iusticia, ruat cælum (“Let justice be done, even if heavens falls”) have analogous meanings along the lines of “justice must be done at any price or regardless of consequences.” Nowadays, the former – popularized by the Emperor Ferdinand I – is used to criticize a legal opinion or practice that wants to preserve maxims in law at any price despite absurd or contradictory consequences, whereas the latter – recognized by William Murray, Lord Mansfield – is used to eulogize the realization of justice despite appearing to be outweighed by a pragmatic or utilitarian consideration: “The constitution does not allow reasons of state to influence our judgments: God forbid it should! We must not regard political consequences; however formidable soever they might be: if rebellion was the certain consequence, we are bound to say ‘fiat iustitia, ruat cælum’ (Let justice be done even if the heaven falls).” (Mansfield 1770, 2561–2.)
- 7.
In fact, the existence of the Senate was designed to divide the most dangerous branch of government and to give stability to the government by protecting the minorities against a speedy and unreflected legislative majority in the House of Representatives.
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Flores, I.B. (2013). Law, Liberty and the Rule of Law (in a Constitutional Democracy). In: Flores, I., Himma, K. (eds) Law, Liberty, and the Rule of Law. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 18. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4743-2_6
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